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Abstract
If conflict onset leads to increases in human rights abuse, how can these abuses be curbed
once conflicts have ended? To answer this question, researchers have traditionally focused on a
country’s regime type and leaders’ incentive structures. This is insufficient, I argue, because many
regimes with obvious incentives to curb repression (especially democracies) fail to do so. In addition
to regime-type, therefore, the answer depends on whether a given regime can count on the
cooperation of its military and law enforcement institutions, which I refer to collectively as the
security apparatus. This is because security agents’ prior experiences usually create strong proclivities
for violence, and these proclivities must be actively counteracted before agents adopt restraint
instead. While some regime leaders have sufficient authority and power over the security apparatus to
compel this restraint, many do not. Security apparatuses that emerge from conflict episodes with the
autonomy to defy regime leaders’ preferences will tend to protect agents from oversight and
accountability mechanisms, perpetuating extrajudicial executions and other forms of severe abuse. I
support this argument using cross-national statistical analyses in addition to an in-depth case study
entailing five weeks of field research in Kathmandu, Nepal.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Then will the violent centuries, battles set aside,
Grow gentle, kind. Vesta and silver-haired Good Faith
and Romulus flanked by brother Remus will make the laws.
The terrible Gates of War with their welded iron bars
Will stand bolted shut, and locked inside, the Frenzy
Of civil strife will crouch down on his savage weapons,
hands pinioned behind his back with a hundred brazen shackles,
monstrously roaring out from his bloody jaws (Virgil 2006, 57).

Questions
This chapter opened with a passage from Virgil’s Aeneid, a section of prose designed to
reassure Roman contemporaries that years of violence had come to an end — that Augustus, Rome’s
first emperor and Virgil’s patron, had literally shut the door on civil strife. Many rulers have issued
similar promises in similar situations, aspiring to steer their countries out of conflict into peace. The
2006 comprehensive peace agreement that ended ten years of armed conflict and civil resistance in
Nepal provides an apt example. Espousing a collective commitment for multiparty politics and
human rights, its signatories pledged to, “Transform the ceasefire between the Nepal Government
and the CPN (Maoist) into long-term peace” (UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs,
1). Two years later, Nepal held its first free and fair elections since 1991. Perhaps even more
impressively, Nepal went on to consolidate its new democracy — all major political factions,
including the Maoist guerillas who initiated the civil war, have respected the outcomes of subsequent
elections, and participated vigorously (and in good faith) in parliamentary politics. And yet, Nepal has
struggled to end severe human rights abuse, especially extrajudicial executions perpetrated by police.
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Local human rights monitors have documented dozens of such killings since the end of the conflict,
2015 being an especially violent year in which at least 47 civilians were killed (Amnesty International
2016). In other words, despite its progress towards democratization, Nepal never fully shackled Furor
Impius, Virgil’s howling avatar of civil strife.
Unfortunately, Nepal is not the only country where human rights abuse has persisted in the
wake of democratization. In the Philippines, for instance, a massive wave of civil resistance now
dubbed the first People Power Movement managed to oust the Marcos dictatorship and install
Corazon Aquino as president of a new democratic government. Despite Corazon’s history as a prorights campaigner, police, military, and pro-government militias continued to perpetrate many
atrocities during her tenure and afterward.
Observations from Nepal and the Philippines present us with a thorny question: Why does
human rights abuse persist despite democratization? And more broadly, why does abuse persist after
conflicts have ended and national crises have passed? Clearly, an authoritarian or conflict-ridden past
does not doom a country to perpetual human rights abuse. Timor-Leste, for instance, democratized
after an exceptionally devastating war for independence that produced more than 100,000 deaths,
most of whom were civilians (Taylor 1999, 70-71). Yet, in the aftermath of that calamity, abuses
became extremely rare. This dissertation sets out to explore this variation, explaining why some
countries go on to curb severe abuse after episodes of contentious politics while many do not.
The question, as I have formulated it, focuses narrowly on post-conflict contexts for several
reasons. Principally, existing research has robustly confirmed that regimes respond to challengers by
increasing repression, leading to more human rights abuse and greater suffering (Davenport 2007;
Conrad and Moore 2010; Hill and Jones 2014). Meaning, in normative terms, conflict-related abuse is
one of the most important problems to solve, and therefore an important problem to understand.
While human rights scholars have recently begun to study variation in abuse during conflict (e.g.,
2

DeMeritt 2015; Cohen 2016; Stanton 2016; Green 2018), very few1 have carried this research forward
to the post-conflict context, a lacuna that requires redress.
Aside from normative motivations, post-conflict contexts are analytically different from
periods before and during conflict, warranting attention as unique sets of cases. They follow
extended periods of violence and anti-regime mobilization, from which new institutions designed
specifically for repression typically emerge (see, for instance, Greitens 2016). Yet, these cases also
present regime leaders, security forces, and everyday citizens with opportunities to break with the
past, either because danger and insecurity have abated or because the conflict produced new leaders
with new preferences and outlooks. By studying these periods as a separate category, I set myself
apart from most quantitative researchers who rely on binary variables to delimit conflict-years from
all others, grouping pre-conflict and post-conflict years together (see, out of countless examples,
Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Conrad and Moore 2010; Hill and Jones 2014).
I use ‘post-conflict’ to refer to time periods following the termination of contentious politics,
the term McAdam et al. (2001) use to refer to public and competitive claim-making by groups. More
specifically, I am interested in maximalist and mature episodes of contention, instances in which a
non-state group challenged an incumbent regime’s sovereignty. In addition, the non-state group must
have mobilized and coordinated a relatively large number of participants over an extended period.2
These types of groups can either arm themselves or remain nonviolent — both methods can pose
existential threats to regime leaders, who typically respond by directing their security personnel to

1

For one exception in the context of armed conflict and peacekeeping, see Murdie and Davis (2010).
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Here, I follow Chenoweth and Stephans (2011).
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repress challengers. These episodes eventually end in one of two ways: Challengers manage to oust
the incumbent regime3 or, alternatively, they succumb to repression and cease resistance efforts.
After contentious politics have terminated, repression can persist, as in the case of the
Philippines, or it can attenuate, as happened in Timor-Leste. Though regimes use a variety of tactics
to suppress resistance and control populations, 4 I focus on lethal violence perpetrated by agents of
the state against unarmed civilians (as well as disarmed combatants). This behavior, which I
sometimes refer to as ‘severe human rights abuse’ or ‘severe repression,’ produces killings,
extrajudicial executions, and disappearances, each of which constitutes a ‘political killing’ in the
parlance of Coppedge et al. (2019). Though other forms of repression and human rights abuse
(including torture) warrant attention, I focus on lethal violence because it is particularly egregious.
When state agents refrain from perpetrating political killings, they practice (or are forced to
practice) restraint.5 Whether state security forces practice restraint in the aftermath of contentious
politics, therefore, is the outcome of interest. Using a combination of the Varieties of Democracy’s
(V-Dem) interval-scale Freedom from Political Killings (FFPK) variable and the Nonviolent and
Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.1 data, it is possible to map variation in restraint after
the termination of resistance campaigns, as illustrated by Figure 1.1. These data provide some
grounds for optimism, showing that FFPK generally improves after conflict termination. However,
many countries clearly continue to languish far below a score of 0, the pooled global average.

A regime is best understood as the core group of people who collectively decide who leads a country (Geddes
et al. 2018).
3

4

For further reading, see Earl’s (2011) review of regime’s tactics and strategies of social control.
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A term similarly employed by Stanton (2016).
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Argument
In post-conflict contexts, I argue, security forces are most likely to adopt restraint when
regime leaders have the power to compel their cooperation. Importantly, this argument stands on
three presuppositions, each of which are derived from existing research on human rights abuse. First,
regime leaders typically prefer to curb severe human rights abuse after contentious politics. Though
this claim is intuitive in the case of democratic regimes, autocrats also have incentives to avoid
political killings across many contexts (to be discussed at length in Chapter 2). Second, once security
forces incorporate severe human rights abuse into their repertoires, as tends to happen during
contentious politics, they become unwilling to give them up. Third, regime leaders’ power over
security agents varies from case to case, and it is never absolute — when leaders’ and agents’

5

preferences diverge, the latter will ignore or contravene orders from the former to the extent they
can do so without repercussions.
When regime leaders have the capacity to compel cooperation, it is usually because they can
inflict costs on the high-ranking commanders who lead a country’s police and military personnel. In
practical terms, this means that regime leaders control commanders’ careers, determining whom to
promote, pass over, and dismiss. When this is the case, commanders must manage their followers in
accordance with regime leaders’ wishes, forcing rank-and-file police officers and soldiers to adopt
restraint in the wake of contentious politics. But regime leaders do not always have control over
senior commanders, often because they lack the means to punish disobedience or because
commanders can inflict even greater costs on regime leaders. Regimes and security commanders each
cultivate multiple kinds of power (material, political, social, etc…) from different sources,6 and the
resulting balance of power between them will vary from case to case. When the balance strongly
favors security forces, they become ‘autonomous’ from civilian control and commanders become
unlikely to restrain followers from using violence.
My argument breaks with conventional literature on human rights abuse, which treats states
as unitary actors, permitting no conceptual daylight between regime leaders’ decisions and their
security forces’ behavior. These conventional arguments use democratic institutions (Armstrong and
Davenport 2004; Davenport 2007), political economies (Ross 2012; DeMeritt and Young 2013),
leader ideologies (Mitchell 2004), civil society mobilization (North et al. 2009), and rational strategic
logic (Pierskalla 2010; Stanton 2016), among other mechanisms, to explain regimes’ decisions to
deploy repression, interpreting any observed human rights abuse as the product of rationally (and
cynically) constructed policies. I join a growing body of scholars who see this view as problematic,

My view of regime-security relations is more complex than the conventional Huntingtonian (1957) view of
civil-military relations, which focuses on whether regime leaders have a monopoly on political power.
6
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overlooking important differences between leaders’ and agents’ preferences, as well as the difficulty
leaders face in monitoring and disciplining their followers (see, for example, Englehart 2009;
DeMeritt 2015; Hendrix and Salehyan 2017; Scharpf 2018). Human rights abuse, therefore, is not
always the product of top-down decision-making. Just as easily, it can be the product of agents’
proclivities for violence and leaders’ inability to curb those proclivities. This is especially likely after
episodes of contentious politics, once a significant threat to the regime has dissipated (or brought a
new regime to power) but after security agents have learned to rely on extreme abuse.
To reiterate, my argument depends on the assumption that security forces who have used
severe repression will not usually give it up voluntarily, even when regime leaders prefer that they use
restraint. I draw from existing literature to validate this assumption, presenting three separate but
compatible mechanisms. The most straightforward of these is that killings and disappearances can be
profitable. During Argentina’s Dirty War, for instance, paramilitary groups, police officers, and
soldiers pillaged civilians on a nearly industrial scale, stripping victims (often without any
provocation) of land, cash, valuables, and even children (Lewis 2008; Goldman 2012).7 Why should
agents accustomed to the benefits of these practices give them up after conflict? Frequently, they do
not. This is a pressing concern for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) specialists,
who observe many ex-combatants turn to criminality (Kaplan and Nussio 2018) or return to combat
as mercenaries. In West Africa, for instance, Charles Taylor recruited many demobilized RUF
fighters from Sierra Leone to fight for him in Liberia. These ex-combatants had no attachment to
Taylor’s cause, but agreed to take up arms again upon receiving cash down payments and promises
of future loot (Themnér 2011, 101). The same incentives that draw demobilized fighters back to

In some cases, leaders use the promise of loot to recruit their followers, drawing followers already disposed to
pillaging (Collier 1999; Weinstein 2006; Lidow 2016).
7
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violence must also influence security agents who remain (or become) employed within government
security institutions. The end of contentious politics will not necessarily change these incentives.
Aside from incentives to do well out of repression, security agents may continue to use
violence because they have been socialized to do so. Building a tolerance for violence is, in fact, one
of the most important goals of military training — most recruits have deep psychological inhibitions
against violence (Collins 2009) that must be broken down before they become useful (in combat) to
commanders. It is impossible to break down these inhibitions, however, without creating a persistent
and general disposition towards violence, which commanders frequently fail to control. Speaking of
this danger to researcher Amelia Hoover Green, a former rebel commander from El Salvador
reflected, “You know, you can train them and train them [about respect for civilians], but you never
know what will happen when they finally get the gun” (2018, 25). This disposition to violence can
become even stronger once agents experience actual combat8 or deliberately harm civilians. Speaking
of the men conscripted into the Nazis’ Reserve Police Battalion 101 to carry out genocide in
occupied Poland, Valentino (2013) observes9 that, “The majority were initially repelled by what they
were ordered to do. Yet most became inured to the blood and violence, and some even came to
relish it” (56). In fact, one of Valentino’s (2013) central findings10 is that sincere ideological
convictions are not necessary to explain mass killings, only social pressure. Once inculcated, these
proclivities are unlikely to dissipate once contentious politics have ended and may continue posing a
danger to civilians.

Cesur and Sabia (2016), for instance, find that combat deployments render US military personnel more likely
to perpetrate domestic violence at home.
8

9

Valentino relies heavily on historical research by Browning (1998) and Goldhagen (1996).

Findings consistent with the Milgram obedience experiments (Milgram 1963) and Zimbardo prison
experiment (Haney et al. 1973).
10
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Of course, there are times when shared ideology and belief systems facilitate or accelerate
violence. This leads to the third mechanism: When security agents view violence as necessary to
protect or promote their preferred political order, they are more likely to violate human rights in its
defense. Knowing this and worrying that many Bolshevik cadres might balk at mass killings, Lenin
deliberately recruited “hard men” to carry out the worst atrocities of the Red Terror (Pipes 1996, 50).
Some of these men were simply drawn to violence, but many were true believers in Bolshevism, and
willing to perpetrate nearly any atrocity for the cause (Leggett 1981; Mitchell 2004). Such extreme
devotion to an ideology is not necessary to produce violence, however. Agents must merely believe
that violence is necessary to separate loyal or ‘improvable’ citizens (Buur et al. 2007) from dissidents
— that it is their job to protect the former (and the state) from the latter. This belief is especially
likely to take root in agents who have participated in counterinsurgency, a role that entails defeating
insurgents by sorting them (with varying levels of precision) from the civilians they attempt to blend
in with. After contentious politics have ended, agents are often reluctant to abandon old practices,
even upon democratization. After the fall of South African Apartheid, for example, even police
officers who supported integration and the new Bill of Rights struggled to adapt to new standards.
Speaking of these reforms in 1999, one inspector confided to researcher Steffen Jensen, “Of course it
is right what is happening. We don’t want the old-style policing anymore, but it is very difﬁcult to
accept sometimes, especially for the ordinary members” (2009, 65). Another inspector explained to
Jensen, who had just witnessed an incident of police brutality, “Believe me, I hate myself for having
to act in that violent manner, but if you don’t, you will not be able to do the job” (68).
In sum, conflict primes security agents for violence, either by introducing them to pillaging
behavior, normalizing violence, or helping them to justify violence when deployed in defense of the
political order. To counteract this priming and establish restraint, civilian leaders will need the
cooperation of security commanders. This cooperation is likely to be forthcoming only when
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commanders, who likely share the same views as their subordinates for the same reasons, depend on
regime leaders for advancement and wellbeing.

Methods
One of this dissertation’s most important contributions is its theoretical argument,
presenting security forces’ autonomy from civilian control as a key determinant of severe human
rights abuse in the aftermath of contentious politics. I develop this theory, in part, by treading an
inductive path, comparing the Argentinian experience reestablishing democracy (1983) with that of
the Philippines (1986). These cases, presented in Chapter 2, do not permit a Millian isolation of
necessary and sufficient conditions, but they illustrate important dynamics at work between the
leaders of two fledgling democracies and their security commanders. These are theory building cases,
in other words, and their selection is not intended to control for all the factors that might plausibly
influence repression outcomes (Lijphart 1971; George and Bennett 2005). They are valuable in that
they show us, in the Philippines, how far off course autonomous security commanders can push a
president’s efforts to establish respect for human rights. By the same token, the Argentinian case
shows us how far a president with broad popular support can go to defang a weakened military and
protect civilians from abuse.
In Chapter 2, I also assess alternative explanations for human rights abuse, especially
democratic institutions, international support, and the threat environment which confronted the
Argentinian and Philippine regimes. My goal is not to overthrow these established explanations, each
of which can play an important role across many cases. Rather, my goal is to show that security
forces’ autonomy contributes meaningfully to the big picture, powerfully augmenting existing
explanations. Consider, for instance, the role of democratic institutions which were implemented in
both Argentina and the Philippines in the form of regularized free and fair elections. Presumably,
10

elections created audience costs in both countries, incentivizing leaders to end severe human rights
abuse (Davenport 2007). Setting aside her sincere commitment to human rights, this pressure may
have exerted an important influence on President Aquino in the Philippines. Ultimately, however, it
made little difference to the powerful security commanders who would flout Aquino’s attempts to set
security policy.
In Chapter 3, I move on from theory building to theory testing. To do so, I leverage new
cross-national data sources to search for a statistical association between security forces’ autonomy
and the prevalence of political killings. While the NAVCO 2.1 dataset (Chenoweth and Shay 2021)
provides my sample of mature, maximalist conflict terminations (1945-2013), I rely on the Varieties
of Democracy project (Coppedge et al. 2019) for operationalizations of both the independent
variable of interest, security forces’ autonomy, and the outcome variable, or the prevalence of
political killings. With the help of a diverse array of statistical techniques, especially survival analysis, I
find evidence to support my argument.
The shortcomings of quantitative methods are well documented. In Chapter 4, therefore, I
take on Nepal’s 1996-2006 civil war and its subsequent democratization as a final case study. Though
I chose Nepal for several reasons, it is, most importantly, well-predicted by my statistical models and
therefore an ‘on the line’ case. On the line cases provide researchers with valuable opportunities to
test, within the confines of a single case, whether a theoretical mechanism that is supported by largen data functions as predicted, as opposed to some alternative factor that might be difficult to
measure or model (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Additionally, Nepal exhibits sub-national variation
in both the independent and dependent variables, facilitating two closely controlled comparisons
(Slater and Ziblatt 2013). Ultimately, this variation helps to corroborate a central theme of my
argument, that security agents’ proclivities for violence can be curbed when their commanders are
beholden to democratically elected leaders. At the same time, this variation shows that commanders’
11

control over rank-and-file police officers is not always strong, especially in regions of insecurity.
Under these conditions, regime leaders’ control over security commanders will not necessarily
translate to better human rights outcomes.
I derive an additional lesson about human rights outcomes from the Nepali Army, which has
gone on to practice great restraint despite demonstrating substantial (if circumscribed) autonomy
from civilian control. Several factors contribute to the Army’s respect for human rights, especially the
importance, for many officers and soldiers, of joining UN peacekeeping missions. Because allegations
of human rights abuse jeopardize these opportunities, restraint is incentivized. Though this finding
does not refute my argument (which is not deterministic), it does show that regime leaders are not
the only actors capable of influencing security forces. In the case of Nepal, for instance, international
human rights norms exert an influence on security forces that regime leaders cannot match.
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Chapter 2: Theorizing Repression and Restraint After Conflict
Introduction
Contentious politics, we know, escalate human rights abuse because regimes (even
democratic regimes) respond to challenges with increased repression (see, for instance, Conrad and
Moore 2010). But when does repression recede in the aftermath of conflict, once regimes have either
defeated their challengers or been ousted and replaced? In this chapter, I develop and present a
theory to explain why human rights abuse is likely to persist or attenuate after conflict termination. I
use the first Philippines People Power Movement (also called the EDSA movement) (1986) and the
transition from military rule to democracy in Argentina after the Dirty War (1983) as theory-building
cases. In the Philippines, the newly elected Aquino regime tried and failed to restrain security forces
from perpetrating further abuses. In Argentina, by contrast, the Alfonsin regime leveraged
widespread anger at the security apparatus to carry out a transitional justice process, deterring
security agents (though just barely) from committing further abuses. A comparison of these cases
shows that the balance of power between democratic regimes and their security forces is critical in
explaining whether human rights abuse persists.
After outlining the argument and demonstrating its plausibility with case studies, I will return
to the core assumptions upon which the argument stands: that regime leaders will tend to prefer to
end or mitigate human rights abuse, that security forces will not, and that principal-agent problems
will usually arise (to some extent) as a result. Drawing from existing literature, I will show why these
assumptions tend to hold across cases. The argument, therefore, is generalizable (though not
deterministic). Further, I will also show that the argument often applies to cases where conflict
13

termination fails to produce democratization. This is because autocratic regimes will often have
incentives to curb repression, and their security forces will also have incentives to balk at any
deviation from the status quo, producing the same dilemma.
I develop my argument to augment, rather than overturn, existing explanations for human
rights abuse. Most importantly, I do not dispute existing claims that democratization disincentivizes
leaders from using repression. However, I show that these disincentives, alone, are not always
enough to curb human rights abuse, especially when democratic leaders lack control over security
forces. I also consider claims about the coercive weight of the past, ongoing threats to the regime,
and support from the international community. Each of these may play a role, but none of these
factors can sufficiently explain human rights outcomes after democratization in Argentina and the
Philippines.

The Argument in Brief
Human rights research has long focused on democracy as the solution to the problem of
state repression. But democratization frequently occurs after conflict episodes without corresponding
improvements in human rights. Democratization, it seems clear, only works some of the time,
suggesting that other factors are at work which cancel out the benefits democratization would
otherwise have provided. In the following paragraphs, I outline an argument which explains this
troubling observation. It does so by breaking with conventional wisdom that focuses narrowly on
regime leaders’ incentives and which assumes leaders direct their security forces to increase or
diminish repression at will. This approach only works, I argue, when the balance of power between
regime leaders and their security commanders favors the former. In reality, this balance of power
tends to vary across cases, and therefore shapes post-conflict human rights outcomes.
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For regime leaders, conflict termination often produces incentives to end human rights
abuse, especially following democratization. But security commanders and their followers are likely to
oppose any policy reforms that would curb abuse. When regime leaders enjoy a high degree of
control over their security commanders, security agents can be coerced into abandoning the (prized)
practices that generate killings and enforced disappearances. When this occurs, security agents
‘restrain’ themselves from perpetrating abuse (Stanton 2016), and killings become rare or disappear
entirely. Otherwise, human rights abuse is unlikely to abate. I base my argument on several
assumptions derived from existing literature: first, democratic leaders prefer to minimize or eliminate
severe repression; second, the people who bear arms on behalf of regime leaders (security agents and
their commanders) derive material benefits from killings and see repression as a legitimate and
indispensable service to society; and third, regime leaders have imperfect control over their security
forces, especially following episodes of contentious politics. I outline these assumptions in turn.
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First, leaders who depend on electoral support are beholden to the preferences of voters.
Voters, for their part, are unlikely to countenance severe forms of repression like extrajudicial
executions and enforced disappearances. It follows that elected leaders should prefer to stop severe
repression to avoid electoral penalties and thereby remain in office. It is not the case that elected
leaders and voters necessarily subscribe to liberal values, though some clearly do — I only assume
that both are rational actors and that leaders value staying in office while voters value restraint on the
part of security forces (in line with Conrad et al. 2018). An important corollary to this first
assumption is that electoral support is not the only factor that incentivizes regime leaders to end or
mitigate severe repression. Later in the chapter, I will discuss why autocratic leaders should also
prefer that security forces adopt restraint in many contexts.
Second, for any of three reasons, most security agents will prefer to continue using
repression regardless of democratization or conflict termination. First, rank-and-file security forces
will often emerge from episodes of contentious politics having been socialized to kill or disappear
dissidents on their own initiative, or on the initiative of junior officers (see, especially, Green 2018).
Simply by repeating these practices, agents (as individuals and groups) incorporate them into their
‘repertoires’ (McAdam et al. 1996) making them feel natural and ordinary. Second, agents often
internalize propaganda that not only justifies the use of violence against suspected dissidents, but
casts it as necessary to the survival of the state (Buur et al. 2007; Holmqvist 2014; Wilcox 2015;
Beresford et al. 2018). Third, repression can be a form of predation, wherein agents kill or disappear
citizens while robbing them or while moonlighting as enforcers for criminal groups (Grossman 1991;
Dube and Vargas 2013). Each of these explanations is compatible — agents might use violence out
of habit, because they see it as a legitimate and necessary service to society, because it provides
material benefits, or any combination thereof.
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Third, regime leaders cannot implement their preferred policies by themselves. They depend
on cooperation from their security agents, who always have some capacity to withhold that
cooperation. Cooperation is automatic when agents’ preferences match regime leaders’ preferences.
Otherwise, security agents will only comply when regime leaders are likely to monitor their individual
contributions (or derelictions) and reward (or punish) them accordingly (see, for instance, Englehart
2009; DeMeritt 2015; Hendrix and Salehyan 2017; Scharpf 2018).
These three assumptions help explain the observation (discussed in the previous chapter)
that some countries make drastic strides towards democratization without proportionate progress
towards protecting human rights. If it is true that leaders in these instances almost certainly prefer to
end severe repression, and if it is true that agents usually prefer not to, then the persistence of
repression after democratization will tend to imply that regime leaders have failed to obtain the
cooperation of security agents. Explaining human rights outcomes, therefore, entails explaining why
some regimes overcome principal-agent problems while others do not.
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In practice, regime leaders depend on high-ranking security commanders to monitor and
discipline agents or, in other words, to set up or cooperate with accountability mechanisms
(especially judiciaries). Unlike most individual members of the security forces, commanders cannot
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conceal the extent of their cooperation. This is because they are responsible for the collective
behavior of their subordinates. Because this is relatively easy to observe, commanders cannot
withhold cooperation without risking retaliation from regime leaders. The credibility of retaliation,
however, varies across cases and depends on the balance of power between regime leaders and
security commanders.
I use the term ‘autonomy’ to describe the extent of security commanders’ power relative to
regime leaders — commanders with a preponderance of power compared to civilian leaders are
highly autonomous, meaning that they are free to withhold cooperation from regime leaders. In the
parlance of the civil-military relations literature, extensive autonomy entails the absence of civilian
control over security forces. When autonomous security forces cooperate with civilians, they do so
‘conditionally’ rather than unconditionally (Huntington 1957). In other words, cooperation under
these circumstances will be the product of bargaining between regime leaders and security forces.
Obviously, not all commanders enjoy extensive autonomy. In the context of conflict
termination and democratization, commanders usually possess near or total monopolies on the use
of armed force, always a potential source of leverage against civilian rulers (leverage which rarely
manifests in events as dramatic as coups d’état). But this leverage can be either blunted or augmented
by a variety of factors. Factionalism within the security forces might, for instance, make it much
harder for commanders to organize resistance against regime leaders. Greater cohesion might make
resistance easier. On the other side of the equation, a regime’s attributes are also important. For
instance, regimes with extensive support from domestic populations or the international community
can counteract pressure from security forces more easily than regimes with less support. Across
cases, regimes and security forces will draw varying amounts of legitimacy and material capabilities
from varying sources, increasing or diminishing their capacities to inflict costs on one another and
rendering security forces more or less autonomous.
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I do not offer a theory explaining the balance of power between regime leaders and security
commanders across cases. Though such a theory would be extremely valuable, it must wait for future
research. For now, my goal is to show that the balance of power does vary across cases of postconflict democratization and that this variation, in turn, helps explain human rights outcomes. This
variation is analytically important to the extent that preferences for restraint are fairly constant across
democratic regimes while preferences for repression are constant across security forces. One of the
most important take-aways from this reasoning is that democratization does not guarantee improved
respect for human rights. Security forces will defy democratic leaders on this point when they are
able — and they are often able.

Theory-building Case Studies
In this section, I compare post-conflict human rights outcomes in the Philippines (1986) and
Argentina (1983). In both instances, activist leaders with sincere commitments to ending human
rights abuse won elections while overthrowing dictatorships and reestablishing democratic rule.
However, these leaders had very different relationships with their security apparatuses. In the
Philippines, President Corazon Aquino depended on General Fidel Ramos and the Philippines
Constabulary to defend her administration from other factions of the security apparatus. In exchange
for defending Aquino from multiple coup attempts, Ramos extracted several concessions that
pleased the entire security apparatus, including the freedom to wage a bloody counterinsurgency
independent of civilian oversight. In Argentina, on the other hand, President Raul Alfonsin and his
allies came to power after ousting a badly discredited security apparatus. Argentinian security forces,
like their Philippine counterparts, clearly preferred a freehand in rooting out and severely repressing
suspected dissidents. But where Aquino had been forced to tolerate continued repression,
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extrajudicial killings and disappearances virtually ended under the Alfonsin regime. A comparison of
these cases illustrates the causal logic of my argument.
These particular cases help to address alternative explanations of human rights abuse, such
as democratization, international intervention, and threat environment. Argentina and the Philippines
resemble one another in that they democratized and received substantial international support short
of peacekeeping missions. Additionally, they emerged from similar threat environments, and were
confronted with armed leftist insurrections that persisted following their transitions to democracy.
Despite these similarities, Argentina’s security forces went on to treat civilians with restraint while
their counterparts in the Philippines did not. This suggests that none of these factors can fully
account for the observed outcomes. I elaborate on these factors in the following paragraphs.

Democracy
As previously mentioned, state repression and human rights scholars have paid special
attention to democratic institutions as a remedy for human rights abuse (Davenport and Armstrong
2004; Davenport 2007; Hill and Jones 2014). At the point where elections become free and fair,
leaders must pay steep audience costs when they resort to violent repression, deterring them from
doing so.
It seems clear that democratization is an important driver of human rights improvement. It
is clearly not, however, a sufficient condition for restraint since many countries fail to achieve it after
democratization. This is evident in the case of Argentina and the Philippines — the former
democratized and virtually eliminated political killings while the latter democratized without mitigating
human rights abuse. A comparison will help to identify the factors that counteract or nullify the
effect democratic institutions might otherwise have produced.
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Peacekeeping
Research shows that peacekeeping operations diminish battle fatalities (Hegre et al. 2019)
and reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Fortna 2004; Kreutz 2010), two normatively
desirable outcomes. In a similar vein, state repression scholars have presented evidence that
peacekeeping diminishes human rights violations and atrocities, both during conflict (DeMeritt 2015;
Kirschner and Miller 2019) and after conflict termination (Murdie and Davis 2010).11 Peacekeeping
may indeed help put countries on track to reduce human rights violations. If so, however,
peacekeeping was not a factor in Argentina or the Philippines since neither case received a mission.
Peacekeeping, in other words, does not provide the only pathway towards restraint, and additional
explanations are needed for Argentina and the Philippines.

International support
Powerful foreign powers have been known to pressure junior allies to use less repression
against civilians, often by tying aid to human rights outcomes (Hafner-Burton 2013). This process is
augmented by transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 2014) and may have become more
common after the end of the Cold War, when the United States ceased competing with the Soviet
Union to amass as many allies and proxies as possible (Hendrix 2018). Indeed, both Argentina and
the Philippines received various forms of international support. For instance, Presidents Alfonsin
and Aquino were warmly received at the White House by US President Ronald Reagan in April 1984
(Diehl 10 Apr. 1984) and September 1986 (Boyd 18 Sept. 1986, World), respectively, legitimizing

I explore this possibility in the context of post-2006 Nepal, the subject of Chapter 4, where a UN
peacekeeping operation may have played some role in coaxing the government to reign in lawlessness in the
Terai region.
11
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each ruler on the international stage. Both countries also received substantial amounts of official
development aid (ODA) from the international community (see Figure 2.3).12 In addition to moral
support and financial assistance, the United States would also embroil itself, to varying extents, in
disputes between each regime and its respective security forces. Most notably, the Bush
administration deployed warplanes to help deflect a relatively serious coup attempt against President
Aquino in December 1989 (the US did not visibly intervene in several other coup attempts) (Moore
and Devroy 2 Dec. 1989). Less sensationally, President Bush visited Argentina immediately after the
newly elected Menem administration (successor to the Alfonsin administration) put down a violent
mutiny by disgruntled security forces, a sign of solidarity and support for Argentinian democracy
(Kirkpatrick 10 Dec. 1990).
In all, the US and other foreign powers provided various forms of assistance to both
Argentina and the Philippines following their democratic transitions. The extent of this assistance is
broadly comparable, yet one case managed to implement restraint while the other failed. Thus,
foreign support may have played an important role in these countries’ experiences but cannot alone
explain their outcomes.

Though Argentina received larger sums of ODA per capita, it also faced a severe fiscal crisis, vastly
increasing the need for aid.
12
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Threat Environment
State repression, in the most basic sense, is primarily a means to an end — regimes use it (or
instruct security forces to use it) to defend their tenures against challengers and threats. As threats
emerge, regimes assess those threats (Davenport 1995) and deploy repression in response, a process
dubbed the law of coercive response (Davenport 2007). This process is often thought or assumed to
be a rational and strategic (Pierskalla 2010; Greitens 2016) but is clearly neither in some cases
(Davenport and Loyle 2012). As an example, repression is clearly influenced by the ‘coercive weight
of the past,’ meaning that institutional inertia sometimes prevents or hinders leaders from adapting to
changing circumstances such as the disintegration of a resistance movement (Sullivan et al. 2012; Hill
and Jones 2014).
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The Alfonsin and Aquino administrations faced similar (though not identical) threat
environments after coming to power, especially in that each country had grappled with violent leftist
insurgencies during the 1970s and 1980s. While suppressing these insurgencies, both sets of security
apparatuses had perpetrated many atrocities, and respect for freedom from political killings is
designated as entirely absent in the years leading up to their respective transitions (Coppedge et al.
2019). By the 1983 and 1986 transitions, respectively, neither leftist insurgency had been entirely
quashed. It should be noted, however, that the Philippine New People Army (NPA) was in a much
stronger position than leftist forces in Argentina — the NPA continued to command tens of
thousands of cadres whose presence was felt across much of the country (“Government of
Philippines – CPP,” 2021). Despite this, the NPA had begun to doubt its ability to achieve a military
victory over government forces, explaining its willingness to support nonviolent protests against
Marcos and then enter peace talks with the Aquino administration (Thompson 1995, 154).
Argentinian leftists, by comparison, had largely been forced to withdraw from Argentina and
probably drew on a much smaller pool of recruits (Lewis 2001). Even so, they continued to
orchestrate attacks on government military installations.
To synopsize, Alfonsin and Aquino each inherited a security apparatus used to wielding
extreme and indiscriminate violence against urban and rural guerillas. Argentinian security forces had
achieved far more success (at a terrible human cost) than their counterparts in the Philippines, but
neither force managed to eliminate an armed and subversive underground. As I will show in
subsequent sections, Argentinian security forces would likely have continued using extreme (and
disproportionate) repression to root out dissidents if not reined in by the Alfonsin administration.
Conversely, Philippine security forces might have been prevented from escalating a
counterinsurgency against the NPA (causing many atrocities) if they had enjoyed less autonomy from
the Aquino administration. Both security apparatuses, in other words, preferred to respond to
ongoing challenges with a maximalist coercive response, yet only one was prevented from doing so.
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Democratization and State Repression in the Philippines
Ferdinand Marcos was originally elected to the Philippine presidency in 1965, then reelected
in 1969. In 1972 Marcos declared martial law to evade constitutionally mandated term limits,
ushering in a period of autocracy and widescale human rights abuse. During this period, the
government combatted two separate insurgencies (one Islamist and one Communist), in which
counterinsurgency efforts generated many atrocities (Jetschke 2011). While the officer corps of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) enthusiastically backed the counterinsurgency, many officers
disapproved of Marcos’s handling of the conflict and management of the military (Yabes 1991). A
cluster of young officers instituted a clandestine group called the Reform the Armed Forces
Movement (RAM), a vehicle they used to launch a coup attempt in February 1986 shortly after
Marcos stole an electoral victory from challenger (and future president) Corazon ‘Cory’ Aquino.
Though the coup quickly stalled out, civilians rushed to RAM’s defense, literally encircling the
mutineers to shield them from counterattacks by loyalist contingents of the military. Civil resistance
surged, drawing at least 1.5 million pro-democracy participants across the country into what became
known as the first People Power Movement or EDSA movement (an acronym for Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue, where protests first started), loosely led by Aquino. In the face of this resistance,
Marcos’s position soon became untenable, and the presidential family fled into exile. Aquino, who
shared credit with RAM for ousting the Marcos regime, then became president with the backing of
several key supporters from the military (Yabes 1991).
Aquino assumed the presidency with the goal of restoring Philippine democracy and
reducing human rights violations. As part of this process, she set out to accomplish two important
goals: first, the peaceful resolution of the Communist insurgency and, second, establishing
accountability mechanisms to punish soldiers and police officers responsible for human rights
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violations (thus also deterring further abuse). Though domestic and foreign human rights advocates
were ‘jubilant’ at Aquino’s inauguration and early steps towards promoting accountability, optimism
(Villadolid 1 March 1986) soon gave way to dismay (Mydans 9 Oct. 1988). In 1990, Amnesty
International reported that, “Despite the existence of institutional and legal safeguards and the
government's often stated commitment to protect and promote human rights, serious human rights
violations, including disappearances, have continued in recent years” (“Philippines: Disappearances
in the Context of Counter-insurgency,” 7).
What derailed the Aquino administration’s efforts to promote human rights and
accountability? The answer, in large part, lies in the AFP officer corps’ commitment to defeating the
New People’s Army (the armed wing of the Communist insurgency) and their deep antipathy to
Communist ideology. To reiterate, the RAM conspirators had coalesced in opposition of President
Marcos’s poor handling of the counterinsurgency, not the conflict per se. Crucially, these officers
believed that unarmed Communist sympathizers were present throughout civil society, were
dangerous, and that victory would require removing these sympathizers by force. In barely veiled
language, General Fidel Ramos explained as much to an audience in New York in 1988, “Many socalled human rights advocates were only after destroying the image of the AFP and picturing it as a
gross violator of human rights…. [T]hose who shoot at us with bullets have cohorts who attempt to
weaken us with other tactics” (Dorsen 1988, 2).
In 1986, Aquino entered peace talks with the New People’s Army and started investigations
into human rights abuse perpetrated by the AFP. Angry military commanders responded with a slew
of coup attempts, several of which nearly succeeded (Thompson 1995; Jetschke 2011). Aquino
survived due largely to General Ramos, commander of the Philippine Constabulary, a gendarmeriestyle amalgamation of national and municipal law enforcement agencies. Ramos’s support came at a
price. To retain his protection, Aquino agreed to drop peace talks, implement Ramos’s proposals to
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revamp the counterinsurgency, and halt investigations into atrocities perpetrated by the AFP, a series
of decisions which alienated many of the human rights activists who had worked closely with Aquino
and her husband (assassinated in 1983) during Marcos’s reign (Thompson 1995; Jetschke 2011). In
1987, Aquino was forced to reverse earlier efforts to ban pro-government (anti-Communist) militias
established and supported by the AFP as an essential component of the counterinsurgency (Jetschke
2011). Despite Aquino’s continuous efforts to make these militias accountable to the civilian
judiciary, AFP commanders effectively shielded them from oversight. They would go on to deploy
mass atrocities against suspected Leftist sympathizers throughout the country.
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Quantitative data helps to illustrate what the first Philippine People Power Movement and
Aquino administration achieved and where they fell short. Specifically, I draw from the Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem) project’s freedom from political killings variable (abbreviated FFPK) and
electoral democracy variable (often shortened to ‘polyarchy’ score). The first measures (on an interval
scale) the extent to which a country’s government officials use extrajudicial executions and
disappearances to suppress political opponents in each country-year. Lower scores denote worse
protection while higher scores denote better protection. Electoral democratization is an index
running from a minimum of 0 to a maximum theoretical value of 1. Broadly speaking, it measures the
democratic competitiveness of politics in each country-year (Coppedge et al. 2016).
The Philippines’ human rights situation improved modestly after Marcos’s ouster, with the
country moving from the 18th percentile in terms of FFPK in 1985 to the 46th percentile in 1987. To
aid interpretation, I calculate the Philippines’ relative progress towards maximum practical respect for
freedom from political killings. To do so I take the highest observed score in 1985 (France’s score of
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+3.472) as the practical limit towards which the Philippines could reasonably aspire (there is no
theoretical limit on V-Dem’s FFPK scale). Yearly relative progress becomes the distance the
Philippines covers from its 1985 FFPK score divided by the maximum distance it could have
covered towards the French 1986 score of +3.472. In those terms, the Philippines achieved almost
33% of possible FFPK progress by 1987 but stalled out in subsequent years. On the other hand,
democratic institutions flourished, as measured by V-Dem’s electoral democracy index. I calculate
electoral democracy progress in the same manner that was used for FFPK, revealing that the
Philippines achieved nearly 60% of possible progress. In other words, Philippine electoral
liberalization progressed about twice as far as human rights liberalization.
The disparity between democratization and human rights progress in the Philippines is
explicable as a principal-agent problem between civilian and security leaders. Aquino appears to have
genuinely sought to protect civilians from security forces and wind down the counterinsurgency (and
the violence it produced). Yet, Aquino depended on the cooperation of a security apparatus that
strongly opposed her pro-rights agenda, seeing it as an obstacle to defeating Communism and
purging society of dissidents. While the security apparatus was united in its commitment to extending
the counterinsurgency, it was divided in its tolerance of Aquino’s political leadership. In the end,
Aquino was forced to depend on General Ramos and his relatively moderate faction for protection
against other commanders who sought to end civilian rule altogether. Indeed, Ramos and his allies
deflected at least eight coup attempts from those rival factions (Thompson 1995; Jetschke 2011). By
virtue of the protection he provided Aquino, Ramos bargained for a free hand in running the
counterinsurgency. He also reversed efforts to create accountability mechanisms that might otherwise
have deterred military and pro-government militias from using excessive violence against civilians.
The People Power Movement and its aftermath show that popular movements can replace
autocrats with elected political leaders with clear preferences for liberalization. But elected leaders are
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not directly responsible for human rights abuse; they depend on the leaders and agents of the security
apparatus to implement those (normatively desirable) preferences. In at least some cases, liberal
leaders (and the movements that support them) will face great difficulty when attempting to project
liberal values on their security apparatus, resulting in the buildup of democratic institutions
(competitive elections) but minimal reduction (or even increases) in state repression levels. In some
cases, leaders can only achieve the former by sacrificing the latter.

Democratization and State Repression in Argentina
In February 1975, Argentine President Isabel Peron granted the Army blanket permission to
“neutralize or annihilate” several militant groups waging a bloody leftist insurgency (Lewis 2001,
105). The guerillas’ attacks on military officers and their families had already enraged much of the
officer corps, resulting in the spread of hardline views throughout the armed forces. Peron’s decree
of 1975 had already suborned all security institutions (including law enforcement agencies) under the
Army’s counterinsurgency operation, but the Army decided to expand its remit even further. In
March 1976, the leaders of Argentina’s Army, Navy, and Airforce formed a junta and staged a coup
d’état to overthrow President Peron. A military government called the National Reorganization
Process (usually referred to simply as the Proceso), itself ruled by the junta and its rotating
membership, administered the country until its fall in December 1983.
After coming to power, the Proceso crushed the insurgency by orchestrating the ‘Dirty War,’
an unofficial country-wide hunt for dissidents and subversives undertaken by military and police
forces. Once targeted, suspected dissidents and their associates (especially their family members)
were subjected to secret arrest, torture, and execution. Argentina’s Dirty War eventually culminated
in tens of thousands of deaths (Scharpf 2018).
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Though the Proceso tried to conceal human rights violations from the public, its semi-covert
assassination campaign gradually elicited backlash. By 1982, economic mismanagement and the
perception of endemic corruption had accelerated unrest. That same year, the Proceso briefly rallied
public support by initiating a war with the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, but its decisive
defeat in June triggered a “Final break between state and society” (Lewis 2001, 192). As in the
Philippines, Civil resistance surged. This resistance was organized primarily by banned labor unions
and the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, who led protest marches that drew as many as 50,000 participants
(Ackerman and Duval 2000). In the face of mass opposition, the Proceso was forced to permit
competitive elections in 1983, which Raul Alfonsin, leader of Argentina’s Radical Party, won.
Like Corazon Aquino, Alfonsin was an activist who entered office with an ambitious agenda
to reestablish democracy and protect human rights.13 But Aquino had depended on the backing of
both popular support and (crucially) a single powerful faction within the security apparatus (which
enjoyed popular support for its own efforts to oust the Marcos regime). Her dependence on General
Ramos eroded Aquino’s capacity to establish civilian oversight over security agents (and reign in
human rights abuse). Contrariwise, Alfonsin and his supporters directly and successfully opposed
Argentina’s armed forces. Public antipathy against the military both led to its fall from power and
undermined its ability to oppose civilian rule in the future (Pion-Berlin 1991). Capitalizing on this
situation, Alfonsin and his supporters immediately set out to reestablish formal civilian control. This
entailed overhauling the bureaucratic rules that structured civil-military relations14 and, more

Alfonsin had been a founding member of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), a group
established in 1975 to document human rights violations and force the Proceso to present abductees. APDH
enjoyed some protection from retaliation by virtue of its members’ ties to important international actors.
Nevertheless, membership brought real danger; at least one APDH member was abducted and tortured by the
Proceso (Lewis 2001, 185-186).
13

For instance, military spending was drastically cut and the military’s stake in private industry was curtailed
(Pion-Berlin 1991).
14
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sensationally, prosecuting the Proceso’s leaders as punishment for their part in administering the Dirty
War. Atrocities became and remained extremely rare throughout Alfonsin’s tenure and thereafter.
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Again, I draw on FFPK and polyarchy scores to illustrate Argentina’s rapid improvements.
The country leapt from the 3rd percentile in FFPK (outperforming just three other countries) in 1982
to the 77th percentile in 1984. As before, I calculate relative progress towards a maximum practical
score,15 showing that Argentina achieved well over 70% of possible FFPK progress and
approximately 90% of possible polyarchy progress. In other words, democratization and respect for
human rights improved drastically and in tandem in Argentina, whereas the latter lagged well behind
the former in the Philippines.
Despite widespread support for democratization and transitional justice, Alfonsin’s control
over the security apparatus was never absolute. This is why Alfonsin resisted pressure from the
Madres and other human rights groups to target large swathes of mid- and low-ranking military and
police officers for human rights prosecutions (Lewis 2001, 204). Fearing a rebellion from the military
if too many officers were singled out for punishment, Alfonsin focused on a relatively narrow pool
of the approximately 1300 well-documented cases singled out by the CONADEP (the National
Commission on the Disappearance of Persons), the committee he himself had set up to investigate
human rights violations. Fearing a growing backlash from the military, Alfonsin further restricted
prosecutions by passing the Full Stop Law in December 1986, which bookended investigations and
indictments for human rights violations perpetrated during the Dirty War. Alfonsin was surprised,
however, at the reaction of government prosecutors who rallied to lodge a spurt of new indictments
before the law came into effect (Pion-Berlin 1991).
Alfonsin’s fears of military retaliation proved well-founded. In subsequent years, a series of
disgruntled mid-ranking commanders would launch a string of bloodless (or nearly bloodless)
mutinies, forcing Alfonsin to grant pardons and commutations to coax these rebels back to their

France, again, provides the maximum FFPK score in 1982 (+0.886) while Denmark provided the maximum
polyarchy score (0.911) for 1982.
15

34

barracks. The breach between the military and regime leaders became so acute that Alfonsin’s
successor, Carlos Menem, would in 1990 pardon all officers convicted or indicted of abuses (Lewis
2001). Despite winning these concessions (which eventually proved to be temporary), the security
forces continued to show restraint in subsequent years.

Comparing Cases: drawing inferences from Argentina and the Philippines
Why did severe human rights violations largely cease in Argentina while persisting in the
Philippines? The commonalities between these cases are striking. In both, leaders came to power
through free and fair elections following periods of autocratic rule and episodes of systemic human
rights violations on the part of security forces. In both cases, the new leaders set about creating
accountability mechanisms intended to punish abusers and deter further abuse. Finally, in both cases,
the security apparatus defied these efforts. The cases differ, however, in the extent of that defiance.
While Philippine security forces countermanded accountability efforts with ease, their Argentine
counterparts had less success. I trace this difference in outcomes to the balance of power between
regime leaders and their security forces. President Aquino depended on General Ramos for survival,
meaning that the balance of power clearly favored Ramos and his peers — Aquino could not impose
her will on security forces without assuring the end of her regime (and possibly her life). President
Alfonsin, on the other hand, had risen to power precisely because the Proceso had been weakened
relative to pro-democratic forces. Argentinian security forces were by no means powerless but acts of
defiance against Alfonsin’s reforms were costly and risky. Compliance (up to a point) was ultimately
adopted.
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It is easy to imagine a world in which Alfonsin enjoyed slightly less popular support in the
wake of his election, or one in which the Proceso enjoyed slightly more support.16 Under those
circumstances, events in Argentina might easily have turned out like the Philippines, where security
forces brushed off attempts to establish accountability. In exchange for nominal support for the new
democratic regime, Argentinian security forces might have gone on killing and disappearing
suspected dissidents at will. By the same token, it is easy to imagine a different outcome in the
Philippines. If, for instance, the People Power Movement had peaked before RAM had made its
move, Aquino and her followers might not have had to share credit for their success with the
military. Had General Ramos enjoyed less legitimacy or had President Aquino managed to
consolidate support for her regime in other ways, the bargain they struck might have been much less
favorable to security forces. In turn, Aquino’s efforts to negotiate a peace deal with the New People’s
Army might have succeeded, obviating the need for pro-government militias and the atrocities they
produced.
I draw several additional insights from these cases. First, regime leaders do not need absolute
control over their security commanders to prevent security agents from committing abuses. A
fraught and unpredictable process unfolded in the aftermath of Argentina’s return to democracy in
which regime leaders and commanders jostled for control and independence. In fact, several junior
commanders went so far as to stage mutinies, which prompted civilians to curtail transitional justice
efforts.17 Ultimately, however, Alfonsin’s government successfully deterred security forces from
perpetrating subsequent abuses. Alfonsin, in other words, had enough power to compel security forces
to use restraint.

For instance, had the Proceso thought better of going to war with the United Kingdom over the Falklands
Islands, it might have retained much more popular support.
16

This is the primary concern of transitional justice skeptics, who see prosecutions as politically destabilizing in
most contexts (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2004).
17
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For its part, a security apparatus does not need to launch a coup d’état to preserve its
autonomy or punish regime leaders for attempting to impose restraint (or other policy changes). Such
was clearly the case in the Philippines, where the fragility of the Aquino regime played into General
Ramos’s hands, allowing him to strike a bargain with President Aquino on terms very favorable to
both Ramos, personally, and the security apparatus as a whole. Once the bargain was struck, Ramos
had an interest in protecting Aquino and preserving the new status quo. Under these circumstances, a
coup d’état would have been unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. In fact, a coup d’état
would be counterproductive in many similar circumstances. For instance, had the Philippines security
apparatus been unified under Ramos, he could have used that cohesion to credibly threaten to
remove Aquino and establish a military dictatorship. One imagines Aquino would have had to strike
the same bargain with Ramos, again sacrificing a human rights agenda to preserve her government
and its efforts to restore democracy. A security apparatus does not need to resort to force, therefore,
to halt efforts to curb human rights abuse. The credible threat of force produces a deterrence effect
that constrains civilians’ options.
I have used these cases to illustrate and develop my argument, but I do not claim to have
accounted for all potentially confounding variables. Most importantly, two violent insurgencies
continued to smolder in the wake of the Philippine EDSA movement (even if the larger insurgency
had entered peace talks), unlike in Argentina where most armed resistance had been crushed or
driven abroad. Had Argentine leftist groups like the ERP and the Monteneros regrouped to mount a
violent insurgency after the fall of the Proceso, extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances
might also have ramped up. But it is notable that leftist groups continued to operate in Argentina,
and at least one group eventually turned (or returned) to violence. In January 1989, more than five
years after the fall of the Proceso, a band of guerillas calling themselves the New Argentine Army
launched a surprise raid on a military barracks on the outskirts of Buenos Aires (Lewis 2001, 229230). The same group was likely responsible for additional raids on military installations in Mendoza
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and Rio Cuarto the following February (Reuters 14 Feb. 1989). While the second and third attacks
generated little bloodshed, the Buenos Aires attack led to dozens of fatalities. After approximately
two days of fighting, the Argentinian Army retook the barracks, probably committing numerous
executions of detained guerillas over the course of the battle.
The New Argentine Army’s raids revealed (both in hindsight and to actors at the time) that a
‘subversive’ presence lingered in Argentina, presenting a challenge to both the civilian regime and the
security apparatus. Argentina’s military and law enforcement agencies had spent the last decade
developing an expertise in hunting down and killing underground militants (and non-militants)
without oversight. Yet, while security forces perpetrated more abuse during its clash with the New
People’s Army, they committed very few atrocities in general. It is unlikely that this change in
behavior stems from a change in preferences or attitudes among the armed forces, who had killed
thousands of citizens in recent years. The Army’s response to the barracks attack (as well as the
gunning down of several rock-throwing protesters in an earlier, related incident) demonstrates that
soldiers remained primed to kill suspected subversives (Lewis 2001, 229). The fact that security
personnel used restraint in the aftermath suggests that disincentives outweighed their preferences for
violence — the government’s efforts to deter human rights abuse worked. Again, I arrive at the
conclusion that, had President Aquino been able to tame the Philippine armed forces after taking
office, her efforts to make security forces accountable to international human rights standards would
have had an effect. That is to say, even while conducting a counterinsurgency, Philippine armed
forces might have practiced much greater restraint had their leaders been truly subordinate to
democratically elected leaders. Under these circumstances, the Philippines might have resembled the
United Kingdom, which suppressed a bloody insurgency in Northern Ireland while ‘mostly’
protecting civilians’ freedom from political killing (Coppedge et al. 2020). Alternatively, the armed
forces might have been prevented from undertaking a violent counterinsurgency at all, as happened
in Argentina and as the Aquino administration preferred.
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Validating Assumptions and Explicating Mechanisms
To begin with, I sketched out the core components of an argument capable of explaining the
persistence of human rights abuse following democratization. I then used illustrative case studies in
section to demonstrate that argument’s plausibility and add nuance. Now, I return to the argument’s
core assumptions about regime leaders, security agents, and the dynamics which govern their
behavior. By drawing on existing literature, I show that these assumptions are generalizable and
applicable to cases beyond Argentina and the Philippines, putting the argument on firmer footing.

Democratization and Incentives to Curb Political Killings
I have already outlined the argument that security forces adopt restraint to the extent that
regime leaders are powerful enough to compel them to do so. This argument takes it for granted that
democratic regime leaders prefer restraint in the first place, an assumption borne out by the Aquino
and Alfonsin administrations. As discussed above, these leaders took on substantial risks to pursue
democratization and respect for human rights prior to assuming power. Their preferences for
restraint were clearly sincere and strongly held, and both worked to implement those preferences
after rising to power (though only one succeeded). Does the assumption that democratic leaders will
generally behave like Presidents Aquino and Alfonsin hold across cases?
Existing research shows that democratization is associated with lower levels of state
repression, though not monotonically (or invariably). More specifically, modest improvements in
political competition pay few human rights dividends, but the consolidation of competitive elections
reliably leads to less human rights abuse (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2005; Hill and Jones 2014). These findings support the ‘domestic democratic peace’ thesis
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(Davenport 2007), or the argument that elections provide citizens (voters) with the means to punish
and reward leaders. Because voters presumably value their physical integrity rights, and because they
can punish leaders who violate those rights, elected leaders should be deterred from perpetrating
abuse.
Importantly, the domestic democratic peace (DDP) thesis obviates the need for leaders with
sincere and deeply held commitments to liberal values like Presidents Aquino and Alfonsin, or other
well-known figures like Nelson Mandela of South Africa or Lech Wałęsa of Poland. If institutional
configurations make repression a costly recourse, then even cynical leaders will prefer restraint so
long as they are subject to electoral penalties. When leaders are chosen via competitive elections,
therefore, a country’s human rights prospects are not down to a lucky break, or the chances of a
liberal paragon18 rising to power. This supports the assumption that the disincentive to use repression
(or the incentive to use restraint) is generalizable across democracies.
There are, however, grounds to be skeptical of the DDP thesis, or the extent to which it
protects physical integrity rights. Most importantly, the DDP logic breaks down if one gives up the
assumption that voters share solidarity, or that voters are mutually interested in one another’s rights.
Conrad et al. (2018), for example, assume only that citizens value their own skins and those of their
close associates, but not society at large. When it comes to the plight of strangers, citizens are
indifferent. Under these circumstances, regime leaders become free to abuse any citizens whose
electoral support they do not rely on, meaning citizens from marginalized groups outside of the
winning coalition. Davenport et al. (2018) find empirical support for this claim in the context of
policing protests, showing that racial prejudice influences perceptions of police violence — voters
often see repression as justified when outgroups are targeted. The underlying logic here is that social

Mitchell (2006) would describe such a figure as a ‘Tolerator,’ an ideal-type of leader based on Oliver
Cromwell, who forced followers to abide by principles of restraint and toleration.
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cleavages reduce solidarity among voters, undermining disincentives to repress people from noncritical voting blocks.
Social cleavages are clearly capable of eroding the DDP, creating protection for some groups
while excluding others. However, this line of research focuses on torture (especially when intended
to elicit confessions or control prisoners) and violence associated with crowd-control (see also
Conrad and Moore 2010). Though serious, these are less egregious forms of repression than killings
and disappearances, which might be more likely to incense voters across social cleavages. Indeed,
Richards et al. (2012) use survey experiments to show that while Americans tolerate many forms of
torture, they disapprove of the severest forms (especially when sexualized). Similarly, nonviolent
resistance research suggests that harsh repression against dissidents can deeply aggrieve non-dissident
audiences, triggering or accelerating anti-regime mobilization across social cleavages (Svensson and
Lindgren 2010; Chenoweth and Stephans 2011; Aytac et al. 2018). If voters disapprove of severe
forms of torture, they are unlikely to tolerate the most severe forms of repression, such as
extrajudicial executions and disappearances. They are likely, in other words, to punish elected leaders
who make use of political killings. This supports the assumption that democratic institutions should
reliably incentivize regime leaders to end political killings across cases. It also emphasizes the need to
identify factors which counteract the DDP, since democratization does not always produce restraint.

Explicating Security Agents’ Preferences for Repression
To reiterate, I have argued that democratic regime leaders can only impose restraint to the
extent that they can compel cooperation from security forces. One of the assumptions that underpins
this argument is that security agents prefer not to use restraint, and that they see good reason to kill
citizens at their own discretion. If this is not so — if security agents themselves prefer restraint —
then security forces ought to forego killings and disappearances regardless of whether regime leaders
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can coerce cooperation from the security apparatus. In other words, my argument would be
unfounded or, at the very least, its scope conditions would be far narrower. I therefore use existing
literature to validate this assumption.
The following subsections explore (separately) the logics of consequences and
appropriateness that motivate security agents to kill (or avoid killing) citizens. On one hand, agents
strongly motivated by material self-interest will always have incentives to prey on citizens, killing
them as a means of extracting wealth. This proclivity will remain constant regardless of whether
agents are embroiled in an active conflict against challengers or whether a conflict has ended. On the
other hand, agents uninterested in enriching themselves are likely to kill citizens when they have been
socialized to seek and cull deviants from the body politic. This learned behavior originates during
conflict episodes but tends to persist long afterward. These observations yield an important
inference: there is nothing ‘natural’ about the decline of human rights abuse following conflict. Even
when conflict leads to democratization, agents motivated to kill citizens will tend to retain these
motivations. If agents stop carrying out atrocities, therefore, it is because something (presumably
regime leaders) has intervened.

Security Agents’ Incentives to Repress: doing well out of repression
According to one school of thought (Mitchell 2004), regime leaders respect human rights
according to their ideological leanings and needs. The security agents who follow regime leaders, on
the other hand, are uniformly amoral and rational. For agents, force of arms is, first and foremost, a
means of personal enrichment, where enrichment entails preying on citizens (supplementing wages
that tend to be meager). In practice, this means looting or forcibly depriving civilians of their
property and dignity. Predation is the mechanism which produces observable repressive acts like
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killings. Enrichment (and predatory behavior) is maximized to the extent that leaders refrain from
imposing discipline on their agents.
This framing is rare in that it brings a rational actor approach to state security forces rather
than rebels, for which there is a robust literature. For instance, the ‘greed’ side of the ‘greed vs.
grievance’ debate, argues that civil war onset is best explained by the presence of lootable resources
(or the ability to ‘do well out of war’) as opposed to social inequality or autocratic governance (Collier
1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). According to this approach, rebel mobilization occurs when
potential recruits expect to profit (via predatory behavior) from participating in rebellion. In a similar
vein, political economists liken rebels to criminals and bandits (building on Becker 1968): when licit
employment markets provide meager opportunities, rebels incur opportunity costs by foregoing
predatory behavior (Grossman 1991; Dube and Vargas 2008).
Weinstein (2007) brings more nuance to the greed discourse by exploring variation in
relationships between different rebel outfits and the civilian communities in which they operate.
Where rebels depend on civilian support to sustain themselves, a social contract tends to emerge in
which rebel leaders discipline their soldiers and screen potential recruits for predators. This
dependence on civilian support often leads to sophisticated taxation schemes, in which rebels
provide collective goods to communities in return for taxation (see, for instance, Suykens 2015 and
Huang 2016). Similarly, Lidow (2016) argues that rebel forces use restraint when their patrons (often
diaspora groups) value civilians’ well-being, or when mid-level commanders are able to distribute
adequate resources to fighters as a substitute for looting. Without incentive structures such as these,
however, rebels will rarely abstain from predatory behaviors.
I submit that state-backed security agents, as individuals, have much in common with their
rebel counterparts. They, too, incur opportunity costs when they forego the kind of predatory
behavior that generates self-enrichment and (as a biproduct) killings. Argentina provides a useful
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example. Even though most of the armed forces were motivated by a conservative ideology (Scharpf
2018), many soldiers and police officers clearly used repression primarily as a means of selfenrichment in some cases:
At ﬁrst, conﬁscated property taken from prisoners, such as clothes, furniture, money, or
jewelry, was either given away to charity or turned over to agents who put the proceeds in
secret accounts to pay for “special operations.” They stockpiled seized weapons, cars, and
fuel as well. Gradually, the task force leaders began keeping such plunder for themselves.
That often led to quarrels over booty. Eventually, task forces were kidnapping, robbing, and
extorting simply for economic gain. Anyone could be taken into custody and forced to sign
over property (Lewis 2001, 182).
In fact, Argentinian security agents often took more than mere property. In the years since
the fall of the Proceso, it has become clear that agents abducted thousands of infant children from
their victims to raise as their own or turn over to friends and allies (Goldman 2012).
Viewing state security forces in this light, neither conflict termination nor autocratic-todemocratic political transitions are likely to affect security agents’ underlying preferences for
repression–predatory behavior will remain a valuable means of self-enrichment, and agents will prey
on civilians to the extent they are permitted to do so.

Security Agents’ Incentives to Repress: repression as order-making
The previous section posited that security agents are rational profit-maximizers who see
violence as an effective means of acquiring wealth (and sometimes power). This approach takes for
granted that violence, for agents, is an analytically neutral means to an end. Constructivist research,
however, provides grounds to doubt that this is the case. Rather, agents’ experiences and values
mediate their views of violence, and these views can change over time. In fact, most individuals have
likely been socialized from a young age to avoid the kind of inter-personal violence (Collins 2008)
that predation produces. It usually takes intensive training to break down inhibitions to violence
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(Green 2018 provides an especially apt review of this literature). But violence, once wielded, is
transformative, changing how perpetrators view themselves, their social roles, and their relationship
with the state. Valentino (2004), for instance, shows that implementing the Nazis’ Final Solution
became possible only after party leaders had indoctrinated recruits and exposed them to gradually
escalating violence against outgroups. Valentino’s argument attempts to explain the onset of mass
killings and genocide, a level of state repression rarely observed. However, the logic that acts of
violence transform practitioners’ (security agents’) values, attitudes, and self-appointed roles should
obtain in cases where regimes suppress movements with severe but less-than-genocidal violence.
Whenever regimes mobilize security forces to suppress challengers, security forces are likely
to acquire a great deal of experience using force against a population, especially (though by no means
exclusively) in contexts of guerilla warfare.19 In these contexts, the regime’s goal is to suppress
challengers (and deter potential challengers) rather than exterminate whole populations. Insurgents,
however, deliberately blend into civilian populations to evade government repression (see, for
instance, Valentino et al. 2004).20 Since most regimes are unwilling to exterminate or incarcerate an
entire population, defeating challengers entails ‘sorting’ rebels and dissidents (who require
suppression) from loyal or unaligned civilians, a task that falls to rank-and-file combatants (typically
either armed police officers or soldiers). This task is extremely difficult to perform with any accuracy,
however, and has become even more difficult since states began mechanizing their security forces
(Lyall and Wilson 2009). Since they usually lack detailed knowledge about local conditions, security
agents engage in sorting behavior poorly (though combatants may not see it that way). Kalyvas’s

Whether armed or unarmed, insurgents typically have incentives to blend in with non-dissidents (when not
actively resisting) to evade security forces’ attempts to kill, capture, or otherwise hinder them.
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Importantly, this tends to be true of both armed and unarmed insurgencies. In both cases, insurgents rely on
anonymity to keep them safe from the government’s attempts to kill, capture, or otherwise hinder them. And
just as rebels hunt government collaborators within the territories they control, nonviolent insurgencies
constantly worry about agents provocateur and other government collaborators.
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magisterial The Logic of Violence in Civil War (2006) studies this process in detail, showing that civilians
take advantage of both government and rebel combatants’ ignorance by denouncing local rivals (a
form of score-settling) instead of actual collaborators.
Nepal’s 1996-2006 civil war (to be discussed in much greater depth in Chapter 4) provides a
useful example of how security agents’ and rebels’ attempts to identify and punish one another’s
agents can take on a momentum of its own. Violent feedback loops emerged where government
forces fought the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) over territory and control of
civilians. Maoist commanders ordered their fighters to use great restraint when dealing with civilians,
but fighters were quickly caught up in cycles of retaliatory assassinations (Adhikari 2014, 44). Both
government and Maoist forces sought to uncover and assassinate collaborators. When one side
assassinated a perceived collaborator, the other felt compelled to respond in kind. As a result, Maoist
fighters (and perhaps police and military personnel) killed many more suspected collaborators than
their leaders preferred.
The political order-making literature studies sorting behavior in the context of everyday
policework rather than episodes of contentious politics, primarily with ethnographic methods. The
underlying logic is the same, however — state agents create political order by sorting loyal or
‘improvable’ citizens (Buur et al. 2007) from dissidents, who require punishment as an object lesson.
In the language of the biopower literature (see Foucault 1976; Holmqvist 2014; Wilcox 2014) this
amounts to differentiating the bodies that warrant the sovereign’s protection from those that do not.
Bodies in the latter category equate to legitimate targets of violence in the eyes of security agents.
These bodies may be attacked for either personal gain (predation) or as a form of patriotic service to
the state (or both). The use of violence against these bodies is useful in a performative sense, also, in
that it becomes a way for security forces to transmit information (or claims) to civilian audiences
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about the regime, its monopoly on violence, and the rights of its agents to make that monopoly
manifest (Kyed 2007; Holmqvist 2014; Telle 2015; Wahl 2017).
Kyed’s (2007) ethnographic work in rural Mozambique illustrates how this dynamic can
produce unintended consequences. After winning control of the country, the new FRELIMO regime
re-tasked many of its fighters (erstwhile rebels) as police officers, deploying them to bring ‘clarity’ to
areas formerly held by RENAMO, FRELIMO’s defeated rival. For the regime, ‘clarity’ entailed
establishing the rule-of-law and accountability in its hinterlands. For the fighters-turned-police
officers, however, ‘clarity’ entailed sorting behavior — they took it upon themselves to punish (with
public beatings) individuals perceived to be resisting the new order. For the police officers, “crime
and criminality [became] symptoms of political opposition” (134), demarcating citizens from noncitizens, and obviating the need for turning suspects over to judicial bodies — contrary to orders.
A similar process unfolded in Detroit, Michigan during the 1960s and 1970s, when the city’s
efforts to suppress local Black Nationalism had profound consequences for its police department
(Davenport and Loyle 2012). Police quickly came to view the entire Black community as responsible
for radical Black Nationalism, legitimating (in the officers’ eyes) violence (including extrajudicial
violence) against any Black citizen. As a result, violence became far more prevalent than the city
government had intended. Moreover, the new status quo persisted despite the eventual collapse of
Black Nationalism in the city, indicating how resilient preferences for repression can be once they
have become institutionalized or internalized. In subsequent years, the police department would
repeatedly rebuff or undermine the city’s efforts to reform police practices and curb brutality.
Thus far, I have gleaned two important insights from existing literature. First, suppressing
insurgencies trains security agents to sort citizens from enemy agents. This process plays out across
nearly all insurgencies, though both violence levels and outcomes vary. It is usually messy because
agents tend to rely on prejudices or arbitrary evidence-gathering when identifying targets, and locals
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subvert this process to further their own agendas. Second, this process socializes agents to think of
themselves as order-makers, meaning defenders of the state (or movement) and guarantors of its
sovereignty (or success). It follows that insurgencies will generally produce agents that see sorting as
a normal, legitimate, and important part of their work as order-makers. Participation in
counterinsurgency, therefore, inclines security agents to continue using violence (as a means of ordermaking).

Why Predation and Sorting Incentivize Violence Across Conflict Outcomes
Conflicts lead to different outcomes: incumbent regimes either defeat challengers (through
outright military victory, cooption, or a favorable settlement) or succumb to challengers, ushering in
a political transition. In turn, political transitions result either in new autocratic regimes or
democratization (the latter being the outcome I have focused on so far). My characterization of
agents and their proclivities are pertinent across this range of outcomes. This should be obvious in
cases where incumbent regimes defeat challengers — surviving regime leaders are likely to retain
their security agents rather than replace them. There is no question of replacing (wholesale) the
original security forces with new agents who might have different motivations and proclivities.
This remains true, I argue, even in cases of incumbent defeat and political transition. It is
relatively rare to observe victorious rebels wholly uproot existing security forces. After Nepal’s civil
war, for instance, the Nepal Army and Nepal Police were both wholly retained despite the overthrow
of the monarchy. Mass replacement of security agents is even more unlikely following successful
nonviolent resistance movements, which do not recruit their own security forces, and which often
attain victory by convincing state security forces to withdraw support from the regime (Nepstad
2011). Argentina and the fall of the Proceso is, again, instructive. Leveraging mass opposition against
the Proceso, the Alfonsin regime fired dozens of high-ranking generals upon coming to power. Yet,
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the rest of the officer corps (to say nothing of the enlisted ranks) remained untouched (Pion-Berlin
1991). Two decades later, when prosecutions reached their height in the wake of a renewed demand
for justice, officials prosecuted only about 600 individual officers, a tiny sliver of the security
apparatus (“Former Argentine president jailed for crimes against humanity” 2010). When rebels win,
therefore, they tend to inherit the same security forces who previously repressed them.
Sometimes following decisive military victories, rebels do overhaul state institutions. As
mentioned previously, victorious rebels in Mozambique used former fighters to build up a law
enforcement presence from scratch (at least in some areas). In situations like this, original agents are,
indeed, replaced wholesale — but not by agents with significantly different proclivities. This is
because the erstwhile rebels recruited into new police and military institutions will also have
participated in sorting behavior, legitimizing and normalizing extrajudicial executions and
disappearances. This is also in line with Huang’s (2016) observation that shared combat experiences
between rebels engender feelings of superiority over non-combatants, creating autocratic proclivities
among successful rebel leaders. Thus, there is no reason why rebel victory per se or democratization
per se should alter preferences for repression among security forces (even when security personnel are
partially or wholly replaced). Just as all roads lead to Rome, sorting behavior (nearly) always generates
preferences for repression among security forces that persists beyond conflict termination.

Applying Principal-Agent Logic to Post-Conflict Repression
At a granular level, regime leaders do not directly create (or obstruct) repression. Security
agents, individual members of the security forces working nominally on behalf of regime leaders, are
the actors who decide to wield violence against individual targets at particular times. In this section, I
problematize models of repression that conflate regime leaders and their security forces, abstracting
them into one unitary actor (the state). Close examination demonstrates that, though regime leaders
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rely on their security forces to remain in power, their control over these forces is often superficial or
conditional. This implies that any theory of human rights outcomes should treat security forces as
conceptually distinct actors, making human rights abuse the product of a three-way interaction
between regimes, civilians, and security forces. This justifies the third assumption which underpins
my argument — regimes cannot always procure the cooperation of their security forces, leading to
principal-agent problems.
North et al. (2009) frame human rights outcomes as the product of a two-player game
between regimes and the populations they rule. Within this framework, repression is meted out
against civilians in accordance with regime leaders’ preferences. Regimes are deterred from using
repression only when civilians are well-organized, and therefore capable of punishing the regime for
using violence (or withholding public goods). Notably, this model permits no causal or conceptual
gap between regime leaders and the agents who carry out orders to repress (or refrain from
repressing) civilians. The assumption implicit in this model (which Mitchell 2004 shares and
explicates) is that agents’ proclivities incline them to commit atrocities. They commit abuse,
therefore, whenever permitted by their leaders, and leaders deliberately withhold or grant permission
depending on their interests. A growing body of literature, however, problematizes this thinking,
suggesting that regime leaders’ control over security forces is never complete and often breaks down
completely.
My approach builds on a growing body of research (see, for example, Englehart 2009;
DeMeritt 2015; Hendrix and Salehyan 2017; Scharpf 2018) that uses principal-agent logic (see Ross
1973; Mithick 1975; Miller 1993) to explain human rights outcomes. This logic was originally
developed by economists who wanted to explain why employees (agents) at private firms or public
institutions cooperate with managers (principals). The challenge for managers is that they must
convince employees, who have specialized skills and private information, to contribute to the
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collective good of the firm or institution even though managers cannot easily tell which employees
are contributing fully and which are holding back. DeMeritt (2015) identifies the same logic at work
when regime leaders (principals) rely on security forces (agents) to carry out killings. Importantly,
security agents have their own interests, which can diverge from those of regime leaders.
Accordingly, agents can ignore orders when regime leaders direct them to kill citizens. They are
especially likely to do so when exposed to scrutiny by foreign observers. This scrutiny makes agents
vulnerable to retaliation by the international community, which can apply a range of sanctions
including International Criminal Court indictments. Because regime leaders cannot easily offset these
penalties, their control over agents is constrained.
I take DeMeritt’s logic one step further. Not only are agents able to ignore orders to repress,
they can also ignore orders to use restraint. To the extent agents exercise this option, regime leaders’
preferences become irrelevant to agents’ actual behavior. As previously mentioned, agents have done
exactly this in locations as diverse as Mozambique, Nepal, the Philippines, and the United States
(Detroit).
If security forces emerge from conflict with proclivities for repression, then regimes that
prefer to end repression will nearly always confront a principal-agent problem. In the next section, I
show that regimes with greater institutional control over their security apparatus will more easily
overcome this principal-agent problem.

Security Apparatus Autonomy and Empirical Implications
Thus far, I have argued that democratization tends to produce a thorny problem in the wake
of conflict: it pits political leaders who value human rights (either intrinsically or instrumentally)
against security forces predisposed to violate those rights. This amounts to a principal-agent problem
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— one which regime leaders must solve if respect for human rights is to be (re-)established.
Ultimately, a regime’s ability to solve this problem boils down to its capacity to inflict costs on
security forces for non-cooperation and, reciprocally, security forces’ capacities to inflict costs on
regime leaders. In other words, the balance of power between regime leaders and their security forces
largely determines whether the latter adopt restraint. The more the balance of power favors security
forces, the more ‘autonomous’ they become.
I do not offer a theory to explain why some security forces come to be more autonomous
than others. Rather, I draw from existing research to show that there are many pathways towards
autonomy (or reduced autonomy) and that rational regimes resist, permit, or even cultivate autonomy
depending on their individual circumstances. This leads to variation across cases of conflict
termination — variation which becomes key to explaining human rights outcomes given that regime
leaders’ and security forces’ preferences will tend to be incompatible.
I use the term ‘security apparatus’ (following Greitens 2016) when referring to the
constellation of armed institutions and personnel a regime uses (even if control is nominal) to fend
off domestic and international challengers. Importantly, this term subsumes many agents belonging
to many separate chains of command into one coalition (for instance, a country’s army, navy, or
national constabulary might each comprise a separate chain). The high-ranking commanders at the
top of these chains exercise hierarchical control over agents below them, but the relationship
between high-ranking commanders is not necessarily hierarchical and cohesion between them will
vary by case. However cohesive or fractious their coalition, commanders will tend to share important
interests, especially when protecting agents from civilian oversight and procuring resources from the
state. In addition to including (armed) public security institutions and military branches, a security
apparatus can also be comprised of semi-formal groups like pro-government militias, which some
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regimes have used to surreptitiously perpetrate atrocities while retaining plausible deniability (Carey
and Mitchell 2016).
The relationship between regime leaders and security commanders differs structurally from
leaders’ relations with rank-and-file security agents. Principal-agent logic applies when the extent of
an agent’s cooperation with the principal is difficult (and increasingly costly) to observe. Such is the
case with low-ranking security agents, whose day-to-day activities are notoriously difficult to monitor.
Security commanders are also technically agents of the regime. However, they are responsible for the
aggregated behavior of their institutions and chains of command, which is extremely difficult to
conceal. Regime leaders, therefore, tend to know (at least broadly) whether security commanders are
cooperating with instructions to prevent low-ranking agents from perpetrating abuse. Despite this,
leaders often lack sufficient power over security forces to punish defiance. In fact, this is exactly
when security commanders are likely to allow or instruct their followers to defy regime leaders —
when the regime lacks the power to retaliate.
How do regime leaders acquire sufficient power over security commanders to compel their
obedience? The dilemma is that security commanders have a monopoly on armed force within a
country, and this monopoly always poses a latent threat to regimes leaders. At extremes, this threat
manifests as a coup d’état, for which there is an increasingly robust literature (see, for example,
Luttwak 1979; Powell 2012; De Bruin 2017; Kenwick 2020). But commanders do not need to
exercise a coup to exert pressure on regime leaders — a credible threat is sufficient to bargain for
policy concessions and other resources. In fact, this may explain why military regimes often opt to
hand control of the state back to elected leaders — they know that they will retain a monopoly on
armed force, which will shield them from any retaliation new leaders might wish to pursue in the
future. Escriba-Folch and Wright (2012) dub this shield (which mitigates a commitment problem) the
‘exit guarantee.’
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To counter-balance security commanders’ monopoly on armed force, Huntington (1957)
argues that regime leaders should develop a reciprocal monopoly on political power. By doing so, a
regime achieves the unconditional loyalty of security commanders, ‘professionalizing’ its security
forces. This amounts to an ideal-type of civil-military relations which few countries attain in practice.
In fact, this conceptualization is probably simplistic, since regimes counter-balance security
commanders (and generally strengthen their authority) with a variety of strategies, only some of
which are obviously political (or political in the sense Huntington intimated). Some of these strategies
work by directly undermining commanders’ monopolies on armed force. For instance, leaders
sometimes deploy security forces to hinterlands far from the national capital, where armed force
poses less immediate threat to regime leaders (Talmadge 2015; Roessler 2016). In addition, regimes
sometimes develop ‘counterweights,’ or small paramilitary agencies loyal to regime rulers instead of
security commanders. These agencies are unlikely to stand up to the combined might of a united
military, but they can make it much riskier and costlier for small contingents to orchestrate coups (De
Bruin 2017, 2019).
Even given the opportunity, regimes will not always undermine their security forces’ power.
This is because regime leaders depend on their security forces to control populations, especially in
authoritarian contexts. This gives rise to the ‘dictator’s dilemma,’ in which leaders depend on security
forces and other elites to control domestic populations in addition to (or even to the exclusion of)
protecting the state from external threats (see, for example, Svolik 2012; Talmadge 2015; Greitens
2016). In fact, the less popular the regime, the more it depends on its security apparatus to defend it
from rebellions and mass opposition. In addition to increasing the security apparatus’s material
capabilities, this entails streamlining its institutional design, promoting competent commanders
instead of cronies and loyalists, and building links between agents and the populations they interact
with. These augmentations can turn security agents into highly effective counterinsurgents, but they
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also cultivate competent leadership and cohesion within the security apparatus — assets which
security commanders can easily turn into autonomy.
The dictator’s dilemma logic helps to explain why some security forces attain autonomy (or
even an exit guarantee) while others do not. This is because regimes approach the dictator’s dilemma
strategically (though usually with imperfect information), continuously assessing whether the risk of a
popular uprising is great enough to justify empowering the security apparatus. Depending on the
threats that arise, regimes will opt for different strategies, and can attempt to switch strategies in
response to changing circumstances (Greitens 2016). In general, this process is poorly understood. It
helps to show, however, why variation between countries would emerge — regimes face different
constellations of threats over time, leading them to select different institutional designs for their
security forces.
The choices regime leaders make prior to conflict-termination set countries on different
institutional trajectories — some security apparatuses will become highly autonomous while others
will not. Should a democratic leader rise to power subsequently, they will inherit these various
institutional legacies. As a result, the ease with which new democracies build respect for human rights
is due largely to choices made by previous regimes rather than new policy preferences. However,
when a democratic regime inherits a non-autonomous security apparatus, that security apparatus
should nearly always adopt restraint. Based on this logic, I present my first hypotheses:
H1a:

After conflict termination and democratization, security apparatuses with less
autonomy will adopt restraint more often compared with those with more
autonomy.
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H1b:

After conflict termination and democratization, security apparatuses with less
autonomy will adopt restraint more quickly compared with those with more
autonomy.

Extending the Argument to Non-democracies
In post-conflict contexts, autocrats do not face electoral incentives to curb human rights
abuse, but other factors exert a similar influence. First, I consider regimes’ relationships with the
international community. Especially since the end of the Cold War, donor states have often based
foreign policy decisions on liberal norms. Increasingly, these states have conditioned aid on respect
for human rights and punished abusive states by either withholding aid or imposing economic
sanctions (Wood 2008; Escriba-Folch and Wright 2015; Kreutz 2015; Hendrix 2018). Often, this
works via transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1999), which rally western publics into
pressuring their donor governments to punish abusive regimes accepting aid. Jetschke (2011) shows
how this strategy achieved limited but meaningful success in the cases of the Marcos Regime
(Philippines) and Suharto Regime (Indonesia). In the Indonesian case, the US government (in
coordination with other donor states) was eventually made to support (and even guarantee)
independence for Timor-Leste despite deep ties and commitments to President Suharto, who
claimed Timor-Leste as Indonesian territory. In a more recent example (December 2019),
Nicaragua’s authoritarian Ortega government released nearly half of all known political prisoners in
the country in response to tightening economic sanctions and international condemnation of its
repressive actions against suspected dissidents.21
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New York Times, 30 December 2019, “Nicaragua Frees Political Prisoners After International Pressure.”
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While confronting serious threats to their rule (such as insurrections and revolts), regime
leaders have many incentives to use repression (as discussed previously) to suppress anti-regime
mobilization. The need to survive against a challenger can outweigh concerns about international
pressure to mitigate repression (Hendrix and Wong 2013), though many regimes at least temper their
response against dissidents in response to criticism (Conrad and Ritter 2019). But what happens after
conflict termination, when either the incumbent regime has definitively defeated its challenger or
succumbed to a new regime? These are situations in which the incentives to repress political
opposition have attenuated, while incentives to appease international human rights standards have
not. Conflict terminations, therefore, should encourage leaders (even unelected leaders) to curb
human rights abuse to safeguard aid flows and access to international markets.
In addition to international pressure, regimes have other incentives to curb repression when
existential threats have been mitigated. Most importantly, violent repression is a costly and inefficient
means of controlling populations compared to other strategies like cooptation and institutionalization
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008). Further, repression is not only inefficient, but can
become counter-productive. This is because repression generates grievances and undermines
legitimacy, at least to some extent and at least within some segments of the population, even as it
prevents citizens from acting on those grievances. At a certain point, high enough repression outputs
can generate more anti-regime mobilization than they suppress. This results in ‘backlash’ (Tilly,
McAdam, and Tarrow 2001; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014) or
‘now out of never’ events (Kuran 1987) in which large numbers of people suddenly mobilize against
the regime, culminating in exactly the kind of existential challenge that repression is meant to deter or
quash.
Because human rights abuse imperils aid and trade flows, and because repression is
inefficient at best and counterproductive at worst, most autocratic rulers should prefer to end severe
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human rights abuse once opposition movements have been crushed. Yet, they will face the same
principal-agent problems that democratic rulers do- security agents socialized to kill suspected
dissidents will remain primed to continue doing so. Thus, autocratic leaders will need the power to
compel security agents to forego these behaviors before restraint can be achieved. When this power
is at hand, security forces should become much more likely to adopt restraint, whether or not the
conflict has produced democratization. This leads to hypothesis 2:
H2a:

After conflict termination, security apparatuses with less autonomy will adopt
restraint more often compared with those with more autonomy.

H2b:

After conflict termination, security apparatuses with less autonomy will adopt
restraint more quickly compared with those with more autonomy.

Accounting for uneven distributions of autonomy within a security apparatus
It should be noted that autonomy from civilian control might vary within a given security
apparatus. For instance, a regime might have much greater control over its law enforcement agencies
than its military, as was the case in Nepal after its 2006 transition to democracy.22 Yet, if government
control over security forces was (and remains) uneven, exposure to sorting behavior was extensive
among both police and military personnel. Thus, proclivities for violence were likely distributed
throughout the security apparatus by the end of Nepal’s civil war, a condition which is typical of
other counterinsurgencies. This being the case, an uneven distribution of autonomy within a given
security apparatus should produce uneven respect for human rights, with non-autonomous
institutions adopting restraint much more often than their autonomous counterparts, all else equal.

22

I address this is much greater detail in Chapter 4.
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This produces important caveats when searching for a statistical association between autonomy and
human rights outcomes, to be addressed in Chapter 3 and 4.

Accounting for Security Commanders’ Incentives for Restraint
My argument posits that security apparatus autonomy poses the greatest barrier to achieving
restraint. Once that barrier is removed, there is little to stop democratic leaders from curbing
repression as a means of avoiding audience costs (or implementing sincerely held liberal preferences).
Alternatively, in the absence of both security apparatus autonomy and democratic institutions, there
is little to stop cynical autocrats from restraining security forces as a means of maintaining
international legitimacy and avoiding domestic backlash. Importantly, this logic does not preclude the
possibility that some autonomous security apparatuses might voluntarily adopt restraint. This is
because, though proclivities for violence will incentivize repression, it is possible that significant
countervailing incentives might also arise. For example, the same pressures that the international
community exerts on autocratic rulers (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Wood 2008; Escriba-Folch and
Wright 2015; Kreutz 2015; Hendrix 2018) can fall upon on individual security commanders, who
might value their reputations or depend on access to international banking. As a more specific
example, the 2013 arrest of Nepal Army Colonel Kumar Lama in the United Kingdom on suspicion
of having perpetrated torture during the 1996-2006 Nepalese civil war sent shockwaves through the
Nepalese security community.23 Thus, some autonomous security forces might exhibit restraint, but
for different reasons than non-autonomous security forces and less frequently across cases.

23

I address this incident in greater depth in Chapter 4.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have developed a theory to explain why human rights abuse attenuates or
persists in the wake of conflict termination and regime change. Conventional explanations that rely
on regime type, threat perception, and international intervention overlook the role that security
forces (law enforcement and military institutions) play in these contexts. Because prior experiences
inculcate a preference for the status quo (violence), security forces have incentives to resist efforts to
curb severe human rights abuse. Human rights abuse is likely to end, therefore, when regime leaders
are powerful enough to compel security forces’ cooperation. Otherwise, security commanders have
no incentives to restrain rank-and-file agents, and killings will tend to persist. In the following
chapters, I test this argument with quantitatively with cross-national data and then qualitatively with a
case study of Nepal’s 1996-2006 civil war and its aftermath.
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Chapter 3: Quantitative Analyses
Introduction
In previous chapters, I developed an argument to explain why regimes commonly fail to
curb human rights abuse after periods of conflict termination and political transition. That argument
posits that security forces often have dispositions to use violence against civilians, and sometimes
have the power to ignore or even overthrow the civilian leaders who might prefer restraint. In other
words, whether a security apparatus continues to perpetrate killings and disappearances after
contentious politics depends largely on whether the security apparatus is autonomous from regime
leaders. In Chapter 2, I developed a series of hypotheses implied by this argument (below). In this
chapter, I use cross-national data on conflict terminations and a variety of statistical techniques to
test these hypotheses. These tests largely corroborate H1 and H2, providing support for the
argument that security apparatus autonomy tends to hinder human rights improvement even in cases
where we should most expect it (conflicts that result in democratization and/or challenger victories).
H1a:

After conflict termination and democratization, security apparatuses with less
autonomy will adopt restraint more often compared with those with more
autonomy.

H1b:

After conflict termination and democratization, security apparatuses with less
autonomy will adopt restraint more quickly compared with those with more
autonomy.
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H2a:

After conflict termination, security apparatuses with less autonomy will adopt
restraint more often compared with those with more autonomy.

H2b:

After conflict termination, security apparatuses with less autonomy will adopt
restraint more quickly compared with those with more autonomy.

Units of Analysis
Insurgencies and resistance movements vary along many dimensions. They can, for instance,
be fought over control of government or territory; challengers can take up arms or specialize in
nonviolent action; and conflicts can result either in the fall of a regime or retrenchment of its
authority. All conflicts are alike, however, in that they eventually end (given enough time), presenting
leaders with new circumstances and opportunities to change course. In other words, I regard all
conflict terminations, regardless of outcome or mode of resistance, as windows of opportunity in
which to test my argument. Accordingly, when selecting cases, I use a broad definition of conflict
and a narrow definition of termination. I borrow both from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns
and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.1 project (Chenoweth and Shay 2021), which tracks all ‘maximalist’ and
‘mature’ resistance movements between 1945 and 2013. The first criterion denotes that campaigns
have all challenged the sovereignty of a regime (seeking to overthrow it, to territorially secede from a
state, or to expel an occupying state). The second indicates that all cases managed to coalesce into a
‘campaign,’ meaning a relatively large group of individuals who pursued coordinated resistance
activity (organizing, recruiting, and staging direct acts of violent or peaceful action against the regime)
over an extended period. This sets NAVCO apart from alternative datasets which tend to specialize
either in violent or nonviolent resistance, or which focus on events (especially lethal attacks and
protests) rather than campaigns.
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Importantly, NAVCO also provides precise data on campaign termination. Tracking
termination is relatively easy in the event of rebel victory; the overthrow of regime leaders can usually
be precisely dated, for instance. But designating terminations that end in rebel defeat poses a
challenge unless rebels formally give up active resistance by signing a peace treaty (a relatively rare
occurrence). Because other data projects (most notably, see Kreutz 2010) rely on the absence of
events like battles and protests to denote termination, they tend to miss ongoing resistance activity
and reciprocal efforts to suppress it. NAVCO, however, codes rebel defeat only after all significant
resistance activity has ended. This makes it clear that a regime has successfully eliminated organized
resistance, also denoting an opportunity to change policies in response to changing circumstances
(threat mitigation). In other words, NAVCO data permits more precise information about the timing
of campaign termination across all cases.
As summarized in Table 3.1, NAVCO 2.1 provides a sample of 336 campaigns that had
terminated by 2013, the end of the study period.24 The campaigns are relatively evenly distributed by
method (nonviolent vs violent) and by outcome (success vs failure). Interestingly, autocratic-todemocratic transitions, in which an autocratic government becomes a democratic one, are relatively
rare, occurring just under 12% of the time.25

Note that I have dropped all campaigns that had not ended by this date. Hence, the count of active
campaigns in 2013 in Figure 3.1 is identical to the number of campaign terminations.
24

To identify democratic transitions, I rely on V-Dem’s ‘Regimes of the World’ variable, which ranks regimetypes from ‘closed autocracy’ to ‘electoral autocracy’ to ‘electoral democracy’ to ‘liberal democracy.’ Specifically,
I code democratic transitions based on whether a campaign-country moves from an autocracy designation
(closed or electoral) to a democracy designation (electoral or liberal) two years or less after a campaign
termination.
25
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Dependent Variable
Fundamentally, my aim is to explain the conditions under which conflict termination leads to
reductions in political killings. Simply put, when do governments provide more protections to their
citizens? As foreshadowed in the previous chapter, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) variable
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Freedom from political killings variable (which I abbreviate as FFPK) provides a means of
operationalizing improvement (Coppedge et al. 2019). Where I previously used FFPK’s interval scale
version to ease comparison with democratic progress in Argentina and the Philippines, I now take
advantage of the variable’s ordinal scale version,26 making outcomes easier to interpret substantively.
This measure sorts the prevalence of political killings (and disappearances) for a given country-year
into five ranked categories, providing the foundation of my operationalizations:
0: Public officials do not respect freedom from political killings (not)
1: Public officials weakly respect freedom from political killings (weakly)
2: Public officials somewhat respect freedom from political killings (somewhat)
3: Public officials mostly respect freedom from political killings (mostly)
4: Public officials fully respect freedom from political killings (fully)
Surveying the sample of conflict terminations, I find that the most common level of
repression one year prior to conflict termination is ‘weakly’ (98 cases). But, as shown in Figure 3.2,
‘not,’ ‘somewhat,’ and ‘mostly’ are common (each occurs in over 20% of cases). Not surprisingly,
states fully respect freedom from political killings in just 14 (about 5%) of cases, and a similar
number of cases could not be scored due to data constraints (V-Dem does not provide scores for
some colonized or annexed countries, such as the Baltic countries under Soviet occupation, prior to
independence or after annexation).
As Figure 3.3 shows, most cases (nearly 63%) experienced some decline of political killings
at some point post-termination. Figure 3 was constructed by subtracting, for each case, the pre-

More precisely, V-Dem’s ordinal scale values are estimates created from a Bayesian measurement model that
takes into account coders’ formal evaluations (scores) and their latent biases.
26
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termination score from the maximum FFPK score observed in the post-termination period (up to 20
years after termination). Though these findings provide mild grounds for optimism, they are also
ambiguous in at least two respects: the point at which improvement becomes meaningful is unclear,
as is the timing of improvement within the 20-year time horizon. I address these ambiguities in turn.
To identify substantively meaningful improvements in FFPK, I employ the concept of
‘achievements’ which occur when a country arrives at a new, normatively desirable status quo. In
empirical terms, a country must enter the post-termination period from a score of 2 (‘somewhat
respected’) or below and go on to achieve a score of 3 (‘mostly respected’) or above. For shorthand, I
refer this type of achievement as mitigation. Obviously, this definition implies that many countries will
mitigate killings without eliminating them altogether, less than an optimal outcome. However,
elimination (in which a country moves from pre-termination score of 3 or below to a score of 4) turns
out to be rare, occurring in less than 25% of cases that had not already achieved elimination prior to
conflict termination. By comparison, 33% of cases go on to achieve mitigation. Mitigation, in other
words, is more feasible than elimination, and is therefore a more reasonable goal for policymakers to
pursue. Furthermore, while mitigation is sub-optimal, it still implies meaningful success, making
political killings the exception rather than the rule. In concrete terms, this means attaining a level of
protection for human rights on par with Brazil as of 2017 or the United States as of 1967 (in the VDem data, the US improves to ‘fully’ in 1968 in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement). As another
example, India improved from a score of ‘somewhat’ to ‘mostly’ immediately after winning
independence from the United Kingdom in 1948 (India retains the same score until 2015 when it is
downgraded to ‘somewhat’).27

Though I focus on mitigation throughout the rest of the chapter, I run a series of robustness tests that treat
elimination as the target instead of mitigation. Results are more sensitive to model specification (perhaps
because of the smaller number of cases that reach full respect) but are broadly consistent to those produced by
mitigation models.
27
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For the duration of this chapter, I will focus on mitigation as the primary operationalization
for improving freedom from political killings. However, this approach potentially discounts FFPK
improvement that, though meaningful to citizens, falls short of this target. To illustrate the practical
importance of this dilemma, consider a case in which a country moves from the ‘somewhat’ to the
‘mostly’ category while another case moves from ‘none’ to ‘somewhat.’ Based on the mitigation
threshold, an ‘achievement’ only occurs in the first case, even though citizens in the second case see a
larger increase in protection. I therefore create an auxiliary achievement measure, significant progress,
which occurs whenever a case improves on its pre-termination FFPK score by 2 or more points in
the post-termination period, or 1 point for cases that enter the post-termination phase from a score
of 3 (‘mostly’).28 I choose a 2-point improvement given that 1-point improvements are common (see
Figure 3.3), suggesting that anything less than a 2-point improvement may be too low a bar.
Turning to the second ambiguity, if about one third of eligible countries manages to achieve
mitigation, the timing of those achievements is important. If two countries each achieve mitigation,
but one does so soon after conflict termination while the other takes decades, are those achievements
comparable? The answer depends on whether one focuses on long-term or short-term outcomes. On
one hand, it is important to understand countries’ long-term trajectories, especially if mitigation
routinely takes decades to achieve. On the other hand, achieving mitigation is an urgent objective,
and policymakers and practitioners require solutions that work in the near-term. Going forward, I
therefore take long-term and short-term mitigation as related but distinct dependent variables, each
requiring a different methodological approach.

For cases that enter the post-termination phase from a score of 3, I treat a 1-point increase as significant
progress, while dropping cases that enter the post-termination period with a score of 4 (precluding any
progress).
28
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Independent Variable of Interest
I rely on two V-Dem variables to operationalize security apparatus autonomy: Head of
government (HOG) removal by other in practice (v2exrmhgnp_4) and its twin Head of state (HOS) removal by
other in practice (v2exrmhsol_4).29 To construct these variables, V-Dem’s managers ask country experts
to assess whether, in a given year, the military would be “Likely to succeed in removing the head of
government [or head of state, respectively] if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?”
(Coppedge et al. 2019).30 Individual responses were recorded dichotomously (0 indicating ‘no’ and 1
indicating ‘yes’) and then averaged to create the final values. I interpret higher values to indicate
greater security apparatus autonomy. Presumably, militaries with the capacity to oust their highest
civilian leaders at will are free to withhold cooperation or extract concessions in exchange for that
cooperation. The maximum score of 1 would reflect the presence of an exit guarantee, or the ability
of the security apparatus to act against civilian leaders without any fear of repercussions. Conversely,
militaries thought to be unable to oust civilian leaders (those with low scores) should have little
capacity to withhold cooperation; at the minimum scores of 0, civilian rulers likely enjoy the
unconditional loyalty of the security apparatus. Scores that fall closer to the mid-point value of 0.5
reflect uncertainty about the balance of power and, therefore, limited security apparatus autonomy.
In concrete terms, countries like India, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States
have scores of 0 in all years since 1945.31 Coup-prone Turkey, on the other hand, typically received
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For rare instances in which no value is provided, I instead use the head of state version of this variable.

30

Note that some countries lack heads of state or government, depending on institutional design.

31

With one exception- the United States has a score of .091 in 2016.
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scores between 0.26 and 0.64.32 Pakistan’s military has enjoyed even more autonomy, with scores
typically varying between 0.54 and 0.85 in the same period.33
Obviously, this operationalization is imperfect because experts are asked about militaries,
exclusive of law enforcement institutions. Ideally, an operationalization of security apparatus
autonomy would incorporate both sets of institutions. However, I know of no other existing dataset
that tracks the relationship between national civilian leaders and national law enforcement
institutions. For the purposes of quantitative analysis, therefore, I am forced to focus on civil-military
relations. I will return to this problem in the concluding section of this chapter and explicate even
more fully in the subsequent case study (Chapter 4).

Methodological Approach for Long-term Mitigation
Research on post-conflict human rights and democratization outcomes has typically
compared scores at or near the time of campaign or conflict termination to scores in specific
subsequent years (see, for instance, Huang 2016; Kim and Sikkink 2012; Dancy et al 2018). The
process of choosing benchmark years (typically ranging from years 3 to 5 to 20) to compare to
baseline measurements, however, is somewhat arbitrary. It also entails dropping cases that occur late
in the study period.34 To alleviate this problem, I adopt an alternative approach. Specifically, I search
for mitigation events in the post-termination period, meaning the 20-year period after conflict

Note that these values represent the standard deviation around Turkey’s mean score for the period 19452017. In 2017, V-Dem treats Turkey’s president as a head of state rather than a head of government (as it treats
the United States presidency).
32

These bounds are determined, once again, by relying on the mean and standard deviation for the 1945-2017
period.
33

Given current data constraints, for instance, change after 5 years would be unobservable for all terminations
that take place after 2008.
34
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termination (exclusive of the calendar-year of termination) or the end of the study period (2018),
whichever comes first.35
Given that I have defined mitigation as a discrete event in time, and given the importance of
understanding long-term outcomes, survival analysis conveys important advantages. To reiterate,
previous studies have tended to focus on change in repression scores at various points in time,
forcing the researcher to make assumptions about when (in the post-termination or post-conflict
period) change is likely to occur, and often entailing data loss for cases that enter late in the study
period. Originally designed to measure whether medical treatments prolong longevity in patients
suffering from heart disease and other ailments, survival analysis mitigates these problems by
censoring observations (subjects) when and as they leave a study, either as subjects achieve an event
(typically death) or drop out of data collection efforts. When working with country data, the latter
occurs when the study period ends or (in rare circumstances) when the subject country is annexed
into another country. I follow political violence scholars like Fortna (2008) and Svolik (2008) in
applying this approach to conflict data.
The Cox proportional hazards regression model, probably the most common of survival
analysis models, enables the researcher to regress multiple variables at once on the dependent
variable (always the achievement of an event, also sometimes called the ‘failure’36), providing a hazard
ratio for each independent variable. Hazard ratios are interpreted similarly (though not identically) to
odds ratios generated by logistic regression; assuming a continuous variable, the hazard ratio indicates
the increase or decrease in risk associated with a 1-point increase in a given independent variable,

This approach also makes survival analysis (also called duration analysis or time-to-event analysis) the
obvious methodological strategy.
35

Conventionally, survival analysis practitioners refer to event achievement as the point of ‘failure,’ since it
often equates to patient death. I refrain from doing this to avoid confusion — it is counterintuitive to refer to
human rights improvement as a failure.
36
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holding all other variables constant. A hazard ratio of exactly 1 indicates no change in the risk of
achieving the event, while a hazard ratio over 1 indicates increased risk and a ratio below 1 indicates
decreased risk. Perhaps counterintuitively, larger hazard ratios in the following analyses indicate
increased ‘risk’ of mitigating political killings (or achieving significant progress), making increased risk
normatively desirable.
Problematically, the Cox model assumes that hazard ratios between individual subjects are
independent from one another. This assumption may not always hold for NAVCO campaigns since
some countries undergo multiple campaigns over time. To address this issue, I add random effects
parameters to the Cox proportional hazard model, a technique which produces ‘frailty’ models (see
Austin 2017 for a detailed discussion and tutorial). In other words, first order observations can be
sorted into second order clusters, and the value of the constant varies between clusters. Whereas
medical researchers often ‘cluster’ subjects (patients) by hospital or treatment location, I cluster
campaign terminations by location country.
Finally, because conventional Cox models do not permit treatment variables to vary over
time (technically, survival analysis structures data cross-sectionally rather than in panel format), I
measure security apparatus autonomy in the first calendar year after campaign termination, taking the
average of the v2exrmhgnp_4 and v2exrmhsol_4 values. This approach incurs a minor drawback in that
some cases achieve mitigation (29 cases) or significant progress (58 cases) in that same year, leading
to concerns about endogeneity. However, measuring security apparatus autonomy scores in the pretermination period or the calendar-year of termination risks missing institutional changes that might
occur after termination (especially when campaigns end in victory). In any event, it becomes clear in
subsequent analyses (to be discussed later) that security apparatus autonomy rarely varies substantially
between the pre-termination and early post-termination periods, and the change, itself, does not
appear to influence whether a country achieves mitigation.
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Control Variables for Long-term Mitigation Analyses
Below, I outline a number of potential variables, several of which are identified in existing
literature, which potentially confound the relationship between security apparatus autonomy and
human rights achievements.
Campaign-level attributes
I take campaign-level attributes into account because resistance movements vary in terms of
strategy and outcomes, and this variation plausibly affects human rights outcomes. Perhaps most
importantly, incumbent leaders, those who have survived challenges and defeated campaigns, may
differ systematically from new leaders who have risen to power because of campaign success. These
leaders (whether incumbent or ascendant) may also have learned very different lessons from a
campaign depending on whether resistance was primarily violent or nonviolent. Accordingly, I use
the NAVCO 2.1 variables primary method (prim_meth) and success. Primary method is a binary campaignyear level variable designating whether resistance was primarily nonviolent (1) or violent (0). I
aggregate to the campaign-level by averaging all scores within each campaign. Any score greater than
0.5 takes on a value of 1, indicating that the campaign, as a whole, was primarily nonviolent, while all
other scores (≥ 0.5) are assigned a value of 0 (indicating that the campaign was primarily violent).37
NAVCO’s success variable is also a binary campaign-year variable. To create a campaign-level success
variable, I simply assign a score of 1 to all cases that end in success. All other cases take on a score of
0. I use these variables to either control for campaign-level attributes or to delimit scope conditions
(a means of sub-setting the sample).
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The data are strongly bimodal, and only a handful of campaigns approach an average of 0.5.
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Democratic institutions
Drawing on recent advances in quantitative research, I control for several other country-level
factors that might increase or decrease the chances of achieving mitigation or significant progress.
First, I use V-Dem’s ‘electoral democracy index’ variable, also called ‘polyarchy,’ which measures the
extent to which the ideals of electoral democracy are, in their fullest sense, achieved (Coppedge et al.
2019). Importantly, this measure does not conflate electoral competitiveness with citizens’ abilities to
freely contest government authority (without fear of retaliatory repression), as conventional
democratic indicators like Polity have done (see Hill and Jones 2014, p 663). In other words,
polyarchy does not conflate measures of democratic competitiveness with measures of repression. As
discussed at length in the previous chapter, greater electoral competition should incentivize leaders to
end political killings (see, for example, Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2005; Hill and Jones 2014). If security apparatus autonomy undermines this capacity, as I have
argued, then smaller autonomy scores should associate with mitigation even when controlling for
electoral competitiveness.

Strategic Threats to the Regime
My argument posits that repression, in some cases, is the product of security forces’
dispositions rather than (or in opposition to) the product of strategic decisions made by regime
rulers. However, this is not to say that regime leaders do not perceive and act against threats to their
rule. Clearly, even democratic regimes respond to challenges with force (Davenport and Armstrong
2004; Davenport 2007), and regime leaders and security forces’ preferences might align whenever a
serious threat emerges. Relatedly, though campaign terminations should tend to coincide with
reductions in threat, this need not always be the case. I therefore rely on two separate variables to
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operationalize the extent to which a regime might perceive threat and order security forces to repress
civilians accordingly.
First, I identify the outbreak of all armed conflicts (entailing at least 25 battle-deaths in
combat between the state and a non-state actor) after a campaign-termination using the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD). I create a binary ‘Armed Conflict’ variable that takes a
1 if a given case experiences an armed conflict after its termination year and before its exit from the
study (via either event achievement or censoring). This variable takes a 0 if the post-termination
period goes ‘un-treated’ by an armed conflict. Presumably, cases that receive a 1 should be less likely
to mitigate repression.
Armed conflict signals a clear and present danger to regime leaders, but often too late. By
the time fighting breaks out, challengers will have likely spent years organizing themselves, acquiring
skills, and expanding their networks. Knowing this, leaders often try to identify and preempt latent
threats, designing their security institutions to search for and breakup anti-government mobilization
efforts before they manifest (see Greitens 2016). Nordås and Davenport (2013) argue that ‘youth
bulges,’ or high ratios of young adults38 to the total adult population, are (and appear to rulers as)
important indicators of latent threat (see, also, Hill and Jones 2014 for additional empirical
corroboration). When facing a youth bulge, regime leaders anticipate difficulty integrating youths into
the economy, a problem which should generate more grievances and higher propensity for antigovernment mobilization. They (regime leaders) therefore encourage security forces to use more
violence to preempt a future threat.39

38

People between the ages of 15 and 24.

When studying the link between repression and population pressures, researchers have conventionally
focused on population size (Henderson 1993, for instance). The youth bulge argument leverages more
theoretical specificity and has outperformed absolute population size in recent studies (Hill and Jones 2014).
39
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To control for the presence or absence of youth bulges, I calculate the ratio of young adults
to all adults (following Urdal 2006) using demographic data from the World Bank for all cases in
each termination year. To render results more interpretable, I normalize this ratio to create my
‘Youth bulge’ variable. Cases that see relatively high concentrations of youth should be less likely to
achieve mitigation or significant progress.

Tax Reliant
I also draw on resource curse logic (see Carl 1997; DeMeritt and Young 2013; Hendrix and
Noland 2014), the condition that arises when regimes have access to valuable (by weight) and easily
extractable natural resources. Where these resources are absent, leaders must develop their
economies by providing responsive governance to citizens, leading to high state capacity,
democratization, and the reduction of human rights abuse, or the emergence of a ‘fiscal contract’
between regime leaders and citizens (Bates and Lien 1985). When countries are ‘cursed’ with these
resources, however, leaders can increase government revenues without building a fiscal contract,
leading to low state capacity, persistent autocratic governance, and high human rights abuse.
Accordingly, regimes that rely on tax-based revenues instead of resource rents should be more likely
to achieve mitigation compared to regimes without this type of political economy.40
To operationalize a state’s reliance on tax revenue (and the infrastructure needed to
efficiently collect those taxes), I rely on the V-Dem variable State fiscal source of revenue (v2stfisccap), an
ordinal variable (0-4) in which lower scores indicate that a state primarily relies on foreign aid or
resource extraction to fund itself, while higher scores indicate that the state is funding itself via

Notably, Englehart (2009) argues that state capacity is the means by which leaders who are inclined to
protect human rights abuse do so. This logic leads to the same prediction, that high-capacity states should be
more likely to achieve mitigation and significant progress.
40
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sophisticated taxation schemes. I create a binary version of this variable I refer to as tax reliant, which
takes on a value of 1 with a v2stfisccap score of 3 or 4, demarcating regimes that primarily fund
themselves with tax revenue from those that do not. Tax reliance should associate with mitigation.

Prior FFPK scores
Finally, I also include a control variable for pre-termination FFPK levels. The state
repression literature has repeatedly discovered that previous levels of repression are strong predictors
of future repression (see Sullivan et al. 2012 and Hill and Jones 2014). This may be because
repression is produced by institutions, which persist over time (the assumption that citizen-sortition
becomes institutionalized amongst security agents is an important assumption undergirding my own
argument). It is possible that more repressive institutions are more difficult to reform. The weight of
the past, in other words, may circumscribe opportunities to achieve mitigation. Thus, lower pretermination FFPK scores may associate with failure to achieve post-termination mitigation.

Results
To begin with, I compare variation in SA autonomy between cases that eventually achieved
mitigation and those that failed to (those that dropped from the study without having achieved
mitigation). It should be noted that cases which enter the study already having achieved mitigation
are dropped from consideration, leaving 234 total campaign terminations, though repression data is
available for only 225 of these. Of this total, 110 cases achieved mitigation while 115 others failed to
do so during the study period, meaning that they are ‘censored.’ As Figure 3.4 illustrates, cases that
achieve mitigation tend to have lower SA autonomy values than censored cases, with means of .34
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and .46, respectively. Both a t-test and Wilcoxson rank sum test confirm that the distributions are
statistically significantly different.

Having established that mitigation is associated with lower levels of SA autonomy, I now
employ Cox regression to procure hazard ratios and account for potential confounders. To ease
interpretation of hazard ratios, I normalize values of SA autonomy when estimating Models 1, 2 and
3, the results of which are presented in Table 3.2.41

Otherwise, a one-point increase in SA autonomy, a continuous variable that runs from 0 to 1, would estimate
the difference between extremes.
41
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Model 1 produces a hazard ratio of 0.74 for SA autonomy, indicating that an increase of one
standard deviation in SA autonomy associates with a 26% reduction in the risk of achieving
mitigation within the study period, a finding which is largely consistent with my argument. This
estimate is statistically significant at a conservative threshold (p < .05), as are hazard ratios for
democratic institutions, armed conflict, and campaign method. Like SA autonomy, the onset of
armed conflict is also (unsurprisingly) associated with a reduced risk of mitigation. Democratic
institutions and a history of nonviolent resistance, on the other hand, substantially increase the risk of
mitigation. Note that Model 1 incorporates a random intercept parameter, which was found to
significantly improve model fit.
Results from Model 1 are in line with H2a. Do these results hold when restricting the sample
to cases in which regime leaders are most likely to prefer mitigation? Model 2 approaches this
question by considering the much smaller sub-sample of cases which undergo democratization in the
post-conflict period. Results are largely consistent with those from Model 1, though standard errors
are larger for all variables (except nonviolent resistance). This is likely the result of sample size, which
falls to 49 cases. As a result, SA autonomy loses statistical significance, though its hazard ratio
changes very little.
In model 3, the sample is restricted to cases of campaign success, amounting to 103 cases.
Hazard ratios are, again, broadly consistent with those observed in Model 1. And again, SA
autonomy becomes a statistically significant predictor, as does nonviolent resistance. Tax reliance also
rises to statistical significance for the first time.
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Arguably, the sub-sample of cases that leads to democratization provides the best test of my
argument, meaning that the high standard error calculated for SA autonomy in Model 2 poses a
challenge. I therefore re-examine SA autonomy within this sub-sample. To produce Figure 3.5, I
estimate a Kaplan-Meier survival curve for this sub-sample stratified by level of SA autonomy. In
choosing a stratification strategy, I simply sort observations into quartiles based on SA autonomy
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values. This strategy clearly shows that quartiles 1–3 behave similarly to one another — the vast
majority of these cases achieve mitigation within 10 years of termination. Cases grouped into the 4th
quartile, however, clearly diverge from the rest — only about half manage to achieve mitigation by
the study period’s end. When taking this same approach to the sub-sample of cases that end in
campaign victory, a slightly different trend emerges (not pictured). In this instance, quartiles 2–4 are
broadly consistent with one another, their cases taking much longer than those in quartile 1 to attain
mitigation. I leverage these findings to estimate two additional models.

To estimate Models 4 and 5, I create two new binary variables to indicate whether a given
case falls within the 4th quartile (for democratic cases) or 1st quartile (for challenger victories). In
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addition to these changes, I have also dropped the indicator for armed conflict onset due to strong
signs of non-proportionality, a violation of the Cox proportionate hazard model.42 As reported in
Table 3.3, the new variables for SA autonomy are statistically significant at a conservative threshold
in both Models 4 and 5. In the democratic sample, the 25% of cases with the highest SA autonomy
scores become more than 66% less likely to achieve mitigation than cases in the bottom 75%. The
only other variable found to be statistically significant in Model 4 is nonviolent campaign — a history of
nonviolent struggle more than doubles the risk of achieving mitigation. Model 5 provides similar
findings: when campaigns end in victories, the 25% of cases with the lowest levels of SA autonomy
become nearly 240% more likely to achieve mitigation. Nonviolent campaigns become over 400%
more likely to achieve mitigation. In addition, variables for democratic institutions and youth bulges
are also statistically significant, associating with substantially increased and diminished risks of
achieving mitigation, respectively. These results broadly support H1a.

42

The model still attempts to control for strategic threats to the regime via the youth bulge variable.
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Investigating Change in SA autonomy
As previously mentioned, I consider the possibility that taking SA autonomy one year after
campaign termination may be a sub-optimal measurement strategy. I allay this concern by comparing
this variable to SA autonomy one year prior to campaign termination across cases. The means and
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distributions of these scores pre- and post-termination are statistically significant (using a t-test and
Wilcoxon rank sum test, respectively) and both shrink, moving from pre-termination to posttermination observations. However, the magnitude of the difference is quite small, as depicted in
Figure 3.6. I investigate further by replicating Models 1, 4, and 5, substituting the IV of interest, posttermination repression, with another variable measuring the difference between post- and pretermination SA autonomy scores. None of the resulting hazard ratios reach statistical significance at a
conservative threshold. These results suggest that relations between regimes and security apparatuses
tend to be durable, persisting even through periods of social and political upheaval.
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Extending the Analysis to Short-term Outcomes
To reiterate, survival analysis is advantageous when time horizons are relatively long.
Citizens and practitioners, however, need speedy solutions to ongoing human rights violations,
meaning that short-term mitigations (as opposed to long-term mitigations which can occur decades
after conflict termination) are especially important to investigate. To better capture short-term
mitigation, I restrict the study period to 5 years after conflict termination in a second round of
analyses. Accordingly, mitigations must be achieved within this relatively narrow time span.
Otherwise, cases are designated as failures.
Because survival analysis becomes inappropriate when studying short-term mitigation, I now
turn to more conventional techniques, in line with previous studies on post-conflict human rights
and democratization (Huang 2016; Kim and Sikkink 2012; Dancy et al 2018). Because mitigation is a
binary variable (either mitigation is achieved or it is not), I employ logistic regression. However,
because linear regression can provide more interpretable results, and because short-term mitigations
are relatively frequent, I also employ linear regression (as recommended by Hellevik 2007).
It remains the case that conflict terminations are clustered in countries, and that outcomes
within countries are likely correlated. Again, I confront this problem either by adding random
intercept parameters to OLS and logistic models clustered on location or, in instances when there are
too few clusters to estimate a random intercept parameter, I rely on robust standard errors clustered
on location. The use of linear regression is also advantageous in that it enables Bayesian modeling
averaging (BMA), a method that can greatly enhance the process of model specification (see Hoeting
et al. 1999; De Luca and Magnus 2011). In circumstances where a researcher must choose between
many plausible control variables to include in a model and is uncertain which configuration is
optimal, BMA estimates many models (often thousands) and tests which variables are the strongest
predictors of the outcome variable across model specifications. I use this technique for two purposes.
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Most importantly, I test whether the IV of interest (SA autonomy) is a strong predictor across model
series. In fact, SA autonomy is significant across 8 of 9 model series, a higher performance than all
other variables except for post-termination democracy, which is significant across 6 of 6 models.
Second, I leverage BMA’s flexibility to optimize model specification, testing an expanded
range of potential confounders including all control variables found to approach levels of statistical
significance in Models 1-5. I run separate BMAs for each iteration of the dependent variable
(elimination, mitigation, and progress) across each sub-sample of the data (full sample, democratic
sample, and challenger victories). This produces nine series of models, meaning that each variable has
nine chances to be designated a strong predictor (excepting democracy, which is dropped from the
democratic sub-sample). I treat any variable that is significant across at least three BMA series as an
important predictor worth incorporating in subsequent analyses (see Table 3.4).
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Of the 14 variables tested by BMA, five (including SA autonomy) appear to be strong
predictors. I incorporate each of these when estimating Models 6-11. As reported in Table 3.5,
coefficients for SA autonomy are negative and significant across all models save one at a conservative
threshold (p < 0.5). I also calculate the predicted marginal effects for Models 7 and 9, as presented in
Figure 3.7. These results lend support to H2a and H2b, suggesting that SA autonomy tends to hinder
mitigation in both the long and short run.
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Discussion
In the long run, it appears that countries emerging from conflict episodes become more
likely to achieve mitigation when security institutions have little or no autonomy from regime leaders.
The negative association between SA autonomy and the time until mitigation is achieved persists
across multiple model specifications, though it does appear sensitive to changes in sample and
measurement strategies. Results from Model 4 are perhaps most important and worth highlighting;
they show that among the subsample of democratic cases — cases where regime leaders should have
the greatest incentives to curb repression — relatively high levels of SA autonomy diminish the ‘risk’
of achieving mitigation by about 66% in any given post-termination year. These results are
statistically significant despite a sample size of just 51 cases. This is strong support for the argument
that democratization alone does not guarantee a new era of respect for human rights. While
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democratic institutions are clearly important, they cannot constrain security forces from perpetrating
killings when security institutions are highly autonomous from civilian control.
These findings also reinforce another lesson long taken for granted in the transitology
literature (see, for example, Linz and Steppan 1996) — institutional structures have enduring legacies
that can either help or hinder the transition to liberal governance. Since SA autonomy changes little
after campaign termination, and since the change itself is not a strong predictor of human rights
outcomes, it seems clear that SA autonomy comprises a durable and potentially problematic
institutional legacy. There are likely many reasons that a regime loses control over its security
apparatus. However autonomy comes to be gained, a security apparatus is unlikely to lose it even
after important political developments like conflict termination and regime change. The implication is
clear: leaders bent on reestablishing control over their security forces (hopefully to restrain them
from perpetrating abuse) are unlikely to succeed in the short run. In practical terms, this means that
local practitioners and foreign states may yield few short-term gains from pressuring governments to
restrain security forces when those security forces are already autonomous. In those instances, ending
political killings may depend on strategies that focus on security commanders and creating incentives
for restraint.
An additional finding is worth noting — it seems that resistance movements can drastically
improve the chances of attaining mitigation by committing to nonviolent tactics. Of the 88
terminations43 that followed nonviolent campaigns, 61 (nearly 70%) eventually achieved mitigation.
Posterior estimates based on Model 1 predict near universal achievement of mitigation among
nonviolent cases by the end of the study period (see Figure 3.8) regardless of security apparatus
autonomy (though lower levels of SA autonomy accelerate the speed at which mitigation is achieved).

43

This figure excludes cases of nonviolent resistance that entered the study already having achieved mitigation.
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These results are not replicated, however, by subsequent BMA estimates. One possible interpretation
is that nonviolence may exert an effect in the long-run but not the short-run.

Conclusion
What prevents countries from achieving human rights goals after conflict termination and
political transition? The preceding analyses show that regimes with the greatest incentives to mitigate
(if not eliminate) political killings oftentimes fail to do so. Importantly, the extent to which a security
apparatus is autonomous from regime control seems to play an important role in human rights
outcomes. This corroborates my argument that security forces often prefer to impede human rights
reforms and do so when they have sufficient power to resist civilian leadership. Compounding the
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problem, civilian leaders have few means of reigning in security forces once they become
autonomous, even after regime change. Unfortunately, this means that security apparatus autonomy
becomes an institutional problem that can undermine a human rights agenda for decades.
These findings do not overturn existing literature, which emphasizes the importance of
democratic institutions in preventing abuse. However, they show the limitations of democratic
institutions in certain circumstances. Instituting elections can be an important, but insufficient, step
towards defending citizens’ physical integrity rights in the wake of contentious politics.
Another important insight arises from these analyses — when leaders cannot compel their
security forces to respect the rights of citizens, security forces occasionally do so anyway. This is
extremely important given that liberal-minded leaders often lack the means to compel obedience
from security forces, and that security forces can defend their autonomy for decades. These leaders
need alternative methods of curbing violence if coercion is not an option. In the following chapter, I
explore, among other things, the incentive structures that lead most security forces in Nepal to
forego human rights abuse despite the Nepal Army’s ability to rebuff elected leaders practically at
will.
The qualitative research presented in the following chapter addresses another important
issue — these quantitative analyses focus exclusively on the relationship between civilian regimes and
their military forces. This is because no data exists to quantify regime leaders’ control over police
forces across the study period. This is problematic given that both civilian security personnel (police)
and military personnel are capable of perpetrating human rights violations, and both may be inclined
to continue doing so in the wake of any given conflict episode. Further, regime leaders’ control over
military and non-military institutions could conceivably vary within cases. This is certainly true, as I
will show, in the case of Nepal. The following case-study, therefore, presents an important
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opportunity to test my argument more rigorously, and to problematize or complicate the quantitative
findings I have just presented.
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Chapter 4: Democratization and State Repression in Nepal
Introduction
In the previous chapters, I argued that security apparatus autonomy poses a critical barrier to
regime leaders who wish to reduce human rights violations. When and if this barrier is overcome,
security forces will usually adopt restraint. I then tested this argument quantitatively, considering all
cases of conflict termination in the world between 1945-2013. Those analyses show that SA
autonomy associates positively with state-sponsored killings after conflicts, supporting the argument.
This support is qualified, however, for several reasons. First, the analyses rely on information about
civil-military relations, exclusively, as a proxy for security forces’ autonomy, even though law
enforcement agencies are an important component of any security apparatus. Beyond that specific
data availability issue, the trade-offs of quantitative methods are well documented. While they can
provide evidence of a claim’s generalizability, they do little to test whether causal mechanisms
perform as theorized. Nor can they adequately identify or account for un-theorized omitted variables
or scope conditions (see, for instance, George and Bennett 2005; Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2005;
Seawright and Gerring 2008; Slater and Ziblatt 2014).
To address these blind spots, I take on Nepal’s 1996-2006 civil war and its aftermath as a
case study. In the following sections, I use historical narratives and elite interviews to show that the
logic of my argument should travel to Nepal, where security forces broadly participated in citizensortition during the civil war, and where post-conflict democratization created incentives to end
repression for elected leaders. Importantly, autonomy from government control was distributed
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unevenly between different security institutions within the country after the civil war: While the
Nepali Army was largely autonomous, the government wielded extensive control over the Nepal
Police, except in the Terai region where government infrastructure had largely disintegrated during
the war. This sub-national variation provides two opportunities for rigorous controlled comparisons
(in line with Slater and Ziblatt 2014).
An examination of human rights reporting shows that Nepal police adopted restraint
throughout much of the country, but not in the Terai region where rank-and-file police officers went
largely un-monitored. Those officers were therefore free to continue relying on the violent
repertoires of behavior inculcated during the war, in line with my argument. Though threat
perception may have played a role in Terai-based police officers’ decision-making, the resulting
violence embarrassed the central government, which ultimately established a more robust
institutional presence and firmer control over its forces in the region. Alternative explanations, such
as the emergence of democratic institutions, the spread of international norms against human rights
abuse, and political economy structures cannot account for this variation in behavior between Nepal
Police forces in the Terai and those in the rest of the country since they did not vary.
The Nepali Army’s decision to eschew all forms of severe repression, despite having relied
on these methods during the civil war, is intriguing. As I will demonstrate, this decision is due largely
to the importance of norms against human rights violations within the international system, which
creates several incentives for restraint. The Nepal case, therefore, helps illustrate that even
autonomous security institutions can be persuaded to adopt restraint under certain conditions.
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Case Selection: Why Nepal?
Several factors influenced my case selection strategy. Most importantly, I searched for a
confirmatory case in which a treatment (security apparatus autonomy) corresponds with an outcome
predicted by theory. The idea behind this strategy (see Seawright and Gerring 2008) is to augment an
initial round of large-n research with in-depth qualitative analysis. Where the initial round of
quantitative research has identified a general pattern consistent with expectations, one or more case
studies should then be used to test whether the theorized causal mechanism operates as predicted
rather than some competing explanation or random chance. A confirmatory case selection strategy
therefore facilitates both theory-testing and theory development.
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Ideally, researchers should search for on-the-line cases when selecting potential confirmatory
cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008),44 or cases that lie close to the regression line, if one has been
developed. As Figure 4.1 depicts, Nepal fits this criterion according to a linear regression equation
similar to Models 6–11, presented in the previous chapter. Where the previous models treated
‘mitigation’ as a binary outcome variable, I now use a continuous version of FFPK observed five
years after each campaign termination.45 This model estimates an FFPK score of 1.45 for Nepal in
2011 (five years after the fall of King Gyanendra’s government in 2006) based on its SA autonomy
score and other control variables, missing the observed score of 1.10 by 0.35, well under half of the
average residual. Nepal’s observed score is even closer to the regression line when the additional
control variables are ignored.
In addition to Nepal’s value as an on-the-line case, several practical considerations made
Nepal a good candidate for a case study. First, the 1996-2006 civil conflict had ended recently
enough that most of the elites involved in the conflict (both combatants and noncombatants)
remained healthy and active in Nepalese society. But enough time had passed (13 years at the time
my fieldwork was undertaken) that elites could be relatively open about sharing their experiences,
especially those who have retired from active service in the security forces. This is not to say that
there are no sensitive topics of discussion. For instance, human rights activists and others continue to
pursue accountability for former rebels, police, and military personnel accused of perpetrating
violations during the war, and ongoing efforts to implement a transitional justice regime are
controversial.46 However, the leaders of CPN-Maoist (which would change its name to the Maoist

This methodology can be expanded into a nested case study design (see Lieberman 2005) where the
researcher has the resources to perform multiple case studies.
44

For illustrative purposes, I have used a linear regression equation. Additionally, the sample includes cases that
entered the data with high interval-scale FFPK scores.
45

Ghimire, Binod. “Nepal yet to Ensure Transitional Justice.” Kathmandu Post. January 23, 2021.
https://kathmandupost.com/national/2021/01/23/nepal-yet-to-ensure-transitional-justice.
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Centre after the end of the civil war) have become tightly integrated into Nepal’s multi-party
democratic politics, and tensions between them, other political leaders, and security forces are not
high. In fact, shifting political coalitions have eroded or blurred old political divides.
Other practical considerations include Nepal’s security situation, which is quite safe.
Additionally, Nepal is a relatively small country and elites (even those from the Terai) cluster in
Kathmandu, the capital. This reduces the difficulty of interview-based research, sparing the
researcher from travelling long distances to meet interviewees. And finally, my personal network of
mentors happened to provide a critical entry point to Nepalese society, the Nepal Peacebuilding
Initiative (NPI). The NPI is a local, politically unaffiliated NGO that develops grassroots
peacebuilding capacity, often in Nepal’s remote villages. Its researchers were instrumental in
connecting me with a diverse array of respondents, for which I remain extremely grateful.

Methodology
A case study provides a means of interrogating a proposed causal mechanism that would
otherwise have remained in a ‘black box,’ extremely difficult to access with quantitative methods
alone. To open up Nepal’s black box, I rely on a mix of historical research, process tracing (George
and Bennett 2005), and elite interviews (see Tansey 2007). Ultimately, I conducted 42 interviews with
43 individuals in Kathmandu over the course of approximately five weeks in the late summer of
2019. These individuals included retired and active officers in the Nepali Army and Nepal Police,
active and former government officials, grassroots civil society organizers, human rights lawyers,
journalists, and aid workers. Nearly all interviewees were from Nepal, save for two Westerners with
extensive experience in the country. The identities of all respondents have been anonymized, and I
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refer to them only by pseudonymous initials. Interviews were semi-structured47 and recorded in
nearly all cases (excepting where respondents declined). The Nepal Peacebuilding Initiative very
kindly connected me to about half of my interviewees. I used the snowball method to find additional
interviewees. To mitigate bias, I also solicited help from acquaintances I made from everyday life. For
instance, a neighbor introduced me to his boss ES, an INGO worker who sat for an interview. In
other cases, I cold-called organizations that I discovered via my many trips across the city. From
these interviews, I offer many illustrative quotes which I use to highlight important findings.
As previously mentioned, I selected Nepal as a confirmatory case, in which quantitative data
accord with theoretical expectations. In this case, scores for security apparatus autonomy (V-Dem’s
HOG removal by other in practice or v2exrmhgnp_4 variable) are low while Nepal’s freedom from political
killings score is high (this right is ‘mostly’ respected) in the years following the end of the civil war
and transition to democracy. But how meaningful are these observations? Using qualitative methods,
I subject the case to a more rigorous examination. This entails a two-step process assessing, first,
whether quantitative data accurately capture conditions on the ground while developing a deeper
understanding of events. The second step entails testing whether the proposed causal mechanism
(security apparatus autonomy) was pivotal to Nepal’s human rights outcome, in line with theoretical
expectations.
The first step of validating quantitative data is especially important in this instance because
v2exrmhgnp_4, which I rely on to operationalize security apparatus autonomy, focuses exclusively on a
country’s military, ignoring law enforcement institutions. This is limiting since my argument pertains
to all security institutions in post-conflict environments — wherever security forces engage in
citizen-sortition, they are likely to continue making use of political killings unless actively prevented
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See appendix for my standard list of questions.
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from doing so by regime leaders. By examining the Nepal Police alongside military personnel, I begin
to address this blind spot.
My inquiry into Nepal’s security forces, their relationship with the government, and their
subsequent behavior reveals useful sub-national variation. As I will show subsequently, the newly
elected government (led initially by former rebel leaders) was unable to impose reforms on the Army
or coopt its senior commanders, demonstrating the Army’s substantial autonomy. Contrariwise, the
government exercised close control over senior commanders in the Nepal Police, deciding whom to
promote and whom to pass over. This situation presents a valuable opportunity to test my argument
under highly controlled conditions, in line with Slater and Ziblatt’s (2014) prescription. On one hand,
I have identified two security institutions with varying levels of autonomy from civilian control. On
the other, country-level factors are held constant — the Nepali Army and Nepal Police both operate
in an environment where the extent of democratic governance, that government’s threat perception,
support from the international community, the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel, and the
political economy are all the same. Under these conditions, my theory predicts that the Nepali Army
would be likely to continue perpetrating political killings after the end of the civil war and the
transition to democracy. Contrariwise, the Nepal Police should cease perpetrating political killings
since democratic regime leaders exercised dominance over the NP hierarchy.
In a surprising turn of events, the Nepali Army, as an institution, completely gave up the use
of human rights abuse following the end of its deployment in 2006, demonstrating how
circumstances beyond a regime’s control can incentivize restraint on the part of an autonomous
security apparatus. In contrast, the Nepal Police exhibited a range of behavior, exercising restraint
throughout most of the country, but not in Nepal’s remote Terai region. I therefore leverage a
second highly controlled comparison to understand why constables posted to the Terai behaved so
differently to their peers elsewhere.
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Case Background
The modern state of Nepal has existed since 1768, when King Prithvi Narayan Shah of
Ghorka united (by force of arms) dozens of his independent neighbors under a single Hindu
monarchy. The power of the monarchy waxed and waned (and then waxed again) throughout
Nepal’s long history before finally being abolished in 2008, following years of political turmoil and a
decade of civil war. Arguably, that chapter of turmoil began in 1990, when a diverse array of prodemocracy reformers coalesced into a civil resistance campaign now referred to as the first people’s
movement or Jan Andolan I. Nepal’s oldest (and technically banned) political party the Nepali
Congress (usually simply referred to as ‘Congress’) spearheaded the movement, though the support
of other parties, especially the United Left Front (ULF) (itself a temporary coalition of Communist
parties), and civil society groups was crucial. Following massive street protests which sometimes
turned bloody, Nepal’s reigning monarch, King Birendra, acceded to the movement’s demand for
democratic reforms. By the end of the year, Congress, the ULF, and other parties had drafted and
ratified a new constitution introducing democratic multi-party politics with a much-diminished role
for the king. Elections were held in the following year, ushering in Nepal’s first freely elected
parliament (Baral 1994; Thapa and Sharma 2009).
The partnership between Congress and the left-wing parties immediately fractured after the
ratification of the 1990 constitution, the moment they became rivals for control of parliament. The
ULF, itself, splintered, giving way to a new left-wing coalition calling itself the Communist Party of
Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML, almost always referred to simply as the UML). After
Congress secured an electoral victory in the 1991 elections, a contingent of hardliners within the
UML pushed their party onto a confrontational path against Congress and its prime minister, G.P.
Koirala. Following months of violent street protests intended to force Koirala’s resignation, the
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UML abandoned its resistance campaign after a negotiated settlement with Koirala and his backers
(Baral 1994). By 1994, however, a UML faction led by Baburam Bhattarai and Pushpa Kamal Dahal
(better known by his nom de guerre ‘Prachanda’) had become disenchanted with what they saw as
corrupt and deeply conservative parliamentary politics (Jha 2015). They therefore broke with their
moderate leftist counterparts in the UML and returned to anti-system opposition. They then formed
the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) and began preparing to wage a guerilla
insurgency against the state (Thapa and Sharma 2009; Adhikari 2014).
The first shots of the Maoist conflict were fired on February 13, 1996 (Jha 2015, 27), when a
party of Maoists armed only with two 1950s-era rifles attacked a police outpost in Nepal’s rural Rolpa
district, a part of Nepal’s southern plains region known as the Terai. The insurgency soon escalated
after this first modest attack, as Bhattarai and Prachanda mobilized the Madheshi communities of the
Terai into their movement. Probably because the Terai had been historically marginalized by highcaste authorities from the hills (based in Kathmandu), CPN-Maoist would come to draw support
from thousands of sympathizers and full-time militants. By the early 2000s, the Maoists had gained
control of large swathes of territory after dislodging the beleaguered Nepal Police who, reeling from
their defeats, had become badly demoralized.
In a bizarre turn of events, King Birendra was suddenly killed (along with many family
members) in 2001 by his son the crown prince, leading to the succession of Birendra’s brother
Gyanendra. Gyanendra departed sharply from his brother’s policies, deciding to both (gradually)
abrogate the 1990 constitution and deploy the Royal Nepali Army (RNA) to combat the Maoist
insurgency. The deployment of the RNA in 2003 precipitated a sharp escalation in violence, though
the strategic situation barely changed — the Maoists continued avoiding pitched battles with the
Army (preferring hit-and-run attacks) while governing large swathes of Nepal’s hinterlands.
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Emboldened by its previous successes, CPN-Maoist changed tactics in March 2004 and
launched a concerted multi-day attack on an Army base near the town of Beni. Despite displaying an
impressive logistical capacity, the attack failed badly, demonstrating to all players that, though the
Army could not dislodge the insurgents from the countryside, the Maoists could not dislodge the
Army from its fortifications. The war had become a stalemate (Adhikari 2014).
The situation changed again in 2005, when King Gyanendra suspended the 1990
constitution, dissolved parliament, and revived the absolute monarchy. This move alienated
Congress, the UML, and civil society (numerous rights advocacy groups had emerged during the war
to pressure both sides to avoid civilian casualties). By 2006, a grassroots civil resistance campaign
(often referred to as the Second People’s Movement or Jan Andolan II) organized by politically
independent activists had emerged to demand the restoration of democracy. Congress and the UML
quickly joined the movement. CPN-Maoist, having been forced to reckon with their failure at Beni,
also joined the movement, leading to the creation of the ideologically diverse ‘Seven Party Alliance.’
Two months later, after constant street protests in Kathmandu and across the country, Gyanendra
was forced to restore parliament and withdraw from politics.
Under the United Nation’s auspices, the Seven Parties Alliance had soon negotiated and
signed a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), formally ending the civil war. As stipulated by the
CPA, elections were held in 2008 to apportion delegates to the Constituent Assembly (CA), a body
that would both serve as an interim legislative body and draft the new constitution. After
campaigning vigorously in the election as a political party, CPN-Maoist won the largest number of
seats (38%) and formed a government with the UML as a junior partner. The Maoist government
lasted less than a year, however, before losing the support of the UML in 2009 during a
constitutional crisis (to be discussed in subsequent sections), leading to a new coalition government
between the UML and Congress. Politics have continued in this fashion since 2008, with regular free
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and fair elections but frequent coalitional collapses and realignments. In 2015, the new constitution
was finally ratified.

The Evolution of Nepal’s Security Apparatus
I now use a combination of historical research and interview data to shed light on the
evolution of Nepal’s security forces, composed of the Nepali Army and the Nepal Police, during the
turbulent 1990s and 2000s. The questions at hand are, did conflict processes normalize citizensortition practices among security forces, and how did the relationship between security forces and
the civilian government change over time? Respondents were by no means unanimous on this topic,
but there is a preponderance of evidence to suggest the answer to the first question is ‘yes.’ The
answer to the second question is more complex; as institutions, the Army emerged with significant
autonomy while the Nepal Police emerged with very little.

Combat experiences normalize extreme repression for security forces and Maoists
To begin with, repression in Nepal was prevalent prior to the restoration of parliament in
1990. In 1980, 10 years before the onset of instability and revolutionary politics, the country had an
FFPK score of -0.85, placing it the world’s 35th percentile at the time. OJ, a human rights lawyer,
pointed out that systemic violence in the pre-conflict era set the stage for events in the conflict and
post-conflict eras. Another respondent, a journalist, made a similar observation, noting that the war
followed centuries of autocratic governance [LD]. During the pre-conflict era, the monarchy used
Nepal’s police forces to maintain order with traditional methods, especially corporal punishment. In
the absence of a technical capacity for investigation, police officers resorted to slaps and beatings to
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elicit confessions and punish suspects.48 To some extent, therefore, violence was already a normal
part of life for Nepal’s security agents, especially police officers. Or, in other words, security forces’
‘repertoire’ already included many violent practices, including killings, prior to the Maoist conflict.
Things changed drastically, if briefly, when King Birendra, under pressure from a prodemocracy protest movement, re-instated Nepal’s parliament in 1990 after a three-decade hiatus.
Though by no means a perfect democracy,49 the transition to multi-party politics prompted a sudden
improvement in freedom from political killings. Nepal sky-rocketed from the 24th percentile in 1989
(repression had recently intensified in response to the pro-democracy movement) to the 43rd
percentile by 1992, falling just short of the global average score that year. From this peak, however,
the human rights situation steadily eroded as the regime turned to extreme measures to suppress
both civil and armed resistance. Extrajudicial executions and disappearances, in addition to rape and
other forms of torture, increased steadily after the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-Maoist)
kicked off its armed resistance in 1996.
Accounts of Nepal’s 1996-2006 civil war resemble other insurgencies in key ways. Most
saliently, an image emerges of relatively well-armed state forces deployed to remote outposts among
unfamiliar communities in search of militants trying to blend in among civilians and rough terrain (an
archetypical scenario of asymmetric warfare described by many works, including Valentino et al.
2004; Kalyvas 2006; Lyall and Wilson 2009). Civilians quickly became caught between these opposing
forces. While CPN-Maoist attempted to mobilize as many people into their revolutionary movement
as possible (sometimes with coercion), Nepal Police and (eventually) Army units worked to disrupt

To illustrate this point, LD pointed to the previously common practice of mutilating suspected rapists’
genitals. For security forces, some violations of physical integrity rights were clearly normalized.
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Though parliament was reinstated, democratic politics were never fully competitive or inclusive. There is
disagreement, in fact, about whether Nepal should be classified as a democracy at all prior to the 2002 royalist
coup. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), for instance, classify Nepal as a democracy during this period while
V-Dem classifies it as an ‘electoral autocracy.’
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those networks, often with indiscriminate and violent methods. To illustrate this point, several
respondents pointed towards mass arrests, especially in the Terai’s Bardiya district, in which entire
villages were sometimes detained and subjected to ill treatment (“Conflict-Related Disappearances in
Bardiya District” 2008). Killings and enforced disappearances became especially common between
2003 and 2005, after King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and deployed the Royal Nepali
Army (RNA)50 into the conflict zones, often working alongside police officers.51 Assassination spirals
became common, in which CPN forces responded to extrajudicial executions on the part of security
forces with their own executions, prompting more killings in turn.52
All told, the conflict produced over 14,000 deaths and disappearances. Though many of
these deaths were caused by combat, many are known to have been unlawful killings — local and
international human rights investigators have documented over 2,000 such instances, likely a
significant undercount (“Nepal Conflict Report” 2012). Clearly, both government and rebel forces
engaged in citizen-sortition dynamics, as each side sought to identify and eliminate informers and
sympathizers. This was a messy process in which armed agents (from both sides) often based their
decision-making on fear, avarice, or some combination of the two. Indeed, the importance of fear is
difficult to understate. For their part, police constables deployed to conflict zones were soon badly
‘demoralized.’53 And, though respondents never used the word ‘demoralized’ to refer to Army
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The Army’s name was shortened to the ‘Nepali Army’ after the abrogation of the monarchy in 2008.

In 2003, the government also established the Nepal Armed Police, an agency which falls under the Home
Ministry’s remit, but which participated in the conflict under the operational control of the military. Its agents
are heavily armed law enforcement officials.
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See, for instance, Adhikari (2014) for a journalistic treatment of these retaliatory cycles.

Several respondents made this point during interviews. This assessment is made especially reliable by a
retired high-ranking commander in the Nepal Police who participated in the counterinsurgency.
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personnel, interviews make clear that at least some officers were keenly aware of their vulnerability.54
One respondent [DS] who worked as a park ranger during the conflict, and who therefore carefully
balanced contacts with government and non-government forces to maintain neutrality, described
forces on both sides as ‘scared.’ For him, the violence he observed during the conflict was largely the
product of this fear. These assessments portray a situation in which insurgents and counterinsurgents
resorted to killings as a means of self-defense in an environment of high insecurity and low
information. Exacerbating the situation for many government forces was a chronic lack of
equipment and resources.55 Many individual combatants were therefore primed for violence.
But in addition to fear, killings and torture were also driven by greed in some cases. For their
part, Maoist fighters often extorted goods and land rights from relatively well-off civilians living in
the conflict zone. This practice was often conducted formally, as part of a centralized taxation
scheme. But individual fighters or commanders sometimes went beyond their instructions, extracting
property for personal use. Denunciations and executions were sometimes a means of carrying out
this work. And some government forces are known to have undertaken similar measures at times.56
Even more troubling, many women have accused security forces of using denunciations and arrests
as a means of sexual gratification and rape.57 Unarmed political actors were also caught up in these
processes, as violence bled over into bitter local-level rivalries between Nepali Congress and UML

One respondent, who participated in counter-insurgency operations in Bardiya district (among other places)
as an RNA junior officer, described harrowing vehicular patrols and near-misses from IED attacks.
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MD, a journalist, emphasized the impact this had on police officers, who sometimes felt they lacked the
means (and sometimes security) to comply with official policies to deal humanely with detainees and suspected
Maoists.
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Respondents universally recognized the large amount of ‘extortion’ that went on during the war as
perpetrated by both sides.
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Security forces (including most of my respondents affiliated with the security forces) have vociferously
denied that this was the case, or denied that the practice was widespread. But respondents unaffiliated with the
security forces were unanimous in portraying the practice as commonplace.
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activists (in addition to other political parties). For these local party organizations, denunciations
became a means of eliminating rivals for political influence and power.
The extent to which killings and other violence were sanctioned by state and rebel leaders is
highly disputed. In general, it seems likely that executions (perpetrated by both sides) were often
conducted outside the direct knowledge of commanders, but command-level policies (on both sides)
probably led to an atmosphere of permissiveness. My aim here is not to adjudicate commanders’
culpability for human rights violations, only to demonstrate that (through a mix of motives)
extrajudicial killings and disappearances must have been incorporated into security agents’ and
militants’ repertoires. In all probability, a small minority of combatants themselves participated in
executions, but the practice was by no means exceptional.
The normalization of killings had long-lasting consequences, noticeably altering expectations
for violence across Nepalese society. One respondent, a human rights activist, worried that, “After
the conflict, the way people have used violence- I think that has become a norm,” (EI) referring to
Nepalis in general. Another human rights activist affiliated with leftist politics (AE), homed in on the
way security forces had used racial prejudices to profile Madheshi people (made up of several groups
from the Terai or plains region of the country) during the conflict. Those practices, he claimed,
disposed police and military personnel to use more brutality against Madheshi people afterward,
implying ethnic markers were interpreted as signs of disloyalty.
Perhaps most tellingly, a former high-ranking commander of the Nepal Police (NH), noted
how combat experience re-conditioned the many constables who served temporarily in the
counterinsurgency. Despite low morale in conflict zones, a steady stream of recruits volunteered for
counter-insurgency rotations due to extra wages (hazard pay) and better opportunities for subsequent
promotion. Afterwards, many of these constables struggled with their experiences. Once transferred
out of combat where duties returned to ‘normal’ police work, NH and his fellow commanders
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struggled to manage them. Several of these constables, explained NH, fired on civilians unnecessarily
and without orders after their transfers away from conflict zones, seriously embarrassing the Nepal
Police. These incidents occurred even though combat veterans were put through human rights
courses and mentorship programs intended to re-condition them for normal duty.

The Nepali Army Emerges from the Conflict as a Powerful Political Player
Prior to Nepal’s civil war, conventional wisdom portrays the Nepali Army (formerly the
Royal Nepali Army) as fiercely loyal to the monarchy. Certainly, the language that Army officers used
in my hearing to speak about the (now deposed) monarchy fits into that discourse. During and
outside of interviews, several officers fondly alluded to a common saying when describing that
defunct relationship: ‘the Army is a slave to its master [the king].’ The abdication of King Gyanendra
and (much worse) subsequent abolishment of the monarchy in 2008, therefore, came as a hard blow
to the officer corps. As one journalist put it, the Army felt ‘orphaned’ (Jha 2014, 73). Worse still, the
fall of the monarchy preceded the election of the Maoist government in 2008 (which had formed a
ruling government in coalition with its junior partner, the UML). In other words, the Army would
now fall under the command of the very opponent it had previously fought to a bloody stalemate.
Army officers now feared that the Maoist leader Prachanda, now prime minister, would attempt to
suborn their institution. Those fears, by all accounts, were justified.
By the time I conducted fieldwork in the summer of 2019, trust in political parties had
plummeted, and elections were thought of as primarily a means of apportioning state contracts and
salaries rather than adjudicating policy and ideological disputes.58 This distrust extended to the

Nepalese nationals and foreign observers view political corruption as endemic. Nearly all my respondents
recognized this problem, apportioning blame evenly between all the political parties. However, several
respondents expressed some hope that this state of affairs would change under the Nepal Communist Party
(NCP), created from the merger of the Maoist Centre and UML. Since it enjoyed an absolute majority, it was
58
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Maoists, who had recently (and temporarily, it would turn out) unified with their less radical
counterparts in the UML, forming a new group called the Nepal Communist Party (NPC). But years
earlier, before and in the wake of their 2008 electoral victory, the Maoists pursued an ambitious
ideological agenda. They were, in fact, looking to capture the Nepalese state in order, finally, to
accomplish a socialist revolution. To accomplish this objective, they had (for the most part)
abandoned armed force in favor of multi-party politics. Indeed, the Maoists proved themselves to be
effective political campaigners, capturing 220 out of 575 seats in the 2008 Constituent Assembly
elections. Despite these successes, the coalition government they formed could not, alone,
revolutionize the country’s social and economic systems. The Army, especially, posed an obstacle to
achieving a national Maoist ‘hegemony’ (Jha 2014, 71).

Figure 4.2: A Hospitality Worker's Shirt Expresses the Prevailing View of Nepalese Party Politics

thought to have a chance of lasting an entire five-year term. This was not to be, however, as the NCP split
vertically in 2020.
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To reiterate, Nepal’s armed conflict had ended in a military stalemate. Though the Maoists
operated openly throughout much of rural Nepal in 2004, their subsequent push to defeat the Army
in prolonged battles failed decisively. This became evident after Prachanda’s unsuccessful assault, the
Maoists’ largest ever operation, on the Army barracks at Beni (“Beni Remembers Devastating
Attack” 22 March 2015). By the end of the armed conflict, when the 2006 Jan Andolan overthrew
King Gyanendra, the Army remained a powerful and intact institution. In fact, its capacity had grown
steadily and drastically over the course of the war after its initial mobilization. Between 2002 and
2005, the RNA doubled its troop strength from 47,000 to 96,000 soldiers (Adhikari 2014, 68). The
government also permitted the RNA to expand its interests in Nepal’s business sector as a source of
revenue, which remains a source of concern for watchdog groups who track corruption (“What the
Indictment of Two Officials Means for Reforms within Nepal Army” 27 May 2020.). By comparison,
the Maoists mustered about 7,000 cadres by the end of the conflict, many of whom were remobilized
into the Young Communist League (YCL), a Maoist-controlled militia and electoral campaign
apparatus.
After the conflict ended in 2006, the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) signed by all
parties stipulated that the military be ‘democratized,’ entailing new recruitment from historically
marginalized communities, integration with some Maoist fighters, a sharp net reduction in personnel,
and human rights training for officers. In fact, the military openly flouted these stipulations (except
for the human rights trainings) under the leadership of Army Chief of Staff Rookmangud Katawal,
and even increased net recruitment (“Report of the Secretary-General on the Request of Nepal for
United Nations Assistance in Support of Its Peace Process” 2009). For his part, Katawal’s resistance
to implementing the CPA stemmed largely from his suspicion that Prachanda’s government sought

110

fundamental social and economic reforms, and perhaps even one-party rule (Adhikari 2014, 70; Jha
2014).
By late 2008, the stage was set for a duel between Nepal’s civilian government, led by
Prachanda, and its security apparatus, led by Katawal. The former was a Marxist revolutionary, had
come to power with a democratic mandate and broad (though by no means universal) popular
support, and sought to implement radical reforms at all levels of Nepal’s state and society. The latter,
composed chiefly of the Nepali Army under Chief Katawal’s leadership, retained a near-monopoly
on armed force, the implicit capacity to attempt a coup if provoked, and shared a conservative vision
of Nepal’s future.
Recognizing the strength of Katawal’s position, Prachanda set out to coopt the Army Chief
(as well as other high-ranking generals) rather than oppose him outright. Several respondents,
including retired Army generals, commented on the prime minister’s early efforts (evidently
successful) to establish a personal rapport with Katawal, facilitating a potential compromise
arrangement. But Katawal continued to resist any efforts to reform the Army as per the CPA. As
pressure from his own supporters mounted (Jha 2014, 71-72), Prachanda turned to new tactics. In
the winter of 2009, Maoist defense minister, Ram Bahadur Thapa (better known as “Badal”) denied
tenure to several brigadier generals, a move designed to create a power vacuum and ensuing power
struggle among the Army’s senior commanders. At the same time, in an effort to further splinter the
Army’s cohesion, Prachanda was courting Katawal’s second-in-command and next-in-line for
promotion to the Army’s highest post, General Bahadur Khadka.
Prachanda crossed the proverbial Rubicon on May 3, 2009 when he ordered Chief Katawal
sacked. When asked about this period, AG, a politician and former government minister affiliated
with Congress, reflected that the political establishment viewed Prachanda’s strategy with alarm,
anticipating that the rest of the Army’s generals would respond to Katawal’s ouster by deferring to
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Prachanda’s authority — if the prime minister proved capable of firing the Army’s highest-ranking
general, he could fire any other general at will. The move was not perceived as an attempt to
subordinate the Army to civilian rule, however, so much as an attempt to bring the Army under Maoist
control, transforming it into a powerful revolutionary tool and threat to multi-party democracy.
Prachanda’s order was very much a gambit, however, in that neither side was sure of how the
resulting power struggle would unfold, or what damage might result.59
Ultimately, Chief Katawal weathered his attempted sacking due largely to three crucial
factors. The first, implicitly, was Katawal’s command over tens of thousands of armed agents, and
the physical threat this posed to Prachanda and his Maoist government. Less obvious, but probably
no less crucial, was domestic support from the Nepali Congress and UML, the latter of which
remained the Maoists’ junior partner in government up until the 2009 crisis. Finally, international
support for Katawal was also important — Indian diplomats, anticipating Prachanda’s strategy, had
worked quietly to build unified support for Katawal (against Prachanda) between Congress, the
UML, and other political parties as tensions ratcheted up (Jha 2014).
When Prachanda issued his order relieving Katawal of command, Nepal’s president (and
Nepali Congress member), Ram Baran Yadav, quickly countered by issuing a letter (without legal or
constitutional standing) asking Katawal to stay on as Army chief as if nothing had happened. After a
brief but tense interval in which it became clear that he lacked the means to enforce his order,
Prachanda resigned on May 25. Immediately afterward, a new coalition government led by the UML
came to power, this time with Congress playing the role of junior partner. One respondent described
the moment as a pivot point marking a swing away from reformist politics back towards a
conservative status quo [MD]. Conveying the same idea, another respondent referenced a common

Many respondents described an extremely tense two-day period in which Chief Katawal slept in his offices
rather than risk being somehow isolated from his staff.
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acronym to explain that this was the moment when the PEON60 (Permanent Establishment of
Nepal) might have crumbled but instead survived [AE]. It, meaning primarily the UML and
Congress, did so by coming to a political bargain (backed by India) with the Army. Prachanda’s
ouster, therefore, was as much a victory for the UML and Congress as it was for the Army. Tellingly,
AG, the high-ranking member of the Congress Party, chuckled fondly at the memory of Prachanda’s
resignation when reflecting on that episode.
Prachanda’s failure to oust Chief Katawal illustrates the limits of electoral authority over
security forces. Students of the coup’s d’état literature will not find this point surprising — security
forces have made frequent use of coups since World War II, even against well-defended and
consolidated regimes (DeBruin 2019). Formal political authority over security forces never
guarantees their obedience. But what this episode also demonstrates is that security forces do not
need to carry out a coup to resist civilian leaders. In this instance, Katawal was able to rely on allies
within the parliamentary system, as well as Indian support, to defy constitutional orders, mortally
wounding the Maoist government in the process. Had Congress and (especially) the UML failed to
support Chief Katawal, the Army might have resorted to armed force, capitalizing on its increased
size and capacity. This extreme mode of resistance was rendered unnecessary, however, by the
Army’s shared interest with Congress and the UML in preserving the status quo.
To what extent was the Nepali Army autonomous from regime control in the aftermath of
the civil war? On one hand, Prachanda clearly exercised some authority over the Army. Otherwise,
Defense Minister Thapa’s denial of tenure to high-ranking Army generals could not have been
enforced. And soon afterward, when Prachanda raised the stakes of the conflict by formally
dismissing Katawal, the latter did not rely solely on his own authority to resist the order, instead
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An inside joke, I gather, among left-leaning political activists.
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drawing on allies from the Nepalese political establishment and India. Had Congress and the UML
been united in demanding that the Army submit to Prachanda’s legal order, perhaps Katawal would
have been forced to give up his command.61 In other words, the Army was not free to operate as it
wished, entirely without consequences. In the end, however, the Prachanda’s failed attempt to sack
Katawal shows that the Army enjoyed significant autonomy. This becomes especially clear when
comparing Nepal’s post-transition history to Argentina’s, where newly elected President Raul
Alfonsin quickly fired all his country’s highest-ranking generals on the heels of his inauguration and
then proceeded to orchestrate a series of prosecutions against many more officers (as discussed in
Chapter 2). Though Alfonsin lacked complete control over his armed forces (as demonstrated by a
slew of mutinies in the late 1980s and early 1990s), he clearly had more control than Prachanda or his
successors in Nepal.

The Nepal Police Emerge from the Conflict without Autonomy
If the Army emerged from Nepal’s civil war and democratization with demonstrable
independence from civilian control, the opposite is true of the Nepal Police (NP), which, as
respondents made clear, civilian authorities easily administered. This becomes especially clear when
examining how inspector generals of police (the highest-ranking position of the NP and abbreviated
IGP) are promoted and fired. In fact, the second and third IGPs to helm the institution after
democratization were fired by civilian authorities due to their connection to embezzlement cases
investigated by an anti-corruption body (both IGPs were eventually convicted and sentenced to jail
time) (Sharma 31 Aug. 2016). By comparison, Army personnel have only very rarely faced
investigations and indictments (much less convictions), even though many soldiers and officers are
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Alternatively, he might have attempted to launch a coup, which could have ended either in failure or success.
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thought (including by nearly all my respondents) to participate widely in corruption schemes (“What
the Indictment of Two Officials Means for Reforms within Nepali Army” 27 May 2020).
Another more recent example is worth recounting. In early 2018, the Congress-led
government needed to appoint a new IGP. Ultimately, the government passed over the senior
ranking Assistant IGP (AIGP) Ramesh Kharel in favor of AIGP Sarbendra Khanal (“IGP
Appointment: Ramesh Kharel to Quit, Pushkar Karki Okay with Decision” 11 April 2018). Congress
leaders later lamented this decision publicly, identifying it as a public relations misstep and a factor in
their subsequent loss at the polls the following February (“Gachhadar, Shrestha Defend Nepali
Congress Leadership” 27 April 2018). This also signals Congress’s agency (at the time) over the NP
— had Congress been unable to make this decision itself (as opposed to being forced to respect the
police chain of command) it would probably not have portrayed the decision as a miscalculation. It is
not difficult to find other incidents in which political authorities intervened in police operations to
overturn internal staffing or administrative decisions. In 2014, for instance, the Kathmandu Post
reported that the Election Committee, another civilian body, contravened in the punishment (for
flouting the chain of command) of a senior superintendent (“Probe Panel Wants Kharel Transferred”
4 June 2014). Were the NP, as an institution, autonomous from civilian control, it is extremely
unlikely that it would permit outsiders to meddle in disciplinary decisions.
My interviews also make clear that the Nepal Police, like much of Nepal’s civil service,
remains beholden to political authorities in ways that are problematic. As MI (an official with the
National Human Rights Commission of Nepal) explained, Nepal’s bureaucrats have almost no
autonomy from elected officials, meaning that civil servants must cater to political party elites to win
promotions or desirable postings, or even keep their jobs. Recognizing this problem, AG (the
Congress-linked former minister) lamented that party affiliation and favoritism drive hiring decisions
in most government offices, including the police service. These patronage networks influence and
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impede the day-to-day business of rank-and-file police officers. Officers attempting to perform their
duties impartially have complained to OJ, a human rights lawyer, that superiors regularly intervene in
their work, deflecting investigations away from individuals with political clout. High-ranking
bureaucrats have many tools at their disposal with which to orchestrate these interventions, especially
the ability to suddenly transfer constables and other employees to new positions in different
locations.
The corruption endemic to Nepal’s police force shows that civilian control over security
forces does not produce universally desirable outcomes. Nevertheless, this examination makes clear
that civilian leaders enjoy considerable power over the NP’s hierarchy and, by extension, can
influence the behavior of rank-and-file constables. Having established the NP’s lack of autonomy,
after also having established the Army’s autonomy and both institutions’ adoption of sortition
killings during the conflict, I turn to each institution’s human rights record in the post-conflict era.

Exploring Nepal’s Post-Conflict Human Rights Outcomes
A complex picture of Nepal emerges from the preceding observations, facilitating a sub-state
controlled comparison of Nepali Army and Nepal Police (Slater and Ziblatt 2013). On the one hand
both institutions used sortition practices extensively during the Maoist conflict, leading to a period of
widespread executions and disappearances. Army personnel were responsible for the majority of
deaths, but police have also been implicated in atrocities. Moreover, police were integrated into Army
operations and would have acquired a great deal of exposure to sortition practices. It is fair to say,
therefore, that both Army and Police personnel would have emerged from their combat experiences
having incorporated lethal violence into their repertoires. In other words, these forces would have
been primed or socialized to continue killing in the wake of the conflict, given opportunities to do so.
In terms of autonomy, however, the two institutions differ. The Army acquired a great deal of
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independence from civilian control during the war, as amply demonstrated by Chief Katawal’s
successful clash with Prime Minister Prachanda. The police, on the other hand, remained under
civilian control, as the firing of several inspector generals amply illustrates. Meanwhile, Nepal
remained a competitive multiparty democracy, even in the wake of its constitutional crisis in 2009 —
a crisis which failed to prevent Prachanda from reclaiming the prime minister’s office for a second
time (if briefly) in 2016.

Applying my argument to the case of Nepal, the prior observations give rise to two different
empirical implications. First, despite their widespread use of sortition behavior in the past, police
should have given up lethal practices after Nepal’s civil war. This is due to high-ranking police
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commanders’ dependence on government leaders for promotion and tenure, which should render
them responsive to the latter’s preferences. Because Nepal’s leaders are elected via free and fair
elections, leaders have both the capacity and incentives to enforce restraint on police. Second, since
government power over the Nepali Army is tenuous, Army commanders have few incentives to
enforce restrain on their personnel, who are likely to continue using extreme repression. I articulate
these as H3 and H4, which are derived from the more general H1 and H2 (designed for country-level
analysis) introduced in Chapter 2:
H3:

Given democratic civilian control over the police, its personnel should have given
up extrajudicial killings following the end of Nepal’s civil war.

H4:

Given the Army’s autonomy, its personnel should have continued to use
extrajudicial killings following the end of Nepal’s civil war.

The Nepal Police and Post-War Human Rights Outcomes
Quantitative measures indicate that political killings declined sharply after Nepal’s civil war
ended in 2006 (see Figure 4.3). Yet, despite ongoing democratization, killings persisted. Not only did
Nepal miss reaching the global FFPK average by 2010, freedom from political killings began to erode
thereafter. Additional qualitative research, however, shows that these abuses have afflicted the
country unevenly. Nearly all known incidents have occurred in the lowland plains which border
India, called the Terai region. The Terai is inhabited by a diverse collection of groups, many of which
share strong ties with communities just across the Indian border. This diverse set of groups, known
collectively as the Madheshis, have been historically marginalized by upper-caste Hindu groups based
in Nepal’s hills region. Since the end of the civil war, Madheshi communities have organized to press
for greater regional autonomy from centralized control and sometimes even independence. Many
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non-Madheshi Nepalese regard this activism as illegitimate and driven largely by foreign (Indian)
political interests.62 Tensions were exacerbated in the autumn of 2015, when the country was still
recovering from a major earthquake that had struck in April. The following October, Terai-based
political groups (with support from CPN-Maoist) blockaded supply routes from India as part of a
political pressure campaign, leading to critical shortages of food, fuel, and medicine in the hills
(“Protests Continue at Nepal-India Border” 4 Oct. 2015).
Though violence never returned to wartime levels (when thousands of disappearances
occurred), local and international human rights groups have documented numerous instances of
extrajudicial killings and lethal crowd-control measures in the Terai since the conflict ended.63 As
recently as March 2017, police dispersed a protest rally by firing on demonstrators in Saptari district,
also in the Terai region, resulting in five deaths (“Amnesty International Report 2017/2018: The
State of the World’s Human Rights” 2018). Most infamously, police killed 47 civilians in August
2015, when the ratification of Nepal’s constitution spurred violent protests by Madheshis who
believed that Nepal’s new federal structure would further marginalize their communities (“Amnesty
International Report: The State of the World’s Human Rights” 2016). Atypically, activists were
responsible for several fatalities among police officers during that round of protests. But several of
the killings documented by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were clearly perpetrated
after demonstrations had been broken up, once police were no longer in danger. In one incident,
police found a 14-year-old protester hiding after his group was fired upon and scattered by police.

On one occasion, a Nepalese acquaintance of mine (from Kathmandu) confused me by referring to
Madheshis as ‘Indians’ during a conversation. They had to clarify for me that they were speaking about
Nepalese citizens, not Indian nationals.
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Extrajudicial executions are often reported as ‘fake encounters’ in which police kill victims after detaining
them and subsequently claim to have killed the victims in self-defense.
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Constables pulled the youth from his hiding spot, restrained him, and then shot him to death in view
of onlookers (Thapa and Adams 2016).
Contemporary violence in the Terai appears to be a direct legacy of the 1996-2006 conflict.
As previously discussed, police personnel had become thoroughly demoralized by their experiences
conducting a counter-insurgency campaign. By the end of the second Jan Andolan, they had in fact
largely withdrawn from Nepal’s rural areas in the Terai (where much of the heaviest fighting had
occurred). Because the Army had also withdrawn (back to their barracks), the state’s public security
apparatus was simply absent, creating a power vacuum. Seeking to fill this vacuum, the Maoists
(largely sequestered in their cantonments until 2008) deployed cadres of the Young Communist
League (YCL), a group into which many of their officially demobilized fighters were clandestinely
channeled. But the YCL was unable to consolidate its hold on power before dozens of armed local
Madheshi groups also emerged, often mobilized by small parochial political parties. Fighting between
these groups for control over territory and local governance institutions generated hundreds of
fatalities between 2007-2009 (Adhikari 2014).
The UN’s peacekeeping operation in Nepal (the United Nations Mission in Nepal,
abbreviated UNMIN) reported regularly on the Terai’s state of lawlessness. Its periodic reports note
how Nepal Police personnel were soon drawn into the conflicts between non-state groups. Linkages
between police and local party bosses grew, leading to, “Widespread impunity for those who break
the law, especially if they are aligned to political parties or blocs” (“Report of the Secretary-General
on the Request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in Support of Its Peace Process” 2008, 13).
Meanwhile, when police did operate in the Terai, they continued to use practices which had become
common during the Maoist conflict. ‘Encounter killings,’ incidents in which police falsely claim to
have killed suspected insurgents in self-defense, persisted. The UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights in Nepal (OHCHR-Nepal) documented dozens of incidents of probable
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extrajudicial killings (culminating in 57 fatalities) between 2008 and July 2010, likely an undercount.
Notably, all but two of these killings occurred within the Terai (“Investigating Allegations of ExtraJudicial Killings in the Terai: OHCHR-Nepal Summary of Concerns” 2010).
At the urging of UNMIN, Nepal’s central government began to expand its security presence
in the Terai in July 2009, largely by recruiting more police constables and deploying them to
peripheral areas (“Report of the Secretary-General on the Request of Nepal for United Nations
Assistance in Support of Its Peace Process” 2010). By 2010, the police had made significant progress
extending its presence into the Terai and establishing security, but local Madheshi rights groups
charged that police continued to use extrajudicial executions or the threat of violence against civilians
in some cases (Hazen 2011). Eventually, these reports began to dwindle but rights groups continued
to document sporadic executions or lethal crowd control measures into the late 2010s (as previously
discussed).
After surveying available evidence of police behavior in the wake of the Maoist conflict, two
patterns of behavior become clear. First, within the Terai, police did not give up the use of lethal
practices. One respondent [ES], who had been a CPN-Maoist cadre before integrating into the
Nepali Army officer corps, characterized police methodology there as a continuation of conflict-era
counterinsurgency strategy. Though they have become less prevalent in recent years, killings remain
firmly integrated into constables’ repertoires. However, the nearly complete absence of killings
outside the Terai is also important, indicating regional variation in post-conflict police practices.
Thus, the empirical record is broadly consistent with H3 throughout much of Nepal, but not within
the Terai. This finding suggests that there are limits to the extent democratic regimes can control
rank-and-file security forces, even when high-ranking commanders are responsive to their
preferences. I explore this inference in greater depth subsequently, in the analysis section.
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The Nepali Army and Post-War Human Rights Outcomes
Where the Nepal Police continued employing lethal practices after the Maoist conflict
(though confining their use to the Terai), the Army abandoned killings altogether. To my knowledge,
no human rights organization (from international groups like Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch, OHCHR-Nepal or local groups like INSEC and the Advocacy Forum) has attributed any
extrajudicial killing (or legitimate encounter death) to the Army since the end of the conflict. The
proximate cause is obvious: As many respondents pointed out, the Army withdrew its soldiers back
to their barracks and bases after the 2006 Jan Andolan, distancing troops from citizens while on-duty.
The Army’s adoption of restraint is inconsistent with H4, posing a challenge to my
argument. However, as I explained in Chapter 2, I do not expect all autonomous security forces to
continue perpetrating killings — it is possible that incentives for restraint arise independent of
civilian leaders’ preferences or their capacity to control security forces. In the following section, I
show that this is exactly what happened in Nepal. More specifically, the Nepali Army benefits
substantially (in several ways) from its relationship with the international community. Because liberal
norms against human rights abuse have become quite important to the international system in recent
decades, the Nepali Army cannot commit such abuse without jeopardizing this relationship. This, I
will argue, is an important driver of the Army’s restraint and its satisfaction with the status quo.

Discussion
As the previous paragraphs show, H3 is only partially supported (depending on one’s
regional focus) while H4 is wholly unsupported. In the following paragraphs, I discuss how these
findings reflect on my theoretical logic, going beyond hypothesis-testing to dig into the processes and
dynamics that produced these findings. Ultimately, I argue that the behavior of the Nepal Police
broadly supports my argument, even as Terai-based repression demonstrates that civilian control
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over high-ranking commanders does not always translate to control over rank-and-file agents,
especially in politically unstable and physically insecure locations. The Nepali Army, on the other
hand, demonstrates that not all autonomous security institutions will forgo restraint; consistent with
my probabilistic argument, circumstances can arise which incentivize good behavior. The rise and
prevalence of liberal norms in the international system provides one such circumstance, though the
Nepali Army may be uniquely sensitive to it.

Explaining Police Violence in the Terai
In the case of the Nepal Police, civilian leaders have clearly controlled the NP’s chain of
command since at least the onset of democratization, choosing its leaders and intervening in
disciplinary procedures at will. By virtue of this control, a democratically elected government should
presumably have compelled its law enforcement officers to adopt restraint, even if those officers had
previously accustomed themselves to wielding violence with impunity. This expectation is borne out
throughout most of Nepal, but not in the Terai where killings have persisted. How can these killings
be explained?
The coercive response logic (Davenport 2007) supplies a straightforward alternative
explanation, predicting increased repression wherever political opposition emerges to challenge the
political status quo. The movement for Madheshi autonomy and independence has posed the only
threat to Nepal’s constitutional order and territorial integrity since the end of the Maoist conflict.64 It
follows, therefore, that the new democratic government would treat the Terai (the locus of
resistance) differently from the rest of the country, encouraging local police to use more violence

Strictly speaking, a small Maoist splinter group, the Biplav faction, has also constituted a challenge to the
constitutional order since early 2019.
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than would be permitted elsewhere. Though parsimonious, this interpretation is flawed. Specifically,
it overlooks indications that violence in the Terai does not occur by design of the national
government in Kathmandu. In fact, political instability appears to have badly disrupted the
government’s administrative control of police in the region, exacerbating principal-agent problems
and permitting an unwelcome level of violence.
The power vacuum and general lawlessness in the Terai after the Maoist war bears
reconsideration. Both UNMIN reports and local human rights defenders describe a dangerous
struggle between parochial political parties far from the oversight of the central government, a
struggle in which local police officers played only ancillary roles. In fact, deaths due to police actions
likely made up only a minority of all documented killings in the 2007-2009 period — non-state forces
(as opposed to either police in the Terai or their administrators in Kathmandu) were largely
responsible for the violence (“Report of the Secretary-General on the Request of Nepal for United
Nations Assistance in Support of Its Peace Process” 2009). Killings finally declined after 2010, the
year in which the government began expanding its security presence in the Terai, implementing the
Special Security Plan at the urging of UNMIN. These observations would seem to reveal a gap in
both the government65 and the Nepal Police’s administrative control over the personnel deployed to
these areas. Rather than deliberately applying violence to counteract political challengers, the
government seems to have largely ignored the region until prompted to assert itself by the
international community.66 Local police forces, it seems, had substantial autonomy from their
highest-ranking commanders, and conducted themselves as they saw fit.

Here ‘government’ refers first to the Maoist-led administration that ruled after the 2008 election, and then
the UML-led administration that ruled in the wake of Prachanda’s 2009 ouster.
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Legislators and executives might easily have been distracted from events in the periphery by intense
constitutional wrangling and political jockeying in the capital.
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One finding from the OHCHR-Nepal’s 2010 report is especially revealing: When police
executed suspected militants or criminals, they often did so because they anticipated that local civilian
authorities would intervene in their investigations to protect suspects connected to local political
parties. Police executed these suspects in the field, therefore, to preempt political interference in
police work they, themselves, saw as legitimate (OHCHR-Nepal 2010, 6 p). This phenomenon
epitomizes the concept of sortition practices, in which security agents rely on their own judgement
and initiative to cull the body politic of dissidents. This strongly contradicts the claim that police
violence in the Terai was deployed by the state as part of a strategic response to unrest. Rather, the
police appear to have taken advantage of the centralized state’s inability to monitor their actions,
either to integrate themselves into politicized organized crime networks or combat those networks.
I have argued that security commanders’ autonomy poses the greatest barrier to ending
extrajudicial executions — when a regime with incentives to curb killings has control over its security
forces, killings abate. I also proposed that control over a security apparatus entails controlling the
senior officers who lead those security forces. When commanders’ professional success depends on
civilian approval, they find ways to prevent subordinates from perpetrating atrocities. Nepal’s Terai
region shows that this dynamic does not always play out smoothly, especially for security forces
working in areas of political instability or physical insecurity. And yet, it is important not to lose sight
of the fact that the Nepali Police largely abandoned killings outside of the Terai, as my argument
would predict. Furthermore, the government addressed violence in the Terai by increasing its security
presence, a strategy which achieved some success. Had the government made this choice while
lacking control of its police commanders, killings might easily have increased rather than declined.
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Explaining the Army’s Restraint
After the fall of the Marcos regime in the Philippines, the armed forces leveraged their
autonomy to escalate their counterinsurgency against the leftist NPA guerillas, reversing President
Corazon Aquino’s attempts to negotiate the conflict peacefully. In Argentina, the military
orchestrated a coup to sort its citizens on a massive scale, killing tens of thousands of militants and
civilians, alike. The military government, or Proceso, kept up these efforts years after driving the
underground into exile — benefitting from mass looting and extortion all the while. Why, then, did
the Nepal Army remain in its barracks after 2006, removing its personnel from opportunities to sort
civilians? The question is vexing since persistent violence and insecurity in the Terai would have
presented a plausible justification for redeployment. The question is vexing, also, because the Army
had proved itself to have substantial autonomy. Had it decided to deploy, even without the support
of civilian executives, it might easily have incurred no official retaliation. The answer, I argue, lies in
the fact that the Nepali Army was and remains sensitive to its reputation with the international
community. Furthermore, it benefited significantly from the post-war settlement, disincentivizing the
use of any behavior that might jeopardize the new status quo.
A motif emerged from my interviews with Army officers, who all used Realist logic to frame
Nepal’s vulnerable position in the international system. They anticipate growing tensions between
India and China and assume that Nepal will have to carefully balance between those rising powers to
maintain its autonomy and security. Assessing Nepal’s strategic future, BN, one of the country’s
highest-ranking generals (retired) framed the issue as an existential matter for the country and the
Army. For elites in the security forces like BN, optimizing Nepal’s ability to survive in the future
depends on Nepal’s international standing at a time when international reputations depend on
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respect for democracy and human rights.67 Accruing a reputation for human rights abuse would
threaten that standing, turning Nepal into (as several respondents noted) a pariah state like Myanmar,
inviting disaster.
Simply put, the Nepali Army’s fear of international isolation disincentivizes illiberal or
authoritarian behaviors. Its geo-strategic logic, therefore, helps account for the Army’s withdrawal
from public spaces despite its autonomy from civilian control. But several other factors further
incentive this withdrawal, especially the lure of UN peacekeeping contracts. Nepalese security forces
have regularly participated in UN peacekeeping operation since the 1950s (Bhattarai 2013).
Opportunities to deploy on these missions are extremely important to officers who not only acquire
valuable training and experience (facilitating promotion), but also earn significantly more money than
their baseline salaries provide (Gaibulloev et al. 2015). The Army (as well as domestic human rights
activists) learned that allegations of human rights abuse jeopardize its access to peacekeeping
deployments (for both accused individuals and the institution as a whole) when local NGOs began
petitioning the UN to vet Nepalese officers before deploying them to peacekeeping missions. Several
officers were repatriated as a result of these petitions. MK, a human rights activist whose
organization submitted several successful petitions reflected on the security forces’ angry reaction.
That anger, he explained, indicated how effective this tactic had been (00:42:00). Another activist,
DL, pointed out that Ian Martin, the head of UNMIN, had also used the Army’s dependence on
peacekeeping opportunities to push for a faster democratization process (as per the 2006 CPA).
Where MK had sought to target individual officers, Martin made an official recommendation that the
UN begin vetting all officers (a recommendation that was never implemented).

BN’s linkage of commitment to liberal norms and international respectability in 2019 is interesting (and
encouraging) given the recent erosion of the international human rights regime.
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The international community can do more than withdraw benefits from security forces
accused of violating human rights norms. Many actors have the capacity to inflict harsh sanctions on
officers accused of abuse, as happened to Nepali Army Colonel Kumar Lama. While on leave in the
UK from a UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, British authorities arrested Lama in 2013,
charging him with two counts of ordering detainees tortured during the Maoist conflict (“Nepal
Torture Charge Colonel Kumar Lama Cleared” 6 Sept. 2016). Lama was eventually acquitted in 2016,
but only after three years of legal proceedings that derailed his work for the UN. Lama’s arrest
signaled a sustained international interest in investigating war crimes allegations and pursuing
individual officers. This reverberated throughout Nepal’s political parties and security institutions,
causing many to reappraise the risk of travelling to Western countries (or doing business with
Western firms) which adhere to universal jurisdiction, or the legal philosophy that serious crimes
perpetrated abroad can be prosecuted in domestic courts. Reflecting on this, GP (a retired general)
explained that Nepali officials would be hard pressed to resist pressure from the Hague, referencing
both the International Criminal Court (ICC) and diffuse pressure to adhere to international
standards.
International liberal norms remain a potent force in Nepalese society, as many active
politicians (from both sides of the war) have been implicated in wartime rights violations of varying
severity. Rival politicians and human rights activists often call attention to these allegations —
sometimes even calling for truth and reconciliation commissions — to embarrass or pressure the
accused during political disputes or bargaining sessions. CPN-Maoist’s recruitment of child soldiers,
for instance, has left many former Maoists particularly vulnerable (Bhattarai 2020, 114-115). In
response to growing pressure to fully implement transitional justice mechanisms,68 Prachanda (who

The comprehensive peace agreement that ended the civil war stipulated a robust transitional justice process
that has yet to be fully implemented.
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remains active in politics) lashed out rhetorically against the ICC in 2019, saying, “I'll emerge a global
hero if I am dragged to the Hague” (“‘I’ll Become Global Hero If Dragged to The Hague’” 30 July
2019). But Prachanda’s outburst stirred up domestic backlash, indicating a vulnerability. LB, a human
rights lawyer, dismissed Prachanda’s claim as bravado, insisting he sees himself as being at risk of
isolation and perhaps even prosecution. Presumably, these same fears prey on less well-known Police
and Army officers also accused of perpetrating violations during the conflict.
The international community has clearly incentivized (with both carrots and sticks) the
Army’s withdrawal from the field. But the Army benefits in other ways from the current status quo,
especially by executing aid-funded development projects. The Army has had a hand in activities like
road construction since prior to the Maoist conflict. But its involvement became much more
substantial after 2009, the year in which the moderate political parties forged a coalition with the
Army to deflect Prachanda’s efforts to tame the military. As a result of that bargain, politicians
coopted the Army into corruption schemes, principally by skimming and sharing international aid
earmarked for development and other projects. HL (a retired general) explained that, “They [political
parties] are using the military to make money- through development,” synopsizing the view shared by
nearly all my respondents. This partnership is especially effective because Nepalese anti-corruption
agencies lack legal instruments to investigate Army personnel (even after retirement), helping to
conceal the misappropriation and embezzlement.69 In this sense, it is clear that autonomous security
institutions are not always in competition with civilian politicians.
If the Nepali Army failed to win the civil war, it has done exceedingly well for itself in
peacetime. It’s benefitted immensely from participating in UN peacekeeping operations and from its
access to international aid. To retain access to these streams of revenue and status, the Army needs

Though Army officers are usually exempt from official investigations, Nepalese journalists often report on
the unlikely wealth accrued by top-ranking civilian and military leaders, a fact noted by many respondents.
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only to refrain from perpetrating human rights violations or obviously undermining liberal
democratic norms. This, I suggest, is key to understanding why the Nepali Army adopted restraint
despite its autonomy from civilian politicians. Without the close involvement of the international
community in Nepal’s post-conflict history, and without access to UN peacekeeping missions, the
Army might easily have redeployed to the Terai and elsewhere, where its soldiers would presumably
have resorted to citizen-sortition. Without international pressure, the Army might never have
withdrawn to its barracks at all.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have leveraged an in-depth case study to test my argument that security
apparatus autonomy poses an important barrier to reducing extrajudicial killings after conflict
termination. This qualitative approach significantly augmented quantitative findings presented in
Chapter 3, which focused on country-level data. Using a mix of elite interviews and historical
research, I have shown that Nepal’s two primary security institutions, the Nepal Police and Nepali
Army, emerged from the conflict with different levels of autonomy from civilian control — Police
commanders were wholly subordinate to government authority while the Army was not. On balance,
the behavior of the Nepal Police provides confirmatory evidence: individual officers adopted
restraint throughout most of the country, but less so where lingering insecurity interfered with the
regime’s (and senior police commanders’) ability to monitor rank-and-file officers.
The Nepali Army behaved somewhat unexpectedly since it adopted restraint despite
possessing substantial autonomy. This does not directly contradict my argument, which
acknowledges the possibility that incentives to adopt restraint, regardless of the government’s
preferences or capacity, might arise in any given case. In Nepal, these incentives arose from the
Nepal Army’s reliance (in several respects) on the international community, which renders the
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institution vulnerable to allegations of human rights abuse. This finding helps to show that eroding a
security institution’s autonomy is not a strictly necessary step along the path to mitigating killings.
However, it is unclear whether this finding is generalizable. Few other militaries (especially in a postcontentious political context) are likely to derive as much benefit from UN peacekeeping operations
and implementing aid-funded development schemes as the Nepali Army. Nor would these pressure
points be salient for human rights outcomes in other eras when human rights norms were less
important to the international community.
One of the most important take-aways from this study of Nepal is the importance of subnational complexity. I have already critiqued existing human rights research for treating the state as a
unitary actor in which regime leaders order an obedient security apparatus to produce a desired level
of repression. In reality, security forces often have the means to ignore or contravene legal orders
(see Chapter 2), producing human rights outcomes at odds with a regime’s actual or presumed
preferences. In truth, the security apparatus itself does not always function as a unitary actor. Its
constituent agencies can have separate chains of command which do not necessarily share the same
preferences. Moreover, these agencies might emerge from an episode of conflict or democratization
with varying levels of autonomy (as occurred in Nepal) and go on to perpetrate varying levels of
repression. With access to more disaggregated data on security forces, quantitative analyses would
likely produce more predictive models. Regrettably, these improvements must wait for the creation
of new datasets.70
Finally, I have argued that a civilian government’s best means of controlling rank-and-file
security agents is by controlling their high-ranking commanders. If Nepal helps to validate this
argument, it also helps to show its limitations and, again, underscores the importance of sub-national

70One

exception is DeBruin’s (2019) dataset on counterweights, though insufficient coverage renders that
dataset insufficient for my purposes here.
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variation. In the Terai, the difficulty of monitoring security agents’ actions meant that control over
high-ranking commanders could not itself produce restraint, as happened outside of the Terai. There,
the state’s near institutional absence provided local police officers with greater leeway to sort citizens,
which is exactly what they did. This finding shows that, as a state’s organizational capacity varies
geographically, so will its ability to restrain its security agents.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
I have set out to explore the puzzling observation that democratization does not always curb
severe human rights abuse such as extrajudicial executions and disappearances. This observation is
difficult to account for with existing theories of human rights abuse, which focus on leaders and their
rationally or ideologically derived preferences. Democratization does not, I argue, completely reset a
country’s institutional framework, creating a tabula rasa on which leaders may enact preferred policies
at will. Rather, democratic regimes must often work within the constraints of institutional legacies.
Critically, democratizers often inherit security institutions that are both autonomous, or free from
civilian control, and used to using violence to maintain order and defend the country. Leaders in
these situations will find themselves with little agency. As a result, audience costs and other
mechanisms that should incentivize leaders to curb abuse will do little good — leaders will not be
able to act on these incentives. Simply put, autonomous security institutions tend to hinder the
process of ending political killings, and this autonomy must usually be overcome before security
forces adopt restraint. This logic applies to autocratic leaders, as well, who often have incentives to
mitigate repression and face the same dilemmas.

Summary of Findings and Future Research Directions
I began this dissertation by developing an argument with the help of two theory building
cases: the tumultuous transitions to democracy in Argentina (1983) and the Philippines (1986). On
one hand, the Philippines case demonstrates how difficult it can be for a democratically elected leader
to reign in a security apparatus that is powerfully equipped, broadly popular, and sees mass violence
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as the solution to lingering dissent and violent opposition. On the other, Argentina shows us how
quickly and thoroughly a democratic government can establish respect for human rights when public
support for the security apparatus has fallen precipitously. This gives rise to the argument that
security apparatus autonomy likely plays an important role in human rights outcomes in the
aftermath of contentious politics. This insight powerfully augments existing explanations for human
rights abuse, which focus on explaining leaders’ incentives to protect or violate rights. Leaders’
incentives are less relevant when leaders lack the agency to implement them.
After building my argument, I drew on several statistical techniques to test whether it can
explain patterns of behavior across the post-WWII world. Indeed, a set of survival analyses revealed
a negative association between security apparatus autonomy and the mitigation of political killings in
the long-term, corroborating the argument. I then leveraged Bayesian modelling averaging in addition
to frequentists linear and logistic models, finding that autonomy also associates with mitigation in the
short-term, only five years after conflict terminations. Finally, I selected a confirmatory case study
with which to subject my large-n findings to more rigorous hypothesis testing. Drawing on historical
research and dozens of interviews with elites, I explored Nepal’s 2008 transition to democracy, which
capped a decade of civil war and a large civil resistance campaign. That research corroborated the
central claims of my argument, showing that many of the same security forces who had perpetrated
atrocities during the war were prevented from continuing to do so by commanders who were
themselves constrained by elected civilian authorities.
If findings from Nepal broadly corroborate my argument, they also show that there are
limits to regime leaders’ control over rank-and-file security personnel, even when commanders owe
their careers to civilian authorities. In areas of high insecurity and low government infrastructure, for
instance, agents will have the leeway to ignore policies and wield violence as they see fit. Additionally,
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these territories may be politically marginal to regime leaders, whose time and attention tend to be
taken up by politics in the capital.
My research also shows that security apparatus autonomy does not guarantee the persistence
of severe abuse. Despite its substantial autonomy from civilian control, the Nepali Army adopted
restraint after the end of the civil war due largely to concerns that human rights allegations would
harm its international reputation. This, in turn, would jeopardize its access to UN peacekeeping
deployments, which are extremely valuable opportunities for career officers and soldiers. A damaged
reputation would also make it more difficult for the country to attract international security partners,
a means of deterring heavy-handed meddling from India and aggression from China, Nepal’s much
larger neighbors.
The finding that security apparatus autonomy is so important to human rights outcomes
leads naturally to the question, how do security apparatuses acquire autonomy in the first place and
how do they sustain it? The authoritarian control literature (Greitens 2016; Svolik 2012) hints at the
importance of leaders’ threat perceptions, and whether they coup-proof their security forces or build
them up to defend against mass movements. In all probability, however, there are many paths toward
autonomy. One path lies in the cultivation of popular legitimacy, the loss of which played an
important role in the collapse of the military regime in Argentina. The variables I employed to carry
out statistical analyses in Chapter 3 indicate only whether military commanders have the power to
oust civilian leaders without violence, signaling that autonomy has been achieved. These variables
reveal nothing, however, about the nature of that autonomy or whether different security apparatuses
can be usefully categorized by the sources of their power.
More generally, data constraints pose one of the biggest challenges to statistical analyses of
human rights abuse and civilian control over security institutions. On one hand, measures of human
rights abuse are aggregated to the country level. On the other, data sources focus on the relationship
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between regimes and their militaries, excluding security institutions such as police. This is
problematic because both military and non-military security forces can commit human rights abuse,
and civilian rulers’ control over security forces can vary between different institutions. For instance,
my fieldwork in Nepal shows that abuse is concentrated in a single region of the country (the Terai
region) and that, while civilian control over police forces elsewhere tends to be quite strong, control
over military forces is tenuous. If such subnational variation occurs across cases, statistical analyses
may yield misleading conclusions. Quantitative analyses, while valuable, must therefore be interpreted
with caution and supplemented with case studies.
To address the quantitative challenge described above, I hope to extend this research into a
nested case study design (Liberman 2005) in the future, adding the prospective case of Indonesia and
a more granular study of the Philippines. These cases followed surprisingly different trajectories,
despite similar geographies, alliance networks, political economies, and facing multiple insurgencies.
Indonesia drastically improved its human rights record following the onset of gradual
democratization in the late 1990s despite a history of severe (even genocidal) state repression.
Contrariwise, the human rights situation in the Philippines barely improved after President Marcos
was force into exile in 1986. Indeed, the election of Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 precipitated a new wave
of abuse. Research into these cases can help show that my theorized causal mechanisms — as
opposed to confounders like selection effects — underpin the systematic correlations identified in
my quantitative analyses.
In the final paragraphs, I expand on my findings, using them to shed light on broader issues
in international relations and the ways in which scholars study them.
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Liberal Internationalism Still Has Teeth
After the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed a precipitous rise in respect for human
rights (Fariss 2014; Coppedge et al. 2019), a move due at least partially to increasingly robust
international norms around the subject. Political leaders’ legitimacy, even amongst local constituents,
often became tied to their conformity with these norms. Thus, human rights advocates have looked
on with increasing alarm at the recent global wave of democratic reversals and the potential
unravelling of international liberalism (see, for instance, Ikenberry 2018). Will these developments
weaken restraints on politicians who might otherwise turn to repression? The case of Nepal provides
limited reassurance that these norms still run deep in some places, shaping ideas about legitimacy and
imposing costs on actors who ignore them (or who have ignored them in the past).
By the time I arrived in Kathmandu in 2019, the Trump administration had spent three years
signaling diminished American interest in holding foreign governments accountable for human rights
violations. Despite this, my interviewees treated human rights abuse as a serious subject, as discussed
in depth in Chapter 4. The gravity of the subject is due, in part, to some elites’ fears of being singled
out and punished by the international community for crimes perpetrated during the 1996-2006 civil
war. But beyond the question of individual culpability, Nepal’s top military leaders clearly see
conformity with human rights norms as a significant strategic asset and nonconformity as a liability.
In other words, liberal internationalism remains an important factor for policymaking audiences in
Nepal. Elites there seem to have ignored President Trump’s rhetoric, perhaps gambling that liberal
internationalism retains a strong enough foothold on the global stage to survive into the foreseeable
future.
In fact, beyond incorporating human rights norms into their logics of consequences, many
Nepali elites and security agents appear to have internalized them. This may be due, in part, to the
ubiquitous human rights training courses that nearly all military and law enforcement personnel must
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complete. When asked whether these trainings are mere lip service, human rights monitors
consistently judged that security forces took them seriously, even though the trainings alone would
not eliminate abuse. These trainings are likely part of a broader discourse which Nepali elites have
institutionalized, at the urging of both local advocates and international bodies like the UN, since the
establishment of democracy in 2008. These institutions appear to be reproducing themselves,
perhaps accounting for elites’ sustained interest in human rights within Nepal despite waning interest
abroad. If liberal internationalism is more resilient than some commentators fear, this resilience may
emanate from relatively small countries like Nepal that have come to value — and act on — civil
liberties and human rights.

The Line Between War and Peace is a Fine One
In his epic poem the Aeneid (quoted at the beginning of Chapter 1), Virgil personified the
“Frenzy of Civil Strife”71 as a beast that could be literally shut up behind locked doors (2006, 57).
This device creates a neat, historical divide between pre- and post-imperial Rome — internecine
violence on one side and tranquility on the other. Modern political leaders have embraced similar
language at times, as Nelson Mandela’s inaugural speech as President of South Africa illustrates: “We
enter into a covenant… in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall,
without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity — a rainbow
nation at peace with itself and the world” (May 1994). In reality, Mandela’s aspirational rhetoric was
never completely achieved. Despite impressive strides, South Africa, like Nepal and the Philippines,
failed to eliminate political killings. Unfortunately, the legacies of contention appear to bleed across
the boundaries of political transitions and military victories, sometimes despite leaders’ best efforts.

71

More literally, “impious rage.”
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In other words, though many countries manage to hobble the beast of Civil Strife, very few
completely encage it behind locked doors. Human rights advocates (both locals and foreigners)
should be mindful of this and avoid being lulled into complacency by symbolic breaks with the past.

Political Leaders and Security Forces Have Different Incentives
Traditionally, state repression scholars have studied their subject by focusing on states’
attributes, or sometimes treating repression as the product of a two-player game between regimes
and resistance movements. Observations from Argentina, Nepal, and the Philippines suggest that
these approaches are oversimplifications, primarily because the state is assumed to be a unitary actor.
This assumption is particularly problematic in the wake of conflict terminations, after conflict
processes sometimes transmute states into patchworks of diverse actors and institutions with
competing interests and varying levels of agency. Sometimes incumbent leaders stave off challengers,
but only by shaking up existing security institutions. Alternatively, new leaders can rise to power only
to find themselves saddled with an inherited and hostile security apparatus. In all cases, the individual
police officers, soldiers, and dissidents who carry out suppression and resistance will undergo
potentially transformative experiences. These can reshape their attitudes about politics, justice, and
outgroups. Security agents may, as a result, become much more likely to buck or flout their political
leaders, whoever they turn out to be.
How should such a constellation of actors and structures be studied? At the very least,
scholars should continue the recent trend of disaggregating regimes and their security forces. More
generally, scholars would do well to treat states as complex systems — ones that have, “Evolved”, as
Thomas Oatley writes, “Over time as a consequence of the actions and interactions of the actors that
inhabit [them]” (2019, 959). I am not insisting that states can never be treated as unitary actors,
especially in the context of international relations, where political, social, and military elites’ interests
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are often aggregated. Within countries, however, different contingents of agents sometimes vie with
leaders (and even among themselves) over which political order to establish and by what means. To
explain why a particular order emerges to generate low or high abuse, researchers will have to grapple
with this complexity, taking domestic and international structures into account even as they
distinguish between agents and leaders.

Addressing the Limits of Electoral Democratization
Famously, Huntington (1968) warned that not all good things go together — that attempts
to simultaneously democratize a country’s political system and modernize its economic system (for
instance) might undermine one another, implying that some good things must be sacrificed for
others. In one sense, this dissertation reproduces the empirical pattern Huntington described —
democratization does not always coincide with the end of human rights abuse. Does this mean that
one must be sacrificed for the other? Clearly not, but this observation does show that policymakers
and human rights advocates cannot rely on the former to produce the latter, as is often optimistically
implied. Elections are not the panacea human rights advocates might justifiably wish for, especially
when a country’s security forces are well-equipped and enjoy popular legitimacy. Human rights
advocates, therefore, must take this into account when designing or prescribing policies to diminish
violations. To protect citizens’ physical integrity rights, political leaders’ authority over security agents
will sometimes need to be built up.
Even in optimal scenarios where a newly elected government has control over its security
commanders, insecurity and poor physical infrastructure can erode control over rank-and-file agents,
facilitating continued abuse. In these cases, governments must amass the political and material
resources necessary to increase monitoring in these areas. Nepal’s recent history confirms that this is
possible, especially when international actors like UN officials pressure regimes into taking these
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steps. International actors might easily facilitate this difficult and costly process by providing targeted
aid. Even when governments fail to make important large-scale investments, however, international
observers might deter individual agents from perpetrating abuse by documenting their activities. If
concealment permits agents to perpetrate abuses without facing repercussions, then monitoring
activities are likely to be effective deterrents of abuse.
At least one additional policy implication emerges from my research: Military aid might
undermine efforts to promote human rights abuse. This warrants serious consideration since
developed countries like the United States often help fledgling democracies (Ruby and Gibler 2010)
by providing material support or training to their militaries. While well-intentioned, my research
indicates that any support to a country’s military could alter the balance of power between elected
leaders and military commanders, possibly reducing the latter’s dependence on the former. Should
this occur, civilian leaders could lose the leverage they need to enforce human rights standards,
creating a barrier to ending human rights abuse.
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Appendix: Qualitative Research Data and IRB Protocols
This appendix provides detailed information about the field research I conducted in Nepal,
previously presented in Chapter 4. Most importantly, it explains data collection and storage
protocols, consent procedures, and information about Institutional Review Board (IRB) certification.
Fieldwork was conducted between August 15 and September 21, 2019 within Kathmandu,
Nepal’s capital city. There I interviewed a total of 42 adult respondents in English, according to preapproved IRB protocols (#1446309). To procure informed oral consent, I made a project information sheet
available (see Exhibit A) to all subjects, drawing on it to verbally outline my research goals, my expectations for
the interview, the fact that subjects would not be compensated, and highlighting each respondent’s capacity to
decline to be interviewed or withdraw at any time. Similarly, I acquired consent before turning on an audio
recording device. For respondents’ protection, I made them aware that I would never ask them to recount
instances of human rights violations with which they were personally involved (either as perpetrators or
victims). This rule was intended to avoid either triggering emotional anguish or creating a record of criminal
culpability.
To ensure the confidentiality of my respondents, I stored encrypted audio recordings on my password
protected mobile phone before uploading them to a password protected folder in University of Denver cloud
storage space. Handwritten notes were digitized and uploaded with similar procedures before being destroyed.
Respondents could also opt for deidentification, in which case I avoided referring to them by name in my
notes. Respondents were also made aware that, though I would treat data as confidential, hacking and other
events are always a possibility. In other words, breaches of confidentiality could not be completely ruled out. I
will destroy all data no later than three years after the submission of this manuscript.
To maintain their anonymity, I refer to respondents in this manuscript only with pseudonymous
initials assigned arbitrarily. To avoid either misconstruing responses or accidentally identifying interviewees, I
followed up with them and acquired explicit permission before using any direct quote.

To recruit subjects, I relied heavily on the Nepal Peacebuilding Institute (NPI), a local NGO
with an established record of facilitating international research efforts in Nepal. NPI staff helped me
to connect with Nepal Army officers, police commanders, politicians, human rights experts, and
other elites. Many of these respondents connected me to additional research subjects. To avoid
relying too heavily on the snowball method (which can sometimes narrow a researcher’s perspective
in ways that are difficult to detect), I also used neighbors and acquaintances to find additional
recruits. One neighbor, for instance, introduced me to their supervisor, ES, an INGO worker. I also
reached out to organizations whose offices I discovered during my many trips across Kathmandu.
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When conducting interviews, I relied on a semi-structured methodology, using two standard
questionnaires (one for security elites and one for all others) to solicit responses and broach different
topics (see Exhibit B). The questions were open-ended and designed to elicit subject’s impressions
about the political establishment and security forces’ behavior and priorities before, during, and after
the 1996-2006 civil war (which ended in democratization). Depending on each subject’s experiences
and interest I dropped or focused on different questions. I often pursued new lines of inquiry when
appropriate, frequently asking interviewees to speculate about counterfactuals. For instance, if Prime
Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (better known as Prachanda) had successfully sacked Army Chief
Rookmangud Katawal in 2009 (in fact, the attempt failed, triggering Prachanda’s resignation and the
collapse of his government) what might the Nepal Army’s relationship with civilian rulers look like
today? Interviews lasted between one and two hours and took place in subjects’ homes, offices, or at
a public place (usually a café or restaurant) of their choosing. Exhibit C provides an overview of
interviews.
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Exhibit A: Institutional Review Board Project Information Sheet
Project Title:

Violence After Victory

Principal Investigator:

Christopher Shay
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver (USA)
Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University (USA)

Faculty Sponsor:

Cullen Hendrix
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver (USA)

DU IRB Protocol #:

1446309

Thank you for taking the time to listen to information about this research project on post-conflict
security sector reform in Nepal. I am conducting this as a PhD candidate with the University of
Denver in the United States and as a pre-doctoral fellow with Harvard University. My goal is to
discover more about the specific challenges that accompany security sector reforms (affecting both
police and military agencies) in countries that have experienced armed conflict or episodes of
nonviolent resistance.
As part of my dissertation research, I am conducting interviews with leaders of political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and other civil society groups, as well as police and military leaders. I
would like to understand how civilian and security figures thought about human rights policy and
security sector reform after Nepal’s 2006 transition, and how they might have agreed or disagreed
about which reforms to implement. I am interviewing approximately 50 to 70 individuals in Nepal,
and would like to include as many different points of points of view in the research as possible.
The interview will take about one or two hours to complete (depending on your interest and
availability). I will ask questions about the policies you believed were important to implement after
the 2006 transition and whether human rights protections were important parts of those policies. I
will also ask about challenges to those goals, and how/whether police, military, and civilian leaders
cooperated with one another or disagreed with one another about how to move forward after the
transition. Regarding the interview:
➢ You may choose not to answer any question, and you may end the interview at any time.
➢ I hope that your views will help identify ways to achieve security sector reforms broadly
beneficial to Nepal and other countries facing political transitions.
➢ I will not ask you specific questions about conflict events or your personal experiences in
conflict. Nor will I ask you about any specific incidents of human rights abuse. If any
interview question makes you uncomfortable, you are welcome to skip it, take a pause from
the interview, or end the interview altogether.
➢ I will treat all information you provide as confidential. With your permission, I would like to
audio-record the interview and take notes for my private use. Only I will have access to these
materials. I will not use any direct quotes or identifying information from my notes in
published research without contacting you again for your clear approval. However, you may
ask that I not contact you again.
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➢ I do not think participation in my study is likely to cause you any harm, but you should know
that I cannot be completely sure that my notes and recordings will remain private. I will,
however, work hard to protect them. I will destroy the physical copies of my notes, and secure
all digital data with encryption software. At your request, I will make sure my notes do not
identify you. You can also ask that I not make any notes at all (including recordings).
➢ When the study is complete, I will publish the results as part of my doctoral dissertation,
related research articles, and eventually as a book.
Do you have any questions?
You are welcome to ask me additional questions, and I will answer them to the best of my ability.
You are also welcome to contact me after the interview should new questions arise. If you have
concerns about this project or this interview, you may contact the University of Denver’s
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects directly at +1 303-871-4015 or by
emailing IRBAdmin@du.edu, calling 303-871-4050, or in writing (University of Denver, Office of
Research and Sponsored Programs, 2199 S. University Blvd., Denver, Colorado USA 80208-2121).
Thank you very much for your time and participation. Once I start the interview, I will ask you to
confirm that you would like to participate in the project.
Project Information and Contacts
Principal Investigator:

Christopher Shay
Email: Christopher.Shay@du.edu | Christopher_shay@hks.harvard.edu
Phone: +1 859 492-6349
PhD Candidate | Research Fellow
Sie Cheou-Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy
Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver, USA
Fellow | Project manager
Carr Center for Human Rights Policy
Harvard University, USA

Faculty Sponsor:

Cullen Hendrix
Email: cullen.hendrix@du.edu
Phone: +1 303 871 4732
Director | Professor of International Relations
Sie Cheou-Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy
Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver, USA
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Exhibit B: Interview Questionnaire
Project Title:
Principal Investigator:
Faculty Sponsor:
DU IRB Protocol #:
Version Date:

Violence After Victory
Christopher Shay
Cullen Hendrix
1446309
31 May 2019

Semi-structured Interview Questions
Preface
I am conducting interviews in Nepal because I would like to know more about the leadup and
aftermath of the 2006 transition. There are two things I’m especially interested in. First, I would like
to know whether the 1996-2006 conflict changed security forces and their relationship with civilians
and the government. Second, I would like to know how that relationship changed after the 2006
transition.

Questions for Political [and Social] Elites
1. [Personal background] Can you tell me about your role and experiences during and after the
2006 transition? What were your priorities back then? Did you work very much with police
and military leaders?
a. What were your views about the resistance and opposition?
b. Do you think your perspective on the conflict has changed over time?
2. Do you think the police and military did a good job handling security during the 1996-2006
armed conflict? Did they act professionally and responsibly? In general, are there things you
would have changed about their behavior?
a. How would you compare the police and military to the Maoist resistance fighters?
Did the Maoists behave professionally and responsibly towards civilians who might
not have agreed with their ideology?
3. Do you think the conflict changed the police and military? Did soldiers or police officers
change their behavior, or did their leaders change their priorities over the course of the
conflict?
a. Did the conflict change the Maoists over time? Did fighters’ or leaders’ behavior
and priorities change?
4. How well do you think the police and military worked with the government during the
conflict? Did the nature of their relationship change over time?
a. Do you think the government ever encountered trouble setting policies for police
and military?
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5. How do you think the security forces have changed since the 2006 transition? Has
“democratization” been successful?
a. How would you characterize the relationship between civilian government leaders
and the police and military?
b. How would you characterize the relationship between civil society and police and
military leaders?
c. Did any big changes occur since 2006? What caused them?

Questions for Security Elites
1. [Personal background] Can you tell me about your role and experiences during and after the
2006 transition? What were your priorities back then, and what are they now? Have you
often worked with civilian leaders or civil society leaders?
a. What were your views about the resistance and opposition?
b. Do you think your perspective on the conflict has changed over time?
2. Do you think the police and military did a good job handling security during the 1996-2006
armed conflict? Did they act professionally and responsibly? In general, are there things you
would have changed about their behavior?
a. How would you compare the police and military to the Maoist resistance fighters?
In general, did the Maoists behave professionally and responsibly towards civilians
who might not have agreed with their ideology?
3. Do you think the conflict changed the police and military? Did soldiers or police officers
change their behavior or did the leadership change its priorities over the course of the
conflict?
a. Did the dynamic between the security services and Maoists change over the course
of the conflict?
b. Did the relationship between commanders and their subordinates and
soldiers/constables change over time?
4. How well do you think the police and military worked with the government during the
conflict? Did the nature of their relationship change over time?
a. Did the government ever interfere too much with the security services, making it
harder for security services to achieve their mission?
b. Did security leaders ever disagree with political leaders?
5. How do you think the security forces have changed since the 2006 transition? Do you think
the security forces became better off or worse off?
a. Are they able to provide security for Nepal and its society? Has the government
helped or hindered this mission?
b. How would you characterize the relationship between civilian government leaders
and the police and military since the transition?
c. Did any big changes occur since 2006? What caused them?
164

6. How would you characterize the relationship between civil society and police and military
leaders?
a. Did any big changes occur since 2006? What caused them?
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Exhibit C: List of Interviews
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